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ABSTRACT
Efficiency Gains from Mergers
by Lars-Hendrik Röller, Johan Stennek and Frank Verboven
The purpose of this discussion paper is to contribute to the analysis of two questions.
Should a merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal
mergers, and balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so,
how should a system be designed to account for efficiency gains? The report is divided
into five separate parts. The discussion paper is based on a report to the European
Commission.
To help answer the two questions we start with an extensive review of the relevant
economic research, including both theoretical and empirical work. Next, we review the
current practice in seven O.E.C.D. jurisdictions. Finally, we propose a merger control
system, emphasising the central role of informational limitations.
Based on our conclusions from the empirical literature that efficiencies may need to be
assessed on a case-by-case basis, we construct an information-economising two-stage
decision framework for evaluating mergers. In a first stage, notified mergers are
assessed using routine tools with modest information requirements. Mergers that do not
pass the first stage test are subject to further investigation, including an efficiency
defence.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Effizienzgewinne von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen
Das Diskussionspapier leistet einen Beitrag zur Analyse von zwei wettbewerbspoli-
tischen Fragen: Sollen im Rahmen der Fusionskontrolle Effizienzgewinne horizontaler
Zusammenschlüsse berücksichtigt und den wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Wirkungen
gegenübergestellt werden? Und, falls ja, wie sollten diese Effizienzgewinne im
Kontrollprozess berücksichtigt werden? Grundlage für das Diskussionspapier ist ein
Gutachten, das für die Europäische Kommission erstellt wurde.
Die Untersuchung beginnt mit einer ausführlichen Darstellung der relevanten ökono-
mischen Forschung. Dabei werden sowohl theoretische als auch empirische Arbeiten
berücksichtigt. Anschließend wird die gegenwärtige Praxis der Fusionskontrolle in
sieben OECD-Ländern erörtert. Auf Basis der gewonnenen Erkenntnisse wird
schließlich ein Verfahren für die Analyse von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen
vorgeschlagen.
Das vorgeschlagene Verfahren greift die empirische Erkenntnis auf, daß Effizienz-
gewinne nicht generell aber fallweise von Bedeutung sein können. Es wird ein zwei-
stufiger Entscheidungsprozess entwickelt, um einerseits die Informationskosten gering
zu halten und andererseits die notwendige Präzision des Kontrollverfahrens zu sichern.
In der ersten Stufe des Verfahrens prüfen die Wettbewerbsbehörden angemeldete
Fusionen anhand von Standardkriterien mit geringen Informationsanforderungen. Nur
solche Fusionen, die diesen Test nicht bestehen, werden dann in einer zweiten Stufe
einer genaueren Analyse unterzogen, bei der Effizienzgewinne berücksichtigt werden.
Contents - Overview:
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 6
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................... 8
3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 12
3.1 TYPOLOGIES OF EFFICIENCY GAINS..................................................................................... 12
3.1.1 Rationalisation.......................................................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Economies of Scale (and Scope)................................................................................ 14
3.1.3 Technological Progress............................................................................................. 16
3.1.4 Purchasing Economies .............................................................................................. 18
3.1.5 Slack ......................................................................................................................... 19
3.2 ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS FROM MERGER....................................................................... 22
3.3 WELFARE EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCIES ........................................ 24
3.3.1 Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers .......................................................................... 25
3.3.2 Total Surplus............................................................................................................. 30
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE...................................................................................................... 35
4.1 OVERALL COMPANY PERFORMANCE ................................................................................... 36
4.1.1 Effects of Mergers on Profits..................................................................................... 36
4.1.2 Effects of Mergers on Share Prices............................................................................ 39
4.1.3 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 41
4.2 DISENTANGLING MARKET POWER AND COST REDUCTIONS .................................................. 43
4.2.1 Effects of Mergers on Product Prices ........................................................................ 43
4.2.2 Effects of Mergers on Market Shares......................................................................... 47
4.2.3 Effects of Mergers on Outsiders’ Share Prices .......................................................... 48
4.2.4 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 49
4.3 STUDIES OF EFFICIENCY GAINS AND PASS-ON...................................................................... 50
4.3.1 Effects of Mergers on Productivity ............................................................................ 50
4.3.2 Effects of Mergers on Innovation............................................................................... 52
4.3.3 Pass-on ..................................................................................................................... 52
4.3.4 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 53
4.4 DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................................................... 53
5. EFFICIENCY DEFENCES IN PRACTICE.......................................................................... 56
5.1 UNITED STATES ................................................................................................................. 57
5.1.1 The Clayton Act ........................................................................................................ 57
5.1.2 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.............................................. 57
5.1.3 Federal Court Cases ................................................................................................. 61
5.2 CANADA............................................................................................................................ 64
5.2.1 The Competition Act.................................................................................................. 64
5.2.2 Merger Enforcement Guidelines................................................................................ 64
5.2.3 Tribunal and Court Cases ......................................................................................... 66
5.3 EUROPEAN UNION.............................................................................................................. 66
5.3.1 The Merger Regulation ............................................................................................. 66
5.3.2 Commission Cases..................................................................................................... 68
5.3.3 Court Cases .............................................................................................................. 70
5.3.4 Efficiency Gains under Article 85 (now 81) ............................................................... 70
5.4 FRANCE............................................................................................................................. 71
5.4.1 Ordonnance No. 86-1286 .......................................................................................... 71
5.4.2 Cases ........................................................................................................................ 73
5.5 GERMANY ......................................................................................................................... 75
5.6 SWEDEN ............................................................................................................................ 76
5.6.1 The Competition Act.................................................................................................. 76
25.6.2 KKV Cases ................................................................................................................ 77
5.6.3 Court Cases .............................................................................................................. 78
5.7 UNITED KINGDOM ............................................................................................................. 79
5.7.1 The Fair Trading Act................................................................................................. 79
5.7.2 MMC Cases .............................................................................................................. 80
5.8 A “CHECK-LIST” ................................................................................................................ 80
5.8.1 Objectives ................................................................................................................. 81
5.8.2 Identification and Measurement of Efficiencies ......................................................... 83
5.8.3 Analysis of Competition ............................................................................................ 85
5.8.4 Informational Aspects ............................................................................................... 87
5.8.5 Other Procedural Aspects ......................................................................................... 89
6. A FRAMEWORK FOR MERGER ANALYSIS ................................................................... 91
6.1 THE TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES....................................................................................... 92
6.1.1 Merger Decision-making and Types of Errors ........................................................... 93
6.1.2 Alternative Approaches ............................................................................................. 93
6.1.3 The Efficiency Defence.............................................................................................. 95
6.2 CALCULATING MINIMUM REQUIRED EFFICIENCIES (MRES) ................................................. 99
6.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 99
6.2.2 Minimum Required Efficiencies in a Worst Case Scenario ........................................ 99
6.2.3 Minimum Required Efficiencies based on Specific Models of Competition .............. 104
6.2.4 Minimum Required Efficiencies using Simulation Analysis...................................... 109
6.2.5 Minimum Required Efficiencies for a Positive Externality....................................... 114
6.3 EVALUATING ACTUAL EFFICIENCIES ................................................................................. 115
6.3.1 What Types of Efficiencies are most likely to be Beneficial? ................................... 115
6.3.2 Can Efficiencies be Created through Alternative Means?........................................ 117
6.3.3 How can Efficiencies be Verified?........................................................................... 118
6.4 SHOULD THERE BE AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE? ................................................................... 120
6.4.1 Arguments for and against an Efficiency Defence ................................................... 120
6.4.2 Formalities.............................................................................................................. 122
7. REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 124
3Contents:
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 6
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................... 8
3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 12
3.1 TYPOLOGIES OF EFFICIENCY GAINS..................................................................................... 12
3.1.1 Rationalisation.......................................................................................................... 14
3.1.2 Economies of Scale (and Scope)................................................................................ 14
3.1.2.1 Short-run Economies of Scale ..............................................................................................15
3.1.2.2 Long-run Economies of Scale...............................................................................................15
3.1.2.3 Economies of Scope.............................................................................................................16
3.1.3 Technological Progress............................................................................................. 16
3.1.3.1 Diffusion of Know-how .......................................................................................................17
3.1.3.2 Incentives for Research and Development ............................................................................18
3.1.4 Purchasing Economies .............................................................................................. 18
3.1.5 Slack ......................................................................................................................... 19
3.1.5.1 The Market for Corporate Control........................................................................................20
3.1.5.2 Product Market Competition and the Internal Efficiency of Firms ........................................21
3.2 ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS FROM MERGER ....................................................................... 22
3.3 WELFARE EFFECTS OF MERGERS AND THE ROLE OF EFFICIENCIES ........................................ 24
3.3.1 Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers .......................................................................... 25
3.3.1.1 Non-collusion Theories........................................................................................................25
3.3.1.2 Collusion Theories ..............................................................................................................28
3.3.1.3 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................29
3.3.2 Total Surplus............................................................................................................. 30
3.3.2.1 Williamsonian Merger Analysis...........................................................................................30
3.3.2.2 Externality Analysis ............................................................................................................32
3.3.2.3 Other Studies ......................................................................................................................34
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE...................................................................................................... 35
4.1 OVERALL COMPANY PERFORMANCE ................................................................................... 36
4.1.1 Effects of Mergers on Profits..................................................................................... 36
4.1.1.1 The European Experience ....................................................................................................36
4.1.1.2 The U.S. and Japanese Experience.......................................................................................37
4.1.2 Effects of Mergers on Share Prices............................................................................ 39
4.1.2.1 Returns to Targets ...............................................................................................................39
4.1.2.2 Returns to Bidders...............................................................................................................40
4.1.2.3 Total Returns.......................................................................................................................40
4.1.3 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 41
4.2 DISENTANGLING MARKET POWER AND COST REDUCTIONS .................................................. 43
4.2.1 Effects of Mergers on Product Prices ........................................................................ 43
4.2.1.1 Direct Studies......................................................................................................................43
4.2.1.2 Indirect Studies ...................................................................................................................45
4.2.2 Effects of Mergers on Market Shares......................................................................... 47
4.2.3 Effects of Mergers on Outsiders’ Share Prices .......................................................... 48
4.2.4 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 49
4.3 STUDIES OF EFFICIENCY GAINS AND PASS-ON...................................................................... 50
4.3.1 Effects of Mergers on Productivity ............................................................................ 50
4.3.1.1 Indirect Evidence.................................................................................................................51
4.3.2 Effects of Mergers on Innovation............................................................................... 52
4.3.3 Pass-on ..................................................................................................................... 52
4.3.4 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 53
4.4 DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................................................... 53
5. EFFICIENCY DEFENCES IN PRACTICE.......................................................................... 56
45.1 UNITED STATES ................................................................................................................. 57
5.1.1 The Clayton Act ........................................................................................................ 57
5.1.2 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.............................................. 57
5.1.2.1 The Federal Merger Guidelines ...........................................................................................57
5.1.2.2 Outline of the Efficiency Section (Section 4)........................................................................58
5.1.2.3 The Guidelines at Work.......................................................................................................59
5.1.2.3.1 The Objectives ..............................................................................................................59
5.1.2.3.2 Identification and Measurement of Efficiencies..............................................................59
5.1.2.3.3 Pass-on (Competitive Effects)........................................................................................60
5.1.2.3.4 Information Problems ....................................................................................................60
5.1.3 Federal Court Cases ................................................................................................. 61
5.1.3.1 Supreme Court Cases ..........................................................................................................61
5.1.3.2 Lower Court Cases ..............................................................................................................62
5.1.3.3 Analysis of Efficiencies in Lower Courts’ Merger Case Law................................................63
5.2 CANADA............................................................................................................................ 64
5.2.1 The Competition Act.................................................................................................. 64
5.2.2 Merger Enforcement Guidelines................................................................................ 64
5.2.3 Tribunal and Court Cases ......................................................................................... 66
5.3 EUROPEAN UNION.............................................................................................................. 66
5.3.1 The Merger Regulation ............................................................................................. 66
5.3.2 Commission Cases..................................................................................................... 68
5.3.3 Court Cases .............................................................................................................. 70
5.3.4 Efficiency Gains under Article 85 (now 81) ............................................................... 70
5.4 FRANCE............................................................................................................................. 71
5.4.1 Ordonnance No. 86-1286 .......................................................................................... 71
5.4.1.1 Definition of a Concentration and Thresholds for Investigation ............................................71
5.4.1.2 “Le bilan concurrentiel” and “le bilan economique”.............................................................72
5.4.2 Cases ........................................................................................................................ 73
5.5 GERMANY ......................................................................................................................... 75
5.6 SWEDEN ............................................................................................................................ 76
5.6.1 The Competition Act.................................................................................................. 76
5.6.2 KKV Cases ................................................................................................................ 77
5.6.3 Court Cases .............................................................................................................. 78
5.7 UNITED KINGDOM ............................................................................................................. 79
5.7.1 The Fair Trading Act................................................................................................. 79
5.7.2 MMC Cases .............................................................................................................. 80
5.8 A “CHECK-LIST” ................................................................................................................ 80
5.8.1 Objectives ................................................................................................................. 81
5.8.2 Identification and Measurement of Efficiencies ......................................................... 83
5.8.3 Analysis of Competition ............................................................................................ 85
5.8.4 Informational Aspects ............................................................................................... 87
5.8.5 Other Procedural Aspects ......................................................................................... 89
6. A FRAMEWORK FOR MERGER ANALYSIS ................................................................... 91
6.1 THE TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES...................................................................................... 92
6.1.1 Merger Decision-making and Types of Errors ........................................................... 93
6.1.2 Alternative Approaches ............................................................................................. 93
6.1.2.1 The Case-by-case Approach.................................................................................................93
6.1.2.2 The General Presumptions Approach ...................................................................................94
6.1.2.3 The Sequential Approach.....................................................................................................95
6.1.3 The Efficiency Defence.............................................................................................. 95
6.2 CALCULATING MINIMUM REQUIRED EFFICIENCIES (MRES) ................................................. 99
6.2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 99
6.2.2 Minimum Required Efficiencies in a Worst Case Scenario ........................................ 99
6.2.2.1 Expected Price Increase in a Worst Case Scenario................................................................99
6.2.2.2 The Importance of Pass-on.................................................................................................101
6.2.2.3 Assessing Pass-on in Practice ............................................................................................101
6.2.2.4 Caveats Regarding the Worst-case Scenario Approach .......................................................103
6.2.3 Minimum Required Efficiencies based on Specific Models of Competition .............. 104
6.2.3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................104
56.2.3.2 Homogeneous Products and Cournot Competition ..............................................................105
6.2.3.3 Differentiated Products and Bertrand Competition .............................................................107
6.2.3.4 Assessing Elasticities of Demand.......................................................................................108
6.2.4 Minimum Required Efficiencies Using Simulation Analysis..................................... 109
6.2.4.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................109
6.2.4.2 Development of the Model of Competitive Interaction........................................................110
6.2.4.3 Model Parameter Calibration.............................................................................................110
6.2.4.4 Simulation of Post-merger Equilibrium..............................................................................111
6.2.4.5 A Hypothetical Example ....................................................................................................112
6.2.4.6 Simulation Analysis in Practice .........................................................................................113
6.2.5 Minimum Required Efficiencies for a Positive Externality....................................... 114
6.3 EVALUATING ACTUAL EFFICIENCIES ................................................................................. 115
6.3.1 What Types of Efficiencies are most Likely to be Beneficial? .................................. 115
6.3.1.1 Efficiencies and Pass-on ....................................................................................................115
6.3.1.2 Other Considerations .........................................................................................................116
6.3.2 Can Efficiencies be Created through Alternative Means?........................................ 117
6.3.3 How can Efficiencies be Verified?........................................................................... 118
6.3.3.1 Burden of Proof .................................................................................................................118
6.3.3.2 Standard of Proof...............................................................................................................118
6.3.3.3 The Partial Efficiency Defence...........................................................................................118
6.3.3.4 Verification and Certification of Information......................................................................119
6.3.3.5 Post-merger Preview..........................................................................................................119
6.3.3.6 Merger License Fees..........................................................................................................120
6.4 SHOULD THERE BE AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE? ................................................................... 120
6.4.1 Arguments for and against an Efficiency Defence ................................................... 120
6.4.1.1 Informational Aspects ........................................................................................................120
6.4.1.2 Political Considerations .....................................................................................................121
6.4.2 Formalities.............................................................................................................. 122
6.4.2.1 The Merger Regulation......................................................................................................122
6.4.2.2 Notice ...............................................................................................................................122
6.4.2.3 Post-merger Review...........................................................................................................123
7. REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 124
61. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this report is to contribute to the analysis of two questions. Should a
merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal mergers, and
balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so, how should a
system be designed to account for efficiency gains?
There are several reasons why efficiency gains from horizontal mergers are an important
issue today. Business conditions are changing rapidly, for example as a result of the
internal market, increased global competition, and the deregulation of many industries.
The consequent need to adapt the industry structure has generated a wave of mergers in
Europe as well as in the rest of the world. The current wave is of historical proportions
and may continue for years to come.
All mergers with a so-called community dimension shall be notified to the Commission
and are subsequently reviewed under the Merger Regulation (Council Regulation
4064/89 of December 21, 1989, on the control of concentrations between undertakings).
According to Articles 2(2-3) of the Regulation, a concentration which “creates or
strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be
significantly impeded” shall be prohibited. Otherwise it shall be allowed. According to
Article 2(1)(b), the Commission shall, in making this appraisal, amongst other things take
into account “the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to
consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition”. The latter clause
has triggered a debate whether the Merger Regulation allows for a so-called efficiency
defence. Can important cost savings (or other efficiencies) save an otherwise anti-
competitive merger? The Commission has, in policy statements, argued that, “(t)here is
no real legal possibility of justifying an efficiency defence under the Merger Regulation.
(Commission, 1996)” Many economists, starting with Williamson (1968), have argued
that competition authorities should take efficiency gains into account.
Another reason for why it is important to discuss an efficiency defence under the Merger
Regulation is the recent introduction of the concept of joint dominance. According to the
Merger Regulation, a merger can only be blocked if it creates or strengthens a dominant
position. A firm is dominant if it has a large degree of market power—a monopoly like
situation. In such cases one talks more precisely of single firm dominance. More recently
the Commission has widened the concept of dominance to also include joint, or
oligopolistic, dominance. The relevance of joint dominance in merger cases was recently
confirmed by the Court in the Kali+Salz decision. This suggests that merger policy has
recently become stricter. Economic theory suggests that cost savings (and other
efficiencies) are more likely to dominate the anti-competitive effects of a merger, the
lower is concentration. Hence, the introduction of joint dominance makes it more natural
to consider efficiencies today.
Recent developments in economics may make an efficiency defence more tractable. For
example new computer based simulation techniques can be used as a way to estimate the
likely anti-competitive effects of a merger and, at the same time, balance these effects
against possible efficiency gains. Such techniques are starting to be used in the U.S. and
in Canada.
7Finally, one may note that the treatment of efficiencies in merger control also has been
recently debated in the U.S. That discussion gave rise to a revision of the Merger
Guidelines to clarify how the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission treat efficiencies. Before this, several revisions of the Merger Guidelines
have occurred that show a gradually more positive attitude towards efficiencies. One can
also notice a similar development in the Federal Courts’ treatment of efficiencies. In the
1960’s the Supreme Court seemed to reject an efficiency defence. In the 1990’s lower
courts have started to analyse efficiencies in a way similar to the Merger Guidelines.
To help answer the two questions whether E.U. merger control should allow an
efficiency defence, and if so, how it should be designed, we start with an extensive
review of the relevant economic research, including both theoretical and empirical work.
Next, we review the current practice in seven O.E.C.D. jurisdictions, and arrive at a
“check-list” of relevant dimensions that need to be considered when assessing the
possible role of efficiencies. Finally, we compare alternative approaches to include
efficiencies in a merger control system, emphasising the central role of informational
limitations.
We should emphasise that although the insights provided by economic research are vital
inputs for answering the questions, the final choice necessarily involves value
judgements. For this reason, this report cannot come to a definite answer to the above
two questions. We should also emphasise, already here in the beginning, that various
issues addressed in this report are still the subjects of intense academic research. Many of
the facts require more detailed analysis.
82. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this report is to contribute to the analysis of two questions. Should a
merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal mergers, and
balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so, how should a
system be designed to account for efficiency gains?
The report is divided into four separate parts. In the first part (Chapter 3) we discuss the
theory that is necessary to obtain a coherent understanding of mergers and the role
played by efficiencies. We start from a typology of possible efficiencies that may arise
from mergers. The effects from mergers on consumers or total surplus may depend on
the type of efficiency. We distinguish between five categories: (1) rationalisation of
production, which refers to cost savings from reallocating production across firms,
without increasing the joint technological capabilities; (2) economies of scale, i.e. savings
in average costs associated with an increase in total output; (3) technological progress,
which may stem from the diffusion of know-how or increased incentives for R&D; (4)
purchasing economies or savings in factor prices such as intermediate goods or the cost
of capital; (5) reduction of slack (managerial and X-efficiency). Next, we review the anti-
competitive effects that may arise from mergers, either due to an increased unilateral
market power, or due to an increased likelihood of successful collusion.
The final section of Chapter 3 then discusses both the price effects and total surplus
effects arising from mergers, taking into account the role played by efficiencies. We
argue that internal efficiencies often need to imply sufficiently large savings in marginal
costs for price to decrease. Not all types of efficiencies guarantee that this will be the
case. The required amount of efficiencies for price to decrease depends on various
variables, such as the merging firms market share and the price elasticity of demand. For
total welfare to increase, all types of internal efficiencies may in principle be considered,
although the required amount may depend on which type of efficiency is realised due to
the merger. It is important to stress that the precise amount of efficiencies required for
price to decrease or total welfare to increase is dependent on the specific assumptions
one makes about how firms behave in the market, both before and after the merger. This
does not make it possible to present a simple and unique formula, applicable to all
mergers.
In the second part (Chapter 4) we review the empirical evidence on mergers. We first
discuss the empirical literature that has considered the effects of mergers on
performance, measured by either (accounting) profits or by stock prices. These studies
usually review a large set of mergers throughout the whole economy. One ambitious
purpose of these studies is to find whether there are some general rules regarding the
differences between pre- and post-merger performance, and infer the importance of
efficiencies. Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of mergers on prices,
market shares, and the stock prices of competing firms. The advantage with these studies
is that they indicate whether the merger had mainly anti-competitive effects (increasing
prices, reduced market shares for merging firms, and increasing stock prices for
competing firms) or if the merger had mainly efficiency effects. Finally, we review the
literature that focuses directly on the effect of mergers on various efficiency and
productivity measures, and by how much changes in productivity and costs are passed on
into the market price.
9The main impression is that the available evidence is rather limited in many respects.
First, there are surprisingly few studies of the effect of merger on productivity, price, and
market shares. Second, the evidence on company performance is contradictory, and
troubled by methodological problems. Third, a large proportion of the studies concerns
mergers in manufacturing during the 1960s and 1970s, with a clear bias towards mergers
in the U.S. This evidence is not sufficient to draw any conclusions about the likely effects
of mergers in different sectors.
Bearing in mind the above reservations, our main conclusions are the following. First, the
empirical literature does provide some support for the fear that horizontal mergers
increase market power. Second, there seems to be no support for a general presumption
that mergers create efficiency gains. Third, in particular cases, however, mergers do
create efficiencies. Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that cost savings are partly
passed on to consumers in the form of a downward push on price. It appears that there
may be substantial variance in the efficiency gains from mergers. In sum, the empirical
evidence suggests that controlling mergers is important, and that the presence and
magnitude of efficiency gains may need to be examined on a case-by-case basis.1
The third part (Chapter 5) reviews the efficiency defence in seven O.E.C.D. jurisdictions,
namely the United States, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. This review indicates what the difficulties are in order for efficiency
gains to be considered by competition policy agencies, and what administrative routines
are used to mitigate these problems. A first impression is that efficiency gains are less
important than many other issues, such as market concentration and entry barriers, in
O.E.C.D. merger control. The review also indicates that the policies of the various
countries differ in the most fundamental respects. For example, in France, Sweden and
the U.K. the competition acts allow competition authorities to consider a wide set of
circumstances, including efficiencies, when they investigate a merger. In the U.S. and
Canada, anti-trust authorities consider efficiencies under their relatively detailed merger
guidelines. In the E.U., the Commission interprets the merger regulation as not allowing
efficiency considerations, once a merger has been found to create or strengthen a
dominant position. In Germany the competition authority only applies competition
criteria in its assessment of mergers. However, if a merger is prohibited, the Minister of
Economy may (but rarely does) authorise the merger on very broad grounds.
Based on our review of the efficiency defences in the seven O.E.C.D. merger control
systems, we synthesise the discussion to produce a “check-list” over the important
dimensions that must be considered in designing a control system that takes efficiencies
into account. This check-list includes the choice of the welfare standard, whether
efficiencies can be viewed as an offence, and how efficiencies are passed on to
consumers. Other dimensions are the types of efficiencies that are included in the
defence, merger-specificity requirements, and how to treat possible inefficiencies. In
addition to these substantive issues, also some procedural aspects are included. For
example, we point out the questions whether efficiency justifications should be phrased
as rebuttals or as defences, and the allocation of the burden of proof. Under each of these
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 To complement this picture we believe that it would be valuable to conduct a follow-up study. Such a
study should, in our view, focus on empirical estimates of returns to scale. Such studies can be used
at least as indirect evidence for the efficiency gains from mergers. It would also be desirable to
deepen the survey into pass-on. In both cases, it should be possible to obtain results for specific
industries.
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check-points we describe the issues that are involved, and what choices have been made
in different jurisdictions.
The fourth part (Chapter 6) aims to bring the threads together and arrive at a framework
for analysing mergers. Based on our conclusions from the empirical literature that
efficiencies may need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, we construct an
information-economising two-stage decision framework for evaluating mergers. In a first
stage, notified mergers are assessed using routine tools with modest information
requirements. Mergers that do not pass the first stage test are subject to further
investigation, including an efficiency defence. We note that the transition from a general
presumptions approach (where explicit efficiency arguments are ruled out) to a
sequential approach with explicit efficiency considerations for some mergers, does not
imply a more lax policy towards mergers. Generally speaking, such a transition does
require a revision of the currently used threshold criteria. Rather than a single
“dominance” threshold level, delineating acceptable from unacceptable mergers, two
thresholds levels are now required: a first threshold to delineate automatically acceptable
mergers from those subject to an efficiency defence; and a second threshold to delineate
the mergers subject to an efficiency defence from those that are automatically
unacceptable. The first threshold typically lies below the currently used “dominance”
threshold level, whereas the second threshold level would lie above the current level.
We next outline how an efficiency defence may be implemented, partly based on our
theoretical findings and partly based on the practice in O.E.C.D. countries. We focus on
the implementation of an efficiency defence assuming that the merger authority has a
price standard, rather than a total welfare standard. We emphasise that there are two
essential components to the analysis of efficiencies: the calculation of minimum required
efficiencies, and the measurement and verification of actual efficiencies. An efficiency
investigation should explicitly balance these two components in an as transparent way as
possible.
The calculation of minimum required efficiencies (MREs) requires essentially an
assessment of the likely expected market power (or anti-competitive) effects. The
difficult task for the merger authorities is to obtain a good idea of the nature of
competitive interaction before and after the merger. This is not an obvious task, given
the various possible models of competition as shown in the theoretical chapter. To
resolve this problem, we propose that the merger authorities focus on calculating the
MREs in a worst case scenario about anti-competitive effects. We provide a simple
methodology to implement this idea, which essentially only requires information on the
expected degree of pass-on of cost changes into consumer prices. Our worst-case-
scenario approach may yield too high efficiency standards for the merging firms. We
therefore also provide formulae for MREs based on specific and simple models of
competition, requiring information on market shares, concentration and price elasticities;
in addition we outline the simulation approach for computing MREs in more complicated
models of competition. Nevertheless, these alternative procedures require a considerably
more complex investigation (including robustness analysis) than our proposed simple
worst-case-scenario approach. For this reason, it seems desirable to place the burden of
proof on the merging firms when these more complex techniques are used.
The computed MREs may then be confronted with the actual expected efficiencies
involved in the mergers. To measure actual efficiencies in a direct way, it is important to
assess the various types of efficiencies, since not all types will have the same effects.
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Given the verifiability issues, it would be desirable to put the burden of proof regarding
the types and the magnitude of expected efficiencies on the merging firms, who should
follow procedures set out by the merger authority.
In order to improve merger policy regarding the account of efficiencies, various concrete
actions seem worth to consider. First, it would be important to think carefully about Art.
2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. Either a reinterpretation of this article or a
modification would be desirable to recognise the potential role of efficiencies, without
outlining how efficiency considerations should be taken into account. A separate Notice
(similar to “guidelines”) could then be published in which more detailed procedures are
formulated on how efficiencies are to be treated in the evaluation of mergers. Finally, we
argue that it would be desirable to systematically perform post-merger evaluation, which
could, for example, include an analysis into actually realised efficiencies from mergers,
and their pass-on to consumers.
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3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter provides a discussion of the theory that is necessary to obtain a coherent
understanding of mergers and the role played by efficiencies. We start from a typology of
possible efficiencies that may arise from mergers. The effects from mergers on consumer
or total surplus may depend on the type of efficiency. We distinguish between five
categories, based on the concept of the production function:
(1) rationalisation of production, which refers to cost savings from reallocating
production across firms, without increasing the joint technological
capabilities;
(2) economies of scale, i.e. savings in average costs associated with an increase in
total output;
(3) technological progress, which may stem from the diffusion of know-how or
increased incentives for R&D;
(4) purchasing economies or savings in factor prices such as intermediate goods
or the cost of capital;
(5) reduction of slack (managerial and X-efficiency).
Next, we review the anti-competitive effects that may arise from mergers, either due to
an increased unilateral market power, or due to an increased likelihood of successful
collusion.
Finally, in this chapter we discuss both the price effects and total surplus effects arising
from mergers, taking into account the role played by efficiencies. We argue that internal
efficiencies often need to imply sufficiently large savings in marginal costs for price to
decrease. Not all types of efficiencies guarantee that this will be the case. The required
amount of efficiencies for price to decrease depends on various variables, such as the
merging firms’ market share and the price elasticity of demand. For total welfare to
increase, all types of internal efficiencies may in principle be considered, although the
required amount may depend on which type of efficiency is realised due to the merger. It
is important to stress that the precise amount of efficiencies required for price to
decrease or total welfare to increase is dependent on the specific assumptions one makes
about how firms behave in the market, both before and after the merger. This does not
make it possible to present a simple and unique formula, applicable to all mergers.
3.1 Typologies of efficiency gains
Efficiencies from mergers may come in a variety of ways. In order to obtain a clear and
systematic understanding into the consumer and welfare effects of mergers, discussed in
section 3.2, it is important to make a typology of the various kinds of efficiencies that
may be created. Naturally there are many different way in which one may categorise
efficiency gains from mergers. Different typologies are useful for the different discussion
in this report.
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The first typology is based on the concept of the production function. It is extensively
used in the literature on productivity measurement.
• Rationalisation,
• Economies of scale,
• Technological progress,
• Purchasing economies,
• Slack.
This typology is useful for the identification of different efficiencies. This typology is
described in detail in sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.5 below.
A second distinction that is often made in the context of merger analysis is:
• Real cost-savings,
• Redistributive (or pecuniary) cost-savings.
This distinction is important since typically only real cost-savings are considered in an
efficiency defence. Redistributive gains are cost-savings that the firms may achieve for
example in the form of lower taxes. However also purchasing economies may be
Redistributive (see below). Real cost-savings are those savings that correspond to some
savings of productive resources in the economy. Rationalisation, economies of scale,
technological progress, and slack reduction are all real cost-savings. Also some
purchasing economies are real cost-savings.
A third distinction that is often made in the context of merger analysis is:
• Fixed costs,
• Variable costs.
This distinction is important since savings in variable costs, but not savings in fixed costs,
may almost immediately benefit not only the merging firms, but also the consumers (see
below). Savings in fixed costs normally come in the form of economies of scale,
technological progress, and purchasing economies. Savings in variable costs may come in
all five forms.
A fourth distinction that is useful in the context of mergers is:
• Firm level efficiencies,
• Industry level efficiencies.
An example of efficiencies at the level of the industry is cost-savings due to a reallocation
of production from the merging firms to their competitors—a common effect of mergers
(see below). This distinction is important since it is mainly about the first category that
the merging firms have an informational advantage over competition authorities. All the
five categories above can occur at both the level of the firm, but also at the level of the
industry. Efficiencies at the level of the industry are discussed separately in the next
section since they should be considered in a different way by competition authorities.
Finally, one may distinguish between:
• Efficiencies in the relevant market,
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• Efficiencies in other markets.
According to some, only the first category can be taken into account in an efficiency
defence. At a minimum, including also the second type introduces some additional
complications.
3.1.1
 
Rationalisation
Rationalisation of production refers to the cost savings that may be realised from shifting
output from one plant to another, without changing the firms’ joint production
possibilities. As the term indicates, rationalisation of production refers to an optimal
allocation of the production levels across the different plants of a firm.
Before the merger, the firms may differ in their marginal cost of production. This may be
the case for at least three reasons. First, one of the firms may have a higher amount of
physical capital. Second, one firm may have some inherent competitive advantage, for
example due to a patent or other superior knowledge. Finally, when marginal cost is
increasing in output due to capacity constraints, firms may differ in their marginal costs
because they are producing at different output levels.
After the merger, the new company becomes a multi-plant firm, and cost savings can be
realised by shifting production from the plants with a high marginal cost to the plants
with a lower marginal cost. A firm fully rationalises its production if the marginal costs at
all its plants are equalised: in this case it no longer pays to further reallocate production
across plants. For example, when cost differences arise from differing capacity
constraints, output rationalisation implies that the firm, who is most capacity-
constrained, reduces its production in favour of the firm with more excess capacity.
The most drastic case of rationalisation occurs when one firm operates at such a low
marginal cost (for all relevant levels of total production) that it is optimal to reallocate all
production to that firm. The merger then effectively involves the shutdown of the other,
less efficient firm. In this case, the merger also leads to an elimination of the fixed set-up
costs that are required to keep a plant operational.2 Such fixed cost savings are discussed
in the next subsection on economies of scale.
3.1.2
 
Economies of scale (and scope)
A firm is said to have economies of scale when its average cost falls as output increases.
Economies of scope generalise the concept of economies of scale to the case of the
multiproduct firm (see 3.1.2.3). Economies of scale and scope are frequently used as an
argument to defend a proposed merger. To assess the validity of the argument in each
case, it is important to understand the sources of economies of scale, and assess whether
they cannot be realised otherwise.
Economies of scale, realised through a merger, may be the result of co-ordination of the
(formerly separate) firms’ investments in physical capital—called long-run economies of
scale. Other realisations of economies of scale may, however, come already in the short
run (when physical capital is held fixed).
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 But in some cases plant closure may also lead to new irreversible costs.
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3.1.2.1
 
Short-run economies of scale
There are two types of short-run economies of scale that potentially can be realised
through a merger, namely the elimination of duplication of indivisible tasks, and a form
of rationalisation.
First, indivisibility occurs when it is technically impossible to scale down an input below
a certain minimum size, even when the level of output is very small. No matter how small
the size of a firm, some minimum expenditure in essential tasks are required to keep the
firm operational. These include certain administrative and support routines, such as the
purchasing of materials, the billing of customers, personnel service, etc … These tasks
involve fixed costs, i.e. costs that do not increase as total output increases. Before the
merger, all firms wastefully duplicate the fixed costs. After the merger, they may be
spread over the larger combined output of the merging firms. The merger then realises
scale economies by avoiding a duplication of fixed costs. Note that a spreading of these
fixed costs may be feasible both when the firms produce identical and when they produce
different products.
Second, short run economies of scale may be realised by a reallocation of production
between plants (rationalisation). We categorise such cost-savings as economies of scale
rather than as rationalisation, if the reason for the reallocation is that short-run marginal
cost are decreasing with higher output.3
3.1.2.2
 
Long-run economies of scale
Long-run economies of scale occur when a doubling of all inputs (including physical
capital) leads to more than a doubling of total output. Product-level (or specific) returns
to scale are related to the total production of a single product variety. Plant-level returns
to scale are related to the total production of all product varieties within a plant. Firm-
level returns to scale are related to economies realised by managing many plants within
the same firm.
Long-run economies of scale may arise for several reasons. First, when the output of a
firm is small, it is usually preferable to invest little, and operate at an inferior technology
with a higher marginal cost. As the production of the firm increases, it becomes
worthwhile to invest more in automated technologies that yield lower marginal costs.
Long-run economies of scale may also arise because of the benefits from specialisation.
Each worker can concentrate his or her efforts on certain specific tasks that can be
implemented more efficiently. Similarly, the energy requirements for a large machine may
be proportionally lower than those of a small machine. Due to certain physical laws,
material requirements may also be decreasing in size.4
To realise long-run economies of scale through a merger, it is essential that the assets of
the partners are combined and integrated. Such a restructuring may not be desirable, in
the short run: the plants are already built and it is costly to unbuild them, reallocate
                                                       
3
 Such cost-savings could also be classified as rationalisation. We choose to classify them as economies
of scale since they reflect downward sloping marginal costs, which is in line with the ordinary use of
the term economies of scale. Moreover, the primary use of the term rationalisation can be found in
Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Their stability requirement in effect assumes away the cost-savings that
we discuss here, if they are sufficiently large.
4
 An often cited example is the “cube-square rule”: a doubling in the surface area of a pipe, will
increase the volume by a factor of 4.
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capital and achieve the economies of scale. Therefore, in the short run, adjustment costs
may impede a full integration of the firms’ activities. In contrast, in the long run, it may
be less costly to integrate the future investment decisions within the newly created firm.
Future investments occur for two reasons. First, the firms’ current capital depreciates
and old plants need renovation. This includes both physical capital and intangible assets
such as brand name. Second, new investment opportunities may arise if the size of the
market increases.
Economies of scale (Scherer et al., 1975; Panzar, 1989) also applies to a context where
the merging firms produce differentiated products. After a merger between firms selling
similar product lines, it may be desirable to concentrate the production of the certain
products within the same plant, rather than to have each former firm continue to produce
the whole product line within the same plant. Such a specialisation of production allows
the plants to reduce down time due to shifting production (run-length economies).
Long-run economies of scale may arise in both production and in research and
development. They may also arise in marketing activities. A single brand name may be
created to economise on advertising expenditures. The sales forces or the distribution
network may be combined (see, for example, Kitching, 1967).
The exploitation of economies of scale through a merger between firms that are
producing differentiated products may involve a reduction in product diversity. This
potential loss to consumers should also be taken into account when measuring the net
benefits from economies of scale
3.1.2.3
 
Economies of scope
Economies of scope arise when it is advantageous to produce goods that are related in
one way or another within the same plant. Economies of scope may for example arise
when multi-product production requires a common “public” input. For example, the
production of wool and mutton requires the common input sheep; the production of beef
and hides requires the common input cows. When economies of scope are present, it may
not be desirable to have plants specialise in the production of single products even if
there are product-specific economies of scale.
3.1.3
 
Technological progress
In the analysis of technological progress a distinction is often made between process and
product innovations. A process innovation reduces the cost of producing an existing
product; a product innovation increases the value (quality) of an existing product.5 Both
types of innovation are essentially equivalent in that they imply an improvement in the
firms’ joint production possibilities frontier. In the discussion below, we often refer to
technological progress as process innovations with corresponding cost savings.
However, it should be clear that similar conclusions can be drawn for product
innovations and corresponding quality improvements.
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 Tirole (1988, p. 389) uses the same definition for a process innovation. He defines a product
innovation somewhat differently as the creation of an entirely new product. He then remarks that
product innovation can be viewed as a special case of process innovation: the new product already
existed prior to the innovation, and the process innovation reduces the cost of production should that
it can be profitably supplied.
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3.1.3.1
 
Diffusion of know-how
Firms may have different technological or administrative capabilities due to different
patents, different experiences, a different management or organisation, etc … A merger
between firms with different characteristics may then lead to a diffusion of know-how
across the participants. This can bring the firms closer to their joint production
possibilities frontier, without shifting the frontier itself.6
First, it may be the case that one of the merging firms has superior know-how in all
dimensions. The merger then allows its partner(s) to learn and potentially adopt all skills
of the firms with superior know-how. For example, the better management may teach the
worse management. Alternatively, the better management may replace the old
management and make all decisions by itself. In these examples, the diffusion of know-
how goes in one single direction, and the superior firm does not learn.
Second, there may be two-way diffusion of know-how. In this case, both firms can
benefit from the merger and improve their technological or administrative capabilities. A
two-way diffusion of know-how is possible when firms have complementary skills or
own some other complementary assets. For example, the merging firms may own
complementary patents, which taken together further improve the production process on
the quality of the product. A merger in this instance effectively implements a cross-
licensing agreement. Similarly, the management of each firm may have built up different
experience or expertise. As another example, consider a relatively young R&D-intensive
firm that has developed a superior product but lacks the marketing know-how or a
distribution network. A merger with one of the existing competitors, with an established
brand name and a solid distribution network, may then ensure a fast diffusion of the new
(or improved) product.
Two-way diffusion of know-how may also occur when firms have different capabilities in
the production of intermediate outputs. For example, consider two car manufacturers
which both produce (or purchase from suppliers) several intermediate outputs such as
brakes or gears. One of the firms may be more efficient in producing brakes (or can buy
them cheaper from a supplier), whereas the other firms may be more efficient in
producing (or purchasing) gears. Specialisation then leads to a reduction in costs, below
either of the firms’ costs before the merger.7
As a final example of two-way diffusion of know-how, consider an industry in which
there is learning by doing. Learning by doing means that the firms’ average costs are
declining in their cumulative (past) output (as a measure of experience). It is sometimes
referred to as “dynamic economies of scale”. A merger may facilitate learning by doing
spillovers, allowing firms to better learn from each other’s experience.
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 Another way to describe the same thing is to say that the inferior firm’s production frontier has
expanded.
7
 We classify this as technological progress and not as rationalisation. First, the cost-savings
correspond to an expansion of the firms’ joint production possibility frontier. Second, the cost saving
is achieved through reallocation of production of intermediary as opposed to final products.
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3.1.3.2
 
Incentives for research and development
An important activity of many firms involved in mergers is research and development
(R&D), in either cost-reducing production processes or in product improvement or in the
development of new products. As discussed above, the integration of investment and
R&D activities after the merger may sometimes create significant economies of scale. In
addition, a merger may alter the incentives for R&D expenditures. R&D decisions are
frequently taken strategically, i.e. dependent on the actions of competing firms. It is often
argued that the presence of too much competition destroys the incentives to spend
money on R&D. The most popular argument is that the outcome of R&D is highly non-
proprietary, due to imitation or information spill-overs of the R&D results (d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988). If this is indeed important, a merger could help to internalise the
benefits from R&D among the participating firms, thereby creating an increased incentive
for R&D.
Even in the absence of R&D spill-overs the intensity of competition influences incentives
for R&D. The industrial economics literature has addressed the question whether a large
dominating firm still has sufficient incentives to spend money on R&D, compared to its
smaller rivals. The answer depends on the expected payoffs from R&D (assuming no
spill-overs). Consider first the case in which the outcome of R&D involves little risk, so
that R&D looks much like traditional investment. In this case, a dominating firm would
have greater incentives to invest in R&D, so as to retain its competitive advantage and
associated monopoly rents. In contrast, if R&D are very risky, then the dominating firm
cannot guarantee success even for disproportionately large amounts spent on R&D. As a
result, the large firm would rather “rest on its laurels”, enjoy the current monopoly rents
and accept the risk of being leapfrogged.8
3.1.4
 
Purchasing economies
Cost savings may also be involved in the merger because of the presence of imperfectly
competitive factor markets. Small firms often need to purchase their inputs such as
materials and energy at prices above marginal costs. When the firms merge, their
bargaining power may increase and more pressure can be put on upstream input suppliers
to cut their prices and obtain quantity discounts. In the automobile industry, for example,
manufacturers sometimes form alliances to purchase their components in larger amounts
to increase their discounts. Similarly, significant advertising discounts may be obtained
when large contracts can be made. To assess the social effects from increased bargaining
power towards suppliers, it is important to know the degree of power at the supplier
side. If there is little power on the supplier side, the increased bargaining power of the
merging firm may be socially harmful. If, however, the increased bargaining power forms
a form of countervailing power to an already strong supply side, then the private benefits
from the merging firm may coincide with the social benefits. Unfortunately, economic
theory has not yet analysed these issues in detail.9
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 The first effect has been called the “efficiency effect” in the literature, referring to the fact that a
monopoly enjoys higher profits than do two duopolists jointly (see e.g. Gilbert and Newberry, 1982,
1984). The second effect has been called the “replacement effect” (Arrow, 1962). Reinganum (1983)
and Tirole (1988) analyse the role of uncertainty in the R&D outcome to assess the relative
importance of both effects.
9
 For preliminary discussions of the role of countervailing power, see Galbraith (1952), von Ungern-
Sternberg (1995), and Snyder (1996).
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Note that mergers may also create discounts when there is no increase in bargaining
power (i.e. when the upstream supplier would retain all the bargaining power to set
prices). This happens when suppliers offer two-part tariffs, consisting of a fixed fee, and
a price per unit (or some other non-linear pricing schemes). Such tariffs are used to
price-discriminate between low and high users. When firms merge, they become high
users, and thereby can spread the fixed fee and obtain a lower average price for their
supplies.
A merger may also lead to a lower cost of capital since capital markets do not function
perfectly. For a variety of reasons, such as asymmetric information about risk and
expected return, firms cannot always borrow at a competitive interest rate. Especially
small and expanding firms often face stringent liquidity constraints, while large
corporations usually have better access to the outside capital markets, and big firms in
declining industries may even generate “excess” liquidity. A small firm that joins a large
corporation, or is being bought by a firm with limited possibilities for internal expansion
obtains new possibilities in raising capital.
3.1.5
 
Slack
Large public corporations are characterised by a separation of ownership and control.
This creates problems of asymmetric information between the shareholders of the firm
and the management to whom control is delegated. A failure by the management to
maximise the profits of the firm leads to internal inefficiency, sometimes called X-
inefficiency.10 Why may the goals of management diverge from profit maximisation,
despite the fact that they are often given profit maximising incentives through profit
sharing, stock option plans, etc…? Other interests of management may be the personal
ambitions to obtain power, become the leader of a big or growing company; or not to
change a chosen strategy and thereby admitting old mistakes; or to avoid to fire excess
personnel. These goals conflict with the shareholders’ goals. The shareholders can
exercise some control over the management through the board of directors. However,
the management is usually much better informed about its projects, and the board may
have only limited possibility to challenge the management’s decisions. To collect all the
necessary information is not necessarily profitable. After all, the whole idea to delegate
power to the management is to avoid these information costs.
The firm’s internal efficiency is partly determined by the management (administrative)
techniques, such as incentives systems, used to mitigate the problems caused by the
separation of ownership and control. We view such techniques as defining the firm’s
production possibility frontier, and hence improvements in such techniques as
technological progress. A merger may lead to improvements in such techniques (for
example if one firm can learn them from the other). Such gains, we classify as
technological progress, and not slack reduction.
However, the firm’s internal efficiency is also determined by other factors, and these
other factors may be affected as a result of a merger. One commonly mentioned example
is that mergers are an important part of the disciplining power of the capital market
(discussed in section 3.1.5.1). Another example, pointing in the opposite direction, is that
a horizontal merger reduces competition in the product market and hence the disciplining
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 The term X-efficiency, introduced by Leibenstein (1966), was originally used in a broader sense than
just to describe issues related to the separation of ownership and control.
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power of the product market on firm efficiency (discussed in section 3.1.5.2). A third
example is that a merger may increase the possibilities for the merged entity to use
relative performance evaluations between the formerly separately owned plants.11 If that
would happen, slack would be reduced as a result of the merger.
3.1.5.1
 
The market for corporate control
A slack makes a firm undervalued and lowers the firm’s stock price. This may induce
another company to buy the firm, re-organise and bring the firm back to profit
maximising behaviour. Actually, Manne (1965) and Marris (1964) argue that the mere
threat of a take-over can be sufficient to discipline the current management, despite the
presence of asymmetric information between shareholders and management.
The threat of corporate take-overs may then serve as a disciplining device to the
management. Yet management is usually not punished after a take-over; they often even
obtain large compensations (“golden parachutes”). The punishment mainly lies in the loss
of the enjoyed managerial rents, including prestige or on-the-job consumption, such as
private jets and excessive representation. See Scharfstein (1988) for a detailed analysis.
Provided there is a sufficiently high punishment threat to management involved, a well-
functioning market for corporate control could then ensure that managerial inefficiencies
could not be long lived.
The disciplinary power of take-overs is, however, limited for several reasons. First, there
is a free-rider problem involved in disciplining the management, as pointed out by
Grossman and Hart (1980). A raider needs to collect costly information to identify
managerial inefficiencies. The raider can then make a profit only if the tender price of the
shares (at which he buys) is lower than the post-raid price. However, each single current
shareholder may not be willing to sell at a tender price, in anticipation of a higher stock
price after the raid. 12 One solution to this free rider problem is dilution, which allows a
majority shareholder (the raider) to sell part of the firm to another company he owns at
terms that are disadvantageous to minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
point out that a raid may be successful if it is done by a large existing shareholder, who
than at least enjoys an increase in the value of its own shares (the other shareholders
would then benefit more, of course).
A second limit to take-overs arises because of possible actions by the existing
management in response to take-over bids. For example, poison pills are sometimes used
as a defence. These are preferred stock rights that may be used in the event of a tender.
Scherer (1980, cited in Holmström and Tirole, 1989) also questioned the strength of the
disciplining power of take-overs. Take-overs are very costly so that they may be used
only in cases of severe mismanagement.
The theory of the disciplining role of take-over threats is also problematic in that it is
difficult to test empirically. Studies of actual take-overs cannot provide sufficient
information, since the theory is about the disciplining threat, which is difficult to measure
as long as it is not realised.
As discussed by Manne (1965), the theory of the disciplining role of take-over threats is
potentially important for the design of merger control. Unfortunately, to our knowledge,
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 For a discussion of relative performance evaluations, see Holmström (1982).
12
 However, see Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), for a critique to the Grossman and Hart argument.
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there has been little or no research on this topic. Nevertheless, a few general remarks can
be made. By making take-overs more difficult, competition policy may reduce the
disciplining role of the take-over threat. Presumably, the firm’s closest competitors form
the most effective take-over threat, since they are likely to possess the best information
about mismanagement. Without the allowance of an efficiency defence, such disciplinary
mergers may not be carried out. As a compromise, one may argue that a take-over
should be temporarily allowed, to replace current management; after the re-organisation
the target should be sold again as soon as possible. The problem with such as
compromise is however that a raider would be strengthening the position of its own
competitors, so that the raid would not be carried out in the first place. Hence, if a
disciplinary threat of mergers mainly comes from competing firms, there may be a real
trade-off between efficiency gains and anti-competitive effects.
3.1.5.2
 
Product market competition and the internal efficiency of firms
When product market competition is soft, management and employees exert low effort
and production costs are high. Moreover, the low efforts and the high costs are too low
and too high respectively, from a social welfare point of view. These ideas are
widespread among economists as well as policy makers. Actually, these ideas motivate
policies to promote competition such as deregulation and trade liberalisation. For
example, the European Commission (1988) argued that “...the new competitive pressures
brought about by the completion of the internal market can be expected to ...produce
appreciable gains in internal efficiency...[which will] constitute much of what can be
called the dynamic effects of the internal market...” According to Scherer and Ross
(1990) the empirical evidence is fragmentary but points in the same general direction: x-
efficiency is more apt to be low when competitive pressures are strong than when firms
enjoy insulated market positions. Moreover, these X-inefficiencies are at least as large as
the welfare losses from resource misallocation.
There is a small literature that has analysed the different linkages between product
market competition and firm efficiency. Some studies focus on financial linkages
between competition and firm efficiency. Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that if there
exists a bankruptcy-risk, and a receiver who is able to recover all funds that are not
invested, leaving the manager with no perquisites in case of bankruptcy, the manager
invests more to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. Any changes in product market
competition that affect the risk of bankruptcy also affect managerial incentives. Schmidt
(1997) makes this intuition more precise. In his model, increased competition has two
effects on managerial incentives: it increases the probability of liquidation, which
increases managerial effort, but it also reduces the firm's profits, which may make it less
attractive to induce high effort. Stennek (forthcoming) argues that limited liability may
serve as a disciplining device on the internal efficiency of a firm, and the tougher the
product market competition, the higher the disciplining power.13 However, even if
policies that promote competition enhance X-efficiency, the social gain may be
outweighed by a less efficient allocation of risk. Other studies focus on informational
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 If competition is tough, firm revenues are low. Hence, in case costs are firms are forced to pay low
wages (including fringe benefits, courses that increase human capital, and so on). But then, to
guarantee that employees receive their expected utility, the firms must pay high wages in case costs
are low. Hence, in the presence of limited liability, if competition is tough, the market forces firms to
give their employees an incentive contract (wages contingent on cost realisation).
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linkages between competition and firm efficiency. Holmström (1982) and Nalebuff and
Stiglitz (1983) argue that cost shocks normally should be positively correlated between
competitors. Then, by using relative performance evaluations, the moral hazard problem
is mitigated within each firm. However, even if more firms increases the amount of
available information and hence increases the overall efficiency of the firms, the effect on
effort is ambiguous.14 Hermalin (1992) focus on wealth linkages between competition
and firm efficiency. He argues that managers often have substantial bargaining power in
negotiations over their employment contracts. Since increased competition decreases the
“pie” over which the principal and agent bargain, increased competition also reduces the
manager's wealth. If “shirking” is a normal good, then competition reduces shirking.
Finally, some papers focus on output and strategic linkages between competition and
firm efficiency. Martin (1993) and Horn, Lang, and Lundgren (1994, 1995) argued that a
reduction in marginal cost saves more money for larger firms. Since the size of firms
decreases with competition, managers exert more effort into cost-reduction under soft
competition - an output effect. Horn, Lang, and Lundgren (1994) also demonstrate a
strategic effect when the compensation scheme is public information.15
Perhaps surprisingly, the emerging picture from these studies is that the effect of
competition on internal efficiency may be both positive and negative. Moreover, even in
the cases the effect is positive, the welfare consequences may be negative. The picture is
rather complex. Unfortunately, none of the studies explicitly examines the effect of
merger on X-efficiency. The reason for the change in competition in these studies is
rather lowered entry barriers or trade liberalisation. Hence, it is not clear to what extent
the studied linkages between competition and X-efficiency also are relevant in merger
analysis. In our view, the issue of whether and how mergers, trough its effect on
competition in the product market, affect the X-efficiency of firms is still an open
question.
3.2 Anti-competitive effects from merger
The prime reason why competition policy authorities are concerned with horizontal
mergers is that they reduce competition, which may have many unwanted repercussions
in the affected markets. The most well-known effect of a reduction of competition is that
prices may increase. This effect will be discussed in detail below. Another effect is that a
reduction of competition may lead to X-inefficiency (or slack) in the firms (see section
3.1.5. above). Reduced competition may also reduce firms’ incentives to provide product
diversity and to innovate (see section 3.1.3.2 above). Finally we should mention an
aspect which is often mentioned but not yet studied in any detail. Firms’ managers have
only limited cognition (or bounded rationality). As an unavoidable consequence, many of
their decisions are based on their beliefs and prejudices, and not on facts and reasoning.
As a result of these individual imperfections, competition in the market place has an
important role to fill as a selection device. If competition is intense, only those firms
survive and expand that are run by managers who (by coincidence) happen to be
equipped with the most accurate beliefs and prejudices. These are the firms that produce
the product varieties that consumers want at a low cost. In contrast, if competition is
soft, also high-cost firms that produce inferior product varieties may survive.
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 In Hart (1983) and Scharfstein (1988) the information is transmitted via the market price.
15
 Also Brander and Spencer (1989) establishes the existence of a negative relation between
competition and managerial incentives.
23
As already argued, the most well-known effect of a reduction of competition is that
prices may increase. There are two possible reasons to be concerned with price increases.
First, there is the obvious fact that a price increase implies a transfer of wealth from
consumers to producers. This is a distributional consideration. Second, an increase in the
price of a product above its marginal cost creates (or strengthens) an allocative
inefficiency, also called the dead-weight loss. Indeed, whenever the price of a product
exceeds its marginal cost, it would be socially desirable to increase production. The
social value of increasing production by one unit equals the current price minus the
marginal cost (the difference between what consumers are willing to pay for an
additional unit, and what this additional unit costs to producers).
Competition authorities in most countries have been primarily concerned with the
distributional effects of price increases. Economists, in contrast, tend to argue that one
should focus on total welfare, and therefore focus on the allocative inefficiency (or dead-
weight loss) caused by the merger. Whatever the policy concern behind price increases, a
proper assessment of the competitive effects from mergers requires a good
understanding of the nature of competitive interaction in the industry.
Generally speaking, oligopoly theory confirms the common intuition that prices increase
as the number of firms is reduced. Abstracting from cost reductions, the fear for price
increases following merger may thus be justified. Two reasons for price increases may be
distinguished. First, a merger between two or more firms may increase the firms’
unilateral market power. Before the merger, the firms compete and do not take into
account the effect of their quantity or price decisions on the profits of their competitors.
After the merger, the firms maximise their joint profits, and thereby take into account the
detrimental effect of quantity increases or price cuts on the market share of each others’
products.
Second, a merger may shift the nature of conduct from competitive to collusive
behaviour, or facilitate collusion at a higher price level. As the number of firms
decreases, it may become easier to sustain implicit cartel agreements, for example
because it becomes easier to monitor cheating. When a shift in conduct takes place, the
merger increases the joint market power of the firms in the industry.
The risk for price increases following mergers may be limited for several reasons. The
presence of actual competitors producing similar products is an obvious first constraint.
Second, the possibility of entry in the long run may effectively constrain the firms’
willingness to raise prices. Third, especially in intermediate goods markets, strong buyers
may exercise countervailing bargaining power that may limit the merging firms’ potential
to raise price. Finally, it may be the case that one of the merging firms is failing16,
perhaps due to a drop in demand for its product. In the absence of a merger such as firm
would eventually have to leave the market, so that market power would increase
irrespective of the merger taking place.
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 This relates to the failing firm defence, stating that a horizontal merger between two firms should not
be considered anti-competitive, if the relevant alternative to the merger is that one of the firms is
declared bankrupt and shut down. This defence has been used in several countries including the US
and in the European Union. In the EU the additional condition is added that that the market share of
the failing firm would inevitably accrue to the acquiring firm even without the merger. For
discussions of the failing firm doctrine, see Kwoka and Warren-Boulton (1986), Shughart and
Tollison (1985), Saloner (1987), and Persson (1997a,b).
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In the following discussion, we will assume that entry is difficult, and that none of the
firms is failing. Efficiency considerations are usually only made when these assumptions
hold true. We will also assume that buyers take prices as given, and hence do not
exercise countervailing power. This assumption is an unfortunate consequence of the fact
that economic theory is lagging behind. The theory of oligopoly that is used to assess the
competitive effects of mergers has generally assumed that one side of the market
(typically the consumer side) is price taking, and that only the other side of the market
exercises market power.
3.3 Welfare Effects of Mergers and the Role of Efficiencies
The previous section sketched some general considerations on the competitive effects of
mergers. This section goes into more detail, and in particular examines the role of
efficiencies. In order to assess the overall effects of mergers it is necessary to first make
explicit the policy goals of merger regulation. In the policy debate several objectives are
frequently mentioned.
• Consumer surplus. A first objective upon which merger analysis may be based is
the protection of consumer interests. If this is the case, the central focus of merger
analysis is on the competitive, or price effects, of mergers
• Total surplus. Another objective may be to further both consumer and
producer interests. Total surplus may operationally be defined as the sum of
consumer and producer surplus. More generally, one may give different weights to
consumer and producer surplus.
• Other objectives. These include the promotion of European integration,
employment, regional balance, viability of small firms, and competitiveness of
national firms on international markets. The concern with the preservation of
employment has often been a political concern in proposed mergers. In principle,
employment considerations should be taken into account in a full cost-benefit analysis
of mergers. In practice, a merger policy designed to preserve old production
structure is presumably not the best way to deal with the employment objective in the
long run. See for example Jenny (1997) and Crampton (1994) for more on the
employment objective.
In the analysis below we focus on the first two policy goals. This makes it natural to split
our analysis into two distinct parts. The first part analyses the price effects of mergers.
Of particular interest is the role played by efficiencies. Is the relationship between
efficiency gains and consumer interests necessarily a trade-off? Or are there
circumstances in which efficiency gains also benefit consumers? To answer these
questions, the typology of efficiency gains provided above will prove to be very useful.
Depending on the specific type of efficiency, a merger may sometimes lower prices, to
the benefit of consumers. To assess the price effects of a merger, it is therefore crucial to
identify the specific types of efficiencies that are involved, and, less obviously, to quantify
the magnitude of these efficiencies.
The second part analyses the total welfare effects of mergers. To focus ideas, we assume
in this part that the efficiency gains are insufficient to ensure price reductions (pro-
competitive effects). We then follow a trade-off approach in which the possible efficiency
gains need to be weighted against anti-competitive effects from the merger. Once again,
the typology of efficiency gains proves useful to assess the trade-offs involved.
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3.3.1
 
Price effects of horizontal mergers
This section considers the price effects of horizontal mergers in the presence (or absence)
of cost savings. In practice horizontal mergers may also generate product (quality)
improvements. In this case, consumers may benefit from a merger even without price
decreases, provided that quality increases sufficiently. The discussion in this section may
thus be rephrased in terms of “quality-adjusted” price effects of horizontal mergers (e.g.
Rosen, 1974). The spirit of the various results will therefore also apply to mergers with
product (quality) improvements.
Since horizontal mergers reduce the number of competing firms in the industry, the
common view is that mergers tend to increase price. However, to obtain a thorough
understanding into the price effects of mergers, it is necessary to examine this common
view under various modes of competition and alternative types of efficiency.
First, consider an simple industry in which all firms have identical and constant unit costs.
Consider a merger with no efficiencies gains. In this case, most theories of oligopoly
imply that the price will increase.17 The only exceptions are if firms have a “perfect”
cartel before the merger, if one firm is failing, or if the merger triggers immediate entry.
In these cases, the price would be unaffected by the merger. What, then, is the role
played by internal efficiencies? To which extent can they ensure that price decreases will
take place after merger?
3.3.1.1
 
Non-collusion theories
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider a Cournot model, in which firms compete by setting
quantities. To simplify, they assume that all firms produce the same homogeneous good.
In this set-up they analyse the nature and the magnitude of internal efficiencies that are
required for a merger to reduce price and increase output to the benefit of consumers.
From their analysis it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
• For price to decrease after a merger, the merged firm must realise a
substantially lower marginal cost than did either of its constituent firms
before the merger. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provide a more precise formula
for the required reduction in marginal costs.
• If the internal efficiencies only consist of output rationalisation or fixed cost
savings, then there will be a price increase after the merger.18 Rationalisation,
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 It is straightforward to verify that price will indeed increase under these circumstances in a Cournot
model. In models with tacit collusion price will either increase, or remain constant if full collusion
already existed. Under Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, price will either remain
constant or increase if it concerns a shift to monopoly. Finally, under Bertrand competition with
differentiated products, the analysis by Davidson and Deneckere (1985a) shows that prices increase
after a merger, at least in their linear demand model with symmetric competition. A similar
observation is made for the logit demand model by Froeb and Werden (1994). See Levy and Reitzes
(1992) for a model of localised competition to study the price effects of mergers.
18
 Given that savings in fixed cost do not affect marginal cost, it is obvious that they cannot be claimed
to reduce prices. The result that output rationalisation cannot reduce prices is less obvious. A
rationalisation of output typically implies a reallocation from the high cost plant to the low cost
plant, which (under rising marginal costs) reduces the marginal cost of the high cost plant, while
increasing the marginal cost of the low plant (except in extreme cases where rationalisation involves
the shut down of one of the merging firms’ plant). Apparently, the net effect of these changes
according to Farrell and Shapiro’s proposition is to always increase price under Cournot competition.
26
but not fixed cost savings, may combined with other cost savings lead to
lower prices.
Given the negative result on rationalisation and fixed cost savings, one may wonder
which type of efficiencies may be responsible for price reductions. The typology of
efficiency gains provided in section 3.1 provides an answer. The following types of
efficiencies may ensure price reductions after mergers, at least provided that they are
“sufficiently large”:
(1)  long-run economies of scale, and product-specific economies of scale
(2)  technological progress, either achieved by a transfer of know-how, or by
increased incentives for R&D
(3)  purchasing economies.
All these efficiencies have in common that they may lead to a (long term) reduction in the
marginal costs below those of the formerly separate firms. The question is of course how
large the reduction in marginal costs is required to be. Interestingly, Farrell and Shapiro
show that the required reductions in marginal cost depend on relatively easy to observe
variables, i.e. the firms pre-merger market shares and the elasticity of demand. We return
to this question in more detail in section 6, where we discuss a framework for merger
analysis, including operational criteria for determining the likelihood that mergers will
not increase prices.
Farrell and Shapiro’s analysis, as most static theories of oligopolies, stresses the
importance of marginal costs rather than fixed costs in reducing prices. In a dynamic
setting, when new entry may occur, it may be possible that also fixed cost savings have
an impact on prices. At this point, there has however been little theoretical work on this
issue.
The analysis of Farrell and Shapiro establishes general results for the Cournot model.19
Some industries are however better described by the Bertrand model, in which firms
compete by setting prices rather than quantities. Does Farrell and Shapiro’s main result
generalise to this alternative setting? In particular, can a price reduction after a merger
only be achieved through a significant reduction in the marginal cost below the pre-
merger level of either participating firm? General results cannot be easily obtained since
the degree of price competition depends on the nature of product differentiation.20
Nevertheless, the results by Werden and Froeb (1994) teach us some interesting results
for an industry with symmetric product differentiation. They assume that a unit price
increase by one firm increases the market share of all competitors by the same percentage
amount.21 Werden and Froeb demonstrate the following result:
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 Brueckner and Spiller (1991) extend Farrell and Shapiro’s model to analyse airline networks. They
consider the role of higher prices under competition on other routes, and the role of scale economies.
They show that consumer may benefit more easily in this setting.
20
 If goods are homogeneous, the Bertrand model predicts a perfectly competitive price – equal to
marginal cost – even if there are only two firms. The intuition for this is that for any price exceeding
marginal cost, a firm would have an incentive to undercut the rival’s price and conquer the whole
market. Because of this result, the intensity of price competition is usually modelled by allowing the
goods to be differentiated rather than homogeneous.
21
 More specifically, they adopt a logit model of product differentiation, see for example Anderson, de
Palma and Thisse (1992).
27
If there are no internal efficiencies generated by the merger, except for fixed
cost savings or output rationalisation, then the prices of all products in the
industry will increase after the merger; the magnitudes of the price increases
are dependent on the market share of the different products.22
Since products are differentiated, each product may have a different price. Therefore, the
effects of a merger on prices are more involved. Werden and Froeb find the following
results on the magnitudes of price changes for the various products. First, the prices of
the merging firms’ products (weighted by their sales) increase by more than any of the
competing firms’ prices. Especially the price of the small firm’s product involved in the
merger increases. Second, competing firms with a large market share (for example due to
a relatively low marginal cost) will increase price by more than competing firms with a
small market share. Moreover, a similar picture seems to emerge as in the general
Cournot model considered by Farrell and Shapiro: significant savings in marginal costs,
below the lowest marginal cost of either partner involved in the merger, are required for
prices to drop after the merger.
Stennek (1996) modifies the assumptions of the Cournot model in a different way,
namely by introducing incomplete information between firms about each others’ marginal
costs. He shows that, under these conditions, the market is inefficient (in particular: more
inefficient than under symmetric information) in short-term allocation of production
between firms. As a result, a merger may increase efficiency due to the pooling of
information. Such information synergies may be large enough for price to fall and
consumers to benefit from the merger. See also Gal-Or (1988).
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 Werden and Froeb demonstrate their result assuming constant (though possibly different) marginal
costs. Note that the incentives for output rationalisation are reduced under product differentiation,
since it implies a change in product diversity. Moreover, the welfare analysis is complicated by any
change in product variety.
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3.3.1.2
 
Collusion theories
Firms may, under certain circumstances, sustain a cartel-like agreement also absent the
opportunity to write legally binding contracts.23 A pre-condition is that the firms are able
to detect and punish any firm under-cutting the agreed upon price, without the help of
the legal system. Firm organised punishment may, for example, take the form of a price
war that is limited in time. Economic models of collusion (notably the super-game
literature) attempt to delineate the exact conditions under which such cartel-like
agreements can be sustained by the firms. These models may also allow us to assess
whether mergers affect the degree of joint market power in the industry.
A first approach to analyse the role of mergers for collusion assumes that there is initially
no collusion, and asks whether and under which circumstances collusion is likely to be
facilitated as a result of the merger. Recent theories of collusive behaviour predict that
there exists a positive relationship between market concentration and the likelihood of
collusion. Formal and informal contributions by Stigler (1964), Friedman (1971),
Davidson and Deneckere (1984), among others, indicate that more concentrated market
structures facilitate collusion for a variety of reasons. Increased concentration implies
reduced profits from cheating by “stealing” competitors’ market shares; increased
possibilities to detect cheating; and less co-ordination problems. Compte, Jenny and Rey
(1998) emphasise the role of capacity constraints for the sustainability of collusion. A
firm’s capacity constraint determines how attractive it is for the firm to under-cut the
collusive price. The capacity constraint also determines how easy it is to flood the market
to punish other firms that deviate. Compte, Jenny and Rey show how merger-induced
asymmetries in capacity may affect the sustainability of collusion.
Economic models of collusion have far less predictive power than the non-collusive
Bertrand and Cournot models, as discussed for example also by Hay and Werden (1993).
The lack of predictive power is almost inevitable, since the mere fact that one collusive
outcome is sustainable implies that a variety of other collusive outcomes are sustainable
as well. The problem thus is to predict on which specific collusive arrangement, if any,
firms would co-ordinate. If one is willing to make some more specific assumptions on
which collusive arrangement firms will co-ordinate, one can obtain stronger predictions
about the effects of mergers in collusion models. Following this approach, it has been
demonstrated that – perhaps surprisingly – the cost savings requirements for mergers to
reduce price are smaller if firms collude rather than compete. The intuition behind this
result is that firms do not compete anyway before the merger and succeed in (partial)
collusion already before the merger. Furthermore, the existing collusion before the
merger may create particular inefficiencies that are eliminated after the merger.
To explain the nature of these existing inefficiencies, consider first Schmalensee’s (1987)
and Harrington’s (1991) analyses. They study fully collusive regimes based on models of
(successful) bargaining.24 To illustrate, assume there are two firms, one with a low
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 It is not clear exactly how one should interpret the term agreement. Some people would argue that
firms actually need to meet and discuss the arrangements in order for collusion to be effective. Others
argue that it may suffice that firms are forward-looking and recognise their mutual long term
interdependence for them to start collusion.
24
 A fully collusive regime is an output allocation on the firms’ Pareto-frontier. Schmalensee considers
this frontier by ignoring incentive constraints that ensure that the agreement is sustainable (no
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(constant) marginal cost, and another with at a high (constant) marginal cost. In a fully
collusive agreement firms will bargain to allocate production such that the price lies in
between two hypothetical monopoly prices: the price that the low cost firm would
choose if it were a monopoly, and the – higher – price that the high cost firm would
choose if it were a monopoly.25 Now consider a merger between the two firms in such a
fully collusive industry. A merger would simply rationalise production by transferring all
production from the high cost to the low cost plant. As a consequence, the price drops to
the lower monopoly price. Therefore, under full collusion a merger to monopoly reduces
price even without any efficiencies other than output rationalisation.
One may argue that this reasoning assumes that firms can enforce a perfect cartel before
the merger. Yet Verboven (1995) shows that this result generalises to industries in which
– more plausibly – only partial collusion can be sustained before the merger, i.e. a price
above the Cournot level but below the optimal cartel allocation. In his model, the
collusive outcome is determined by the sustainability constraints ensuring that no firm
would defect, independent of the exact bargaining process. Verboven also shows that the
condition for price to decrease is that the market share of the merging firms is sufficiently
small. Furthermore, as the degree of sustainable collusion increases the tolerated market
share of the merging firms also increases.
3.3.1.3
 
Conclusion
The above discussion shows that there are many different modes of (price) competition,
and accordingly, many different models of (price) competition. Actually, any description
of competition, including ours, is bound to be stylised. Just to mention one example, the
mode of competition is much affected by the exact information that the firms have about
themselves, about their competitors, and about their market. The effect of merger on
price has been studied for some such cases, but not for all of them. Another, but related,
problem is that some aspects of competition have hardly been begun to be analysed in
economic theory. (That is, there are still too few models of competition!). One example
is that almost all economic models of competition are based on the assumption that the
firms’ managers are fully rational, while in reality only they are boundedly so.
This multiplicity of modes and models of competition creates a problem for policy
design. Should policy be based on only one of the models? If so, which one? Or, are
there ways in which policy can be made more flexible? The ideal choice, of course,
would be that competition authorities, in each individual merger case, apply that model
which conforms best with the actual mode of competition. In our policy discussion in
section 6, we will describe some methods that can be used that are based on explicit
models of competition. We also describe simulation analysis, a flexible technique that
may be tailored to fit the situation at hand even better. However, these methods presume
that the competition authority is rather well informed about the mode of competition in
the market that they investigate. If that is not the case, we suggest that the authority may
use an approach that is based on a worst-case scenario. Hereby, the authority may
combine flexibility with limited information. We also suggest that if the firms, that
presumably are more informed about the details of the competitive situation, are not
                                                                                                                                                                  
cheating). Harrington does take into account the firms’ incentives to cheat, but focuses on cases
where the incentive constraints are not binding.
25
 This assumes that side payments are not feasible.
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satisfied with such an analysis, and can provide a more well-tailored (and verifiable)
analysis, then the agency may use that instead.
3.3.2
 
Total surplus
Most economists take the view that competition policy should not be designed solely to
protect the interests of consumers. A common policy goal formulated by economists is
the maximisation of “total surplus”, the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus.
Under this policy goal, transfers from consumers to producers due to price increases are
not considered as a problem. However, increased prices yield an allocative inefficiency,
i.e. a dead-weight loss due to sub-optimal production and consumption.
3.3.2.1
 
Williamsonian merger analysis
Perhaps the most influential contribution which advocated the total welfare approach in
merger analysis is by Williamson (1968). Williamson proposed to compare the dead-
weight losses due to price increases after merger with the internal efficiencies that are
generated. Williamson concluded that cost savings need not be very high to compensate
for dead-weight losses induced by price increases. We now illustrate Williamson’s
analysis in Figure 1. We will show that the “trade-off” framework is useful, though the
conclusion that only small cost savings are required is not general, since this depends on
how intense competition is before and after the merger. This conclusion is similar in spirit
to the one obtained when discussing the price effects of mergers. The degree of
competition, both before and after merger, is essential in examining the price effects of
mergers.
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Consider a homogeneous goods industry where unit costs are constant and equal to AC1
before the merger, and drop to AC2 after the merger, as illustrated in Figure 1. Consider
three alternative scenarios on how behaviour changes due to the merger:
(1) From perfect competition to monopoly
This is the most simple case to analyse. Total welfare before the merger coincides with
total consumer surplus at the competitive price P1, indicated by the triangle ABC. At the
competitive price, there is no producer surplus. After the merger, unit costs drop and the
monopoly price P2 is charged. Total welfare is now the sum of consumer surplus, ADE,
and producer surplus, DEFG. As a result, the change in welfare due to merger is the
difference between the rectangle, BHFG, and the triangle, EHC. Intuitively, the cost
savings evaluated at post-merger production (BHFG) need to be traded off against the
net losses from reduced consumption (EHC). The specific example on Figure 1, which
considers a unit cost reduction by 25%, shows that the internal cost savings outweigh the
losses from reduced consumption. But note that if we had considered a unit cost
reduction by only 12.5%, the reverse would have been true.
(2) From perfect competition to “partial monopoly”
This is the original scenario, considered by Williamson’s article of 1968. Williamson thus
assumes that a merger in an initially competitive industry “extends market power”, but
not to the monopoly extreme. Consider for example a price rise to P3 instead of P2. The
result is a higher output after the merger, implying higher internal cost savings than in the
first scenario, amounting to BIFJ. These need to balanced against the losses from
reduced consumption, which are now only the triangle KIC. The unit cost reduction by
25% generates internal cost savings which by far exceed the losses from reduced
consumption on Figure 1. In fact, under the assumed price increase of this example, total
welfare would increase for any reduction in unit cost by more than 2%. This confirms the
claim made by Williamson.
The difference between scenario 1 and scenario 2 shows that it is important to know the
extent of the price increase after the merger. Scenario 1 had been considered by DePrano
and Nugent (1969) in a critical review of Williamson’s analysis. Williamson (1968)
replied that the drastic price rise to monopoly considered by DePrano and Nugent (1969)
is unrealistic, since a merged firm needs to take into account the risk of entry when
raising its prices. Entry can almost never be blockaded, argues Williamson, and therefore
one may expect that a merged firm will follow a “limit pricing strategy”, taking into
account potential competitors as well as actual competitors.
The debate between Williamson and Deprano and Nugent illustrates the importance of
predicting the extent of the price increase after a merger. In other words, it is necessary
to properly assess the nature of post-merger competitive interaction. The third scenario
stresses that one should also properly assess pre-merger conduct.
(3) From “partial monopoly” to monopoly
To illustrate the importance of considering pre-merger market power in the same Figure
1, consider a merger in which the initial price is P3, which exceeds marginal cost AC1.
After the merger the marginal cost is AC2, and the monopoly price P2 is charged.
In this scenario, total welfare changes from the area AKBI before the merger to the area
AEFG afterwards. Therefore, the trade-off is between internal cost savings of BHFG and
losses from reduced output of EKIH. In the example of Figure 1, which assumed a 25%
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reduction in unit costs, the internal cost savings would be sufficient. In fact, in the
example any reduction in unit costs by 9% would suffice for welfare to increase.
A general intuition on the trade-off between internal cost efficiencies and the losses due
to output reduction can be gained by considering a merger which causes a “small”
reduction in total industry output, accompanied by a “small” increase in internal cost
efficiency in an industry which is initially non-competitive. Generally speaking, the gain
due to internal cost savings is proportional to the industry output, the loss due to
reduced output is proportional to the price-cost margin.26 To assess the welfare trade-
off, one therefore needs to have a good estimate of both pre-merger output and of pre-
merger price-cost mark-ups. Pre-merger output times the expected cost reduction would
be approximately equal to the expected welfare gains. Pre-merger mark-ups times the
expected output reduction would be approximately equal to the expected welfare losses.
Of course, the main empirical difficulty in comparing the expected gains to the expected
losses is in the assessment of the expected cost reduction and the expected output
reduction.
Which types of cost savings are valid to apply the framework of Williamson? Note that
Williamson’s formula does not depend on the actual type of efficiency that is realised; it
is sufficient that the efficiency implies a reduction in average costs. Therefore, all types
of efficiency in principle qualify for a Williamsonian type of defence, provided, of course,
that they involve sufficiently large average cost reductions. Nevertheless, a case may be
made that efficiencies that involve a marginal cost reduction are superior to those that do
not. This is because in this case, it may generally be expected that the price increase will
be lower than when there is no reduction in marginal cost.
3.3.2.2
 
Externality analysis
Williamsonian analysis evaluates the efficiency gains from unit cost savings over the total
industry output. This approach is justified under the assumption that all firms in the
industry participate in the merger. Of course, in practice, most mergers only take place
among part of the firms in the industry. In this case, one should evaluate the internal cost
savings at the – smaller – output of the merging firms. Another difficulty with
Williamsonian analysis is that one needs to be able to measure the actual cost reduction
that will be generated by the merger. It is, of course, in the interest of the merging firm
to claim as high efficiencies as possible.
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) propose a methodology for evaluating mergers among some
of the firms in the industry without a need for relying on internal efficiency claims. In a
general Cournot setting, they propose to evaluate the externality that is created by the
merger. The externality of a merger consists of the sum of the effect on consumers and
on the rival firms who did not participate in the merger. Farrell and Shapiro argue that if
the externality is positive, then the merger must also increase total welfare since the
proposed merger may be expected to also be profitable (otherwise it would not be
proposed in the first place).
Farrell and Shapiro derive conditions under which price-increasing (i.e. output-reducing)
mergers will generate a positive externality. In particular, they find that the market share
of the merging firms should be sufficiently small. The intuition for their result is clear.
                                                       
26
 Weiss (1992) provides some further results and computations on how to measure the
efficiency/competition trade-off in a Williamsonian framework.
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When two (or more) firms merge in order to reduce output, there is an expansion of
output by the competitors. The expansion by the competitors is less than the contraction
of the merging firms. The result is an overall fall in output, accompanied by a reallocation
of output from the merging firms to their competitors. Such a reallocation of output
would be desirable if the merging firms are relatively inefficient (i.e. operate at a higher
marginal cost) as compared to their competitors. A relative inefficiency of the merging
firms would indeed exist if they have a relatively small market share. In sum, a small
market share by the merging firms indicates their relative inefficiency, making a merger
which reallocates output to the competitors desirable.27 The opposite is of course also
true: when two large firms merge to contract output, there will be a reallocation to
relatively inefficient competitors so that the merger will create a negative externality. In
this case, total welfare will only be positive if large internal efficiencies can be proven by
the merger.
The main contributions of Farrell and Shapiro’s approach are twofold: (1) they point out
a potentially important effect that has traditionally been ignored in assessing merger: a
reallocation of output to competitors; (2) they demonstrate that due to this effect
mergers may be beneficial even when there are no internal efficiencies (or when internal
efficiencies cannot be proven). Their analysis applies to Cournot competition.28
In fact, the general message of their results also applies to other forms of oligopolistic
interdependence. In particular, in the models of Bertrand competition with differentiated
products of Davidson and Deneckere (1985a), Werden and Froeb (1994) a price increase
by the merging firms triggers price increases by the competitors. These positive
responses are, however, typically less than the original price increase initiated by the
merging firms. As a result, the market share of the merging firms decreases and a
reallocation of production from the merging firms to the competitors takes place. Similar
to the Cournot model, such a reallocation of output would be desirable if the merging
firms are relatively inefficient, as would be the case when they have relatively small
market shares.
The relatively simple specific conditions on the market shares that are provided in Farrell
and Shapiro’s Cournot analysis do not generalise to Bertrand models with product
differentiation. This is natural, since the product differentiation is market-specific, and no
simple general description can be provided. In section 5, where we discuss the
framework, we nevertheless attempt to provide some operational sufficient criteria that
will hold for all oligopoly models.
                                                       
27
 Verboven (1995) extend Farrell and Shapiro’s Cournot model to allow for tacit collusive behaviour.
He finds reasonable conditions under which the externality effect of a merger is even more likely to
positive than in Farrell and Shapiro’s Cournot model.
28
 McAfee and Williams (1992) focus on some more specific aspects assuming increasing marginal
cost. Barros and Cabral (1994) apply the framework of Farrell and Shapiro to investigate mergers in
open economies.
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3.3.2.3
 
Other studies
There has also been some literature that tries to draw inferences on the welfare from the
mere fact that merger is proposed and thus is supposed to be profitable.
Levin uses a model with homogeneous goods and quantity-setting firms to show that
output-reducing mergers are never profitable if market share is less than 50% (assuming
no internal efficiencies other than output rationalisation). Furthermore, any proposed
(thus profitable) merger with a market share less than 50% increases welfare, whether it
increases or decreases output.
Werden and Froeb (1998) consider the entry-inducing effects of mergers. Entry reduces
the possibilities to raise price and thus the profitability. Hence, if we observe a
(profitable) merger, it seems more likely that it will reduce price (and thereby deter
entry). The entry possibility thus allows us to infer price reducing efficiencies. As stated
by Werden and Froeb: “If firms are rational and informed, they merge only if they expect
significant efficiency gains generated from merger, or they perceive substantial entry
obstacles such as sunk costs. Consequently, the entry issue can be collapsed into
efficiency considerations, and in the absence of strong evidence that an otherwise anti-
competitive merger generates significant efficiency gains, there is a sound basis for
presuming that entry obstacles will prevent entry in response. (Thus the best way for
courts to treat entry in many mergers may be not to consider it at all.)”
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4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
This section reviews the empirical evidence on mergers. Most of this literature has not
attempted to directly identify efficiency gains from mergers. The available empirical
evidence may nevertheless help us to shed some indirect light on the existence and the
magnitude of efficiency gains. Many studies have considered the effect of mergers on
company performance, as measured by the accounting profits or the share prices of the
firms. If company performance is found to increase, there is evidence that the merger
created either market power or efficiency gains, or a combination of both. Unfortunately,
such evidence is not sufficient to discriminate between the two explanations. Additional
information may be gathered to obtain more conclusive results. For example, evidence on
consumer prices and market shares are also potentially useful in disentangling the market
power and efficiency effects. There are also some papers that study the effect of mergers
on the competing firms’ share prices. If these also rise, this suggests that market power is
more important than efficiency gains, since increased market power tends to benefit the
competitors, whereas reduced production costs tend to harm competitors.
The evidence on share prices, profitability and consumer prices may not only tell us
something on the relative importance of market power and efficiency motives for merger.
It may also indicate how the gains or losses from mergers are distributed between
different groups in the economy. Since competition policy in the E.U. and other
jurisdictions are partly motivated by distributional concerns, such knowledge is crucial
for the proper design of merger control.
Section 4.1 considers the evidence on company performance, measured by accounting
profits and stock prices. Section 4.2 discusses the literature that has attempted to
disentangle the two motives market power and cost reductions. Finally, in section 4.3 we
provide evidence from a limited number of studies that have attempted to directly
quantify the importance of efficiency gains.
The main impression is that the available evidence is very limited in many respects. First,
there are surprisingly few studies of the effect of merger on productivity, price, and
market shares. Second, the evidence on company performance is contradictory, and
troubled by methodological problems. Third, most studies concern mergers in
manufacturing during the 1960s and 1970s, with a clear bias toward mergers in the U.S.
This evidence is not sufficient to draw any conclusions about the likely effects of mergers
in different sectors.
Bearing in mind the above reservations, our main conclusions are the following. First, the
empirical literature does provide some support for the fear that horizontal mergers
increase market power. Second, there seems to be no support for a general presumption
that mergers create efficiency gains. Third, in particular cases, however, mergers do
create efficiencies. Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that costs savings are passed-
on to consumers in the form of a downward push on price. It appears that there may be
substantial variance in the efficiency gains from mergers. (Unfortunately, however, there
does not exist any formal statistical testing that clearly indicates that the variance is
high.) In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that controlling mergers is important, and
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that the presence and magnitude of efficiency gains may need to be examined on a case-
by-case basis.
To complement this picture we believe that it would be valuable to conduct a follow-up
study. Such a study should, in our view, focus on empirical estimates of returns to scale.
Such studies can be used at least as indirect evidence for the efficiency gains from
mergers. It would also be desirable to deepen the survey into pass-on. In both cases, it
should be possible to obtain results for specific industries.
4.1 Overall Company Performance
4.1.1
 
Effects of mergers on profits
The industrial economics approach studies merger performance by measuring the
(accounting) profits of the merging parties before and after the integration. From a
theoretical point of view, a merger may increase or decrease profitability. On the one
hand, oligopoly theory predicts that horizontal mergers increase market power, i.e. the
firms’ ability to set a price above marginal cost. On the other hand, mergers tend to
lower the merging parties’ market shares, since the rival firms may have an incentive to
expand their production as a result of the merger. The net effect of an increased mark-up
but decreased sales is ambiguous. In addition, the effects of mergers on the internal
efficiency of the firms are also ambiguous. A merger may lead to rationalisation or scale
efficiencies, but it also reduces competition in the product market, and may hence
increase or create slacks in the organisation. Hence, the effect of a merger on the
merging firms’ profits is an empirical issue.29
In sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.1.2 we review individual studies in detail. We treat the
European and the non-European (mainly U.S.) experiences separately to see if there are
any systematic differences. The reader may skip these two sections, and turn directly to
the results in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1.1
 
The European experience
A large-scale project consisting of studies from several European countries is reported in
Mueller (1980a). The study by Mueller (1980b), discussed below, on U.S. mergers, is
also part of this international comparison. An important advantage of this project is that
all the studies use the same methodology. The data cover firms undertaking mergers
during the period 1962-1972, for the five years preceding the merger and the five years
afterwards. All studies use several different tests for the effect of mergers on profitability.
Two measures of profitability are adopted, namely the rate of profit on equity, and the
rate of profit on total assets. Two alternative methods are used to control for external
shocks. First, the merging firms’ profits are compared with a control group consisting of
a pair of firms that are similar to the merged ones. Second, they are compared to the
industry average.
                                                       
29
 One may argue that firms would not merge unless a merger is profitable. However, there are
circumstances under which firms may merge, even if that lower their profits relative to the pre-
merger situation (Roll, 1986, suggests a hubis hypothesis; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, suggest an
empire-building hypothesis; Fridolfsson and Stennek, 1999, suggest a pre-emption hypothesis).
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Kumps and Wtterwulghe (1980) study 21 mergers in the manufacturing and retail sectors
in Belgium during the period 1962 to 1974. They show that the merging firms performed
better than a control group of non-merged companies. Their profit rates declined by less
between the 5-year pre-merger period and the 5-year post-merger period, than those of
the control group firms. Cable, Palfrey, and Runge (1980) study around 50 mergers in
Germany during the period 1964 to 1974. They find that the merging firms did better
than the control firms, although not in a statistically significant way. Jenny and Weber
(1980) study 20 - 40 (depending on the test) horizontal mergers in France during the
period 1962 - 1972. They show that the merging firms experienced decreasing
profitability between the four-year pre-merger and four-year post-merger period. This
reduction was larger than the reduction of the control firms, although the difference is
not statistically significant. Peer (1980) studies around 30 mergers in the manufacturing
and retail sectors in the Netherlands during the period 1963 to 1973. He finds that the
merging firms did worse than the control firms did, although not in a statistically
significant way. Rydén and Edberg (1980) study 25 large mergers in Sweden during the
period 1962 to 1976. They show that the merging firms experienced a reduction in the
profitability between the 5-year pre-merger period and the 5-year post-merger period. At
the same time a control group of non-merged firms increased their profitability. Cosh,
Huges, and Sing (1980) study 211 mergers in the U.K. during 1967 to 1969. They show
that the merging firms experienced an increase in the profitability between the 5-year pre-
merger period and the 5-year post-merger period. At the same time a control group of
non-merged firms decreased their profitability. Meeks (1977) studies take-overs by large
U.K. listed firms during the period 1964 to 1972. The typical target is small in
comparison with a control group, but has average profitability. The typical buyer is large
in comparison with a control group, and has a higher profitability. During the seven years
following the take-over, the profitability of the integrated firm is typically reduced.
To summarise, the evidence on the European mergers during the 60s is mixed.
Profitability improved on average, in comparison with control firms, in two countries
(Belgium and Germany) and it deteriorated in three countries (France, Netherlands, and
Sweden). The evidence on the profitability of U.K. mergers is mixed. One study finds
that profitability has increased, another that profitability decreased, and it is not clear
what causes the different results. Often the changes in profitability are small and
insignificant.
4.1.1.2
 
The U.S. and Japanese experience
As a part of the international comparison, discussed above, Mueller (1980b) studies
around 250 mergers in the U.S. during the period 1962 to 1972. He compares
profitability three years after and five years before the merger. The merged firms
experience a loss in comparison to the non-merged firms.
Perhaps the most famous study – or actually, collection of studies -- is by Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1987). This is a very detailed study considering a large sample of U.S.
mergers over a long time period. In one study, Ravenscraft and Scherer estimate the pre-
merger profitability of 634 targets (chapter 3). All targets were manufacturing companies
and they where acquired in 1968, 1971, or 1974. Their sample includes small and
privately held companies, not listed on major stock exchanges. Profitability was
measured by the ratio of annual operating income to total end-of-period assets. The
average profitability of the targets was 20 percent. The average profitability of all
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manufacturing corporations was at the same time 11 percent. Hence, the targets were
substantially more profitable. The difference is also statistically significant. Ravenscraft
and Scherer also separately study the pre-merger profitability of ninety-five targets of
1962-1976 tender offers. These targets were slightly less profitable than the industries to
which they belonged.
In another study, Ravenscraft and Scherer examine post merger performance, using so-
called line of business data (chapter 4). That is, the unit of observation is not the
acquiring firm, but the branch of the firm that made the acquisition. Branches are defined
according to three- or four-digit level of the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification.
Hereby, the sample consists of 4,409 lines of business observations. For each line of
business, they have data on profitability for the years 1974-77, and on the merger
history—as measured by ratio of the value of the acquired assets to total assets--between
1950 and 1977. (In total more than 7,000 acquisitions were undertaken, and the median
acquisition was made eight or nine years before the date for measuring profitability.) In
an ordinary least squares regression model, they show that merger intensity has a
negative effect on profitability.
Ravenscraft and Scherer also study sell-off of acquired units (chapter 6). They estimate
that between 19 and 47 percent of the acquired units were subsequently sold off. They
also show that these units experienced a fall in profitability preceding sell-off, and that
their profitability was below the profitability of non-divested lines in the same industry.
Combining these observations with the observation from their chapter 3 that the acquired
units were twice as profitable as the industry average, Ravenscraft and Scherer conclude
that these units were in good health at the time of their acquisition, but became gravely ill
thereafter.
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) study the post acquisition performance of the 50
largest U.S. mergers between 1979 and mid-1984. They use pre-tax operating cash flow
returns on assets, and they use industry performance as a benchmark. Data are collected
for each of the five years before the merger and each of the five years after the merger
(leaving out the year of merger). In the period before the merger, the merging firms
earned a median annual return around 25 percent. After the merger the return has
declined to around 20 percent. However, this decline was smaller than the decline
experienced by other firms in the same industries. Hence, the industry adjusted median
annual return was around zero percent before the merger. After the merger the industry-
adjusted return has increased to around 3 percent.
Ikeda and Doi (1983) study the performance of forty-nine merging firms in the Japanese
manufacturing industry 1964 - 1975. Profit rate is measured by the average current profit
before tax as a percentage of end-of-year equity and end-of-year total assets. Data are
collected for the five years before and after the merger. One test concerns the merging
firms’ absolute performance, and another test concerns the merging firms’ performance
in comparison with the performance of rival firms in the industry to which the merging
firms belong. The absolute test shows that around 60 percent of the merging firms
increased profitability, while 40 percent decreased profitability. In relative terms, 60 to
70 percent of the merging firms experienced an increased profitability.
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4.1.2
 
Effects of Mergers on Share Prices
A second strand of literature has assessed the performance of mergers by studying the
effects they have on the stock prices of the participating firms at the time of the merger
announcement. The empirical methodology is called event study analysis. Basically, event
study analysts estimate whether there is a significant difference in stock prices a few
weeks before and after an “event” such as a merger announcement. The change in stock
prices is measured net of market-wide price movements.
An important potential advantage of event-studies is that stock prices reflect the present
value of expected future profits created by firms, under the assumption that the stock
market is efficient. This approach differs fundamentally from the profitability studies
based on accounting data. Accounting profits only refer to current profits, which may be
subject to exceptional temporary gains or losses; in addition, the accounting profits
depend on the precise methods that have been used to classify revenues and costs.
The evidence is summarised and discussed in section 4.1.3. In the preceding four sections
we review individual studies in more detail. As is conventional, we report results on
returns to targets (section 4.1.2.1), bidders (section 4.1.2.2) and total returns (section
4.1.2.3) separately. The reader may skip the first four sections, and turn directly to the
summary.
4.1.2.1
 
Returns to targets
The results concerning targets are relatively clear. The average target shareholder gain
varies between 20 to 35 percent. The target gains more in tender offers than in mergers.
The gain is higher if there is more than one bidder. The gains have varied over time, due
to changes in the legal and institutional environment.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) review 13 early event studies. Six studies concern mergers,
and seven concern tender offers. The period is 1956 to 1981. The abnormal percentage
stock price changes associated with successful corporate take-overs was 30 percent for
tender offers, and 20 percent for mergers. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) survey
event studies that cover take-overs made in the 1980s. (Much of their conclusions come
from a study of 663 successful tender offers from 1962 to 1985.) The target premiums
averaged 19 percent in the 1960s, 35 percent in the 1970s, and from 1980 to 1985 the
average premium was 30 percent. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) use a sample of 236
successful tender offers occurring over the period 1963 to 1984. The mean target gain
for the whole period was 32 percent. They also show that competition among bidding
firms increase the returns to targets, and decrease the returns to acquirers. Schwert
(1996) studies 1814 targets in successful and unsuccessful take-overs during 1975 to
1991. The average gain in tender offers was 36 percent and in mergers 17 percent. He
also shows that the total return to the target consists of two approximately equal parts,
namely the mark-up (which is the increase in the stock price beginning the day the first
bid is announced), and the run-up (which is the increase in the stock price in the period
of 40 days before the first bid). The mark-ups are essentially unrelated to the size of the
run-up. One interpretation of this result is that the run-up reflects information held by
other potential bidders, rather than insider trading or information leakage. If this
interpretation is correct, then previous event studies may have exaggerated the gains
from mergers since they normally include the run-up as a part of the merger premium.
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4.1.2.2
 
Returns to bidders
The event study evidence on bidder gains is mixed, but it suggests that bidders on
average break-even, or do slightly better. Naturally, however, there is some variance,
meaning that some bidders gain while others lose.
In Jensen’s and Ruback’s (1983) survey, the abnormal percentage stock price changes
associated with successful corporate take-overs was four percent for tender offers, and
zero percent for mergers. In Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) bidders realised a small,
but statistically significant, gains of about one to two percent. They also show that this
gains has declined, to become negative (statistically insignificant) in the 1980s. Bradley,
Desai, and Kim (1988) confirm this pattern.
4.1.2.3
 
Total returns
The evidence indicates that shareholders of target firms realise large positive abnormal
returns in take-overs. The evidence on the rewards to bidding firms is mixed, but suggest
that they break even. Since targets gain, and bidders do not appear to lose, the evidence
seems to suggest that take-overs create value to the participating firms. However, as
pointed out by Jensen and Ruback (1983) the bidding firms tend to be larger than target
firms. Hence, the sum of the returns to bidding and target firms does not measure the
gains to the merging firms. The dollar value of small percentage losses for bidders could
exceed the dollar value of large percentage gains to targets. Or, as Roll (1986) says, in
some cases the observed increase in the target would correspond to such a trivial loss to
the bidder that the loss is bound to be hidden in the bid/ask spread and in the noise of
daily return volatility. Roll reviews the evidence up to 1985 and argues that it is
inconclusive.
More recent studies provide more conclusive evidence. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988)
explicitly construct their sample so as to match pairs of targets and bidders in order to
measure synergistic gains. During the whole period, the average combined gains is 7
percent, and statistically significant. Stulz, Walking and Song (1990) study 104 tender
offers during the period 1968 to 1986 and find an average gain of about 11 percent,
which is statistically significant. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find that 76 percent of
330 successful tender offers from 1963 through 1988 achieved positive total gains.
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) demonstrate that the overall gains from a sample of bank
mergers announced during the period 1985 to 1991 are slightly positive, but statistically
indistinguishable form zero. Banerjee and Eckard (1998) show that the participants in the
great U.S. merger wave of 1897 - 1903 gained between 12 and 18 percent. Based on the
more recent evidence, we conclude that the total gains on average are positive.
However, the long-term effects may be different. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that
bidders in mergers under-perform (while bidders in tender offers out-perform) the market
in the three years after the acquisition. The long-term under-performance of acquiring
firms is not uniformly distributed across firms. It is predominantly caused by the poor
post-acquisition performance of low book-to-market “glamour” acquirers.30 To explain
their findings, Rau and Vermaelen propose a performance extrapolation hypothesis. The
management, as well as the market, the board of directors, and the large shareholders
over-extrapolate the past performance of the bidders’ management when they assess the
                                                       
30
 Rau and Vermaelen interpret a low book-to-market value as an indication that the current
management is efficient in managing the firm’s assets.
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benefits of an acquisition. That is, the market overestimates (underestimates) the ability
of glamour bidders (value firms) to manage other companies’ assets.
4.1.3
 
Summary and conclusions
Profit flow studies:   If a generalisation is to be drawn from the profit-flow studies, it
would have to be that mergers have but modest average effects on the profitability of the
merging firms. A robust finding, however, reappearing in many studies is that the
profitability of mergers is not guaranteed: a large proportion of mergers reduces
profitability.
This result can be interpreted in several ways. The worst case scenario is that in many
mergers market power is increased, but that the mergers create internal inefficiencies in
the firm that offset any profit increases. Another possibility is that there were no effects
on production costs on average, and that losses are due to competitors expanding their
production in response to mergers. This is a very surprising result. It is not difficult to
understand that a merger can be socially undesirable. But why should firms engage in
activities that are even bad for them? This is an issue to which we will return below.
It is important to keep in mind that there is variance around the mean profit effects.
Some mergers are profitable, and some mergers are unprofitable. This result is consistent
with the view that some, but not all, mergers do create efficiencies. This is important,
since it suggests that policy should not count on general cost savings from mergers, but
that policy somehow should allow for cost savings in specific cases–perhaps an efficiency
defence.
The available evidence is limited in several respects. Most studies concern mergers in
manufacturing during the 1960s and 1970s. The evidence is not sufficient to draw any
conclusions about the likely effects of mergers in different industries.
The empirical methodology adopted in the above mentioned and other studies is not
homogeneous. For example, some studies simply consider the profitability of the merging
firms before and after the merger. Other studies are more sophisticated in that they
compare the profitability of the merging firms with other firms in the same industry in
order to control for other changes that may have affected profitability during the studied
period. However, as Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) point out, the use of competing
firms to control for exogenous shocks creates its own problems. The reason is that a
merger normally confers an externality on the outsiders. When two firms merge and
reduce competition, the remaining competitors also gain. In fact, the outsiders may gain
more than the merging firms (so called strong positive externalities). The reason is that
the outsiders gain from the increase in the price, without having to reduce their own
production. Thus, what appears to be an unprofitable merger, may simply be a profitable
merger with a strong positive externality. The reverse is also true. What appears to be a
profitable merger may be an unprofitable merger with strong negative externalities.
These problems warn us that one should interpret the results of the studies with care.
Event Studies: The event study evidence shows that the target firms' shareholders benefit
(20-35 percent), and the bidding firms' shareholders generally break even (in the short
run). Moreover, the combined gains are mostly positive (up to 10 percent gains). The
increased total gains seems to suggest that merging firms either increase market power
or experience efficiency gains, such as cost savings.
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Unfortunately, almost all event studies discussed above use data from the U.S. It is not
clear to what extent these studies are also representative for Europe.
Furthermore, recent results invite to some caution concerning the event study
methodology. First, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that the bidders’ long term
performance is often negative. This may be interpreted to say that the short-term price
movements in the stock market are not very good at predicting merger performance. If
this interpretation is correct, Rau and Vermaelen’s results should be perceived as
evidence against the efficient market hypothesis underlying the (short-term) event study
methodology.31 If the efficient market hypothesis is rejected, it is not clear how one
should interpret the results in the earlier literature discussed above. Second, empirical
evidence suggests that the measures of target gains may include other information than
just the take-over (Schwert, 1996). Third, Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) argue
theoretically that changes in share-prices may reflect other information than the
profitability of the merger (see below). There are also some general problems associated
with event study methodology that do not only affect studies of mergers. For example,
the practical measurement of the stock price effects of certain events is clouded by other
events influencing stock prices. Furthermore, it is not obvious exactly which event that
should be taken as the (merger) event.
From this evidence, our two main conclusions are:
1. Merger control should not be based on a general presumption that mergers create
cost savings. The presence and magnitude of efficiency gains may need to be
examined on a case-by-case basis.
2. The available evidence on profitability and share prices does not point at any easily
observable conditions under which to expect efficiency gains.
We have already argued that both studies of profitability and studies of share prices are
troubled by methodological problems. Furthermore, if one combines the evidence from
studies of profitability and studies of share prices the emerging picture is mixed, and
perhaps even confusing. The available evidence indicates that a large proportion of
mergers reduce profitability, but that share prices rise. If the evidence from both types of
studies is correct, we are left with two empirical puzzles (cf. Caves, 1989; Sherer and
Ross, 1990): Why do unprofitable mergers occur? How share prices increase when
profitability falls? Most theoretical explanations for why unprofitable mergers may occur
rely on the idea that owners of the firms lack the instruments to discipline their managers,
and that the managers consistently overestimate their abilities (Roll, 1986), or that the
managers are motivated by a desire to build a corporate empire (Shleifer and Vishny,
1988). Neither the hubris nor the empire building hypothesis explains why the share
prices may increase at the same time as the profit flows decrease. In an attempt to
answer both puzzles, Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999) propose a hypothesis called the
pre-emptive merger motive. Firm A may merge with firm B, even if the merger reduces
their combined profit flow as compared with the status quo. This would happen if the
relevant alternative is that firm B merges with firm C, and this alternative merger would
reduce firm A's profit flow even more. Expressed differently, even if a merger reduces
the profit flow compared to the initial situation, it may increase the profit flow compared
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 Actually, Rau and Vermaelen argue that there is a growing body of evidence that short-term
measurements of abnormal performance do not capture the full effects of the stock market reaction to
an event.
43
to the relevant alternative—another merger. Furthermore, even though such a pre-
emptive merger reduces the profit flow, the aggregate value of the firms—the discounted
sum of all expected future profits—may actually increase. The reason is that the pre-
merger value of the firms accounts for the risk that the firms may become outsiders.
Under the hypothesis that the stock market is efficient—in the sense that share prices
reflect firm values—these results demonstrate that the two strands of the literature may
be consistent. In particular, the event studies can be interpreted to show that there exists
an industry-wide anticipation of a merger, and that the relevant information content of
the merger announcement is which firms are insiders and which are outsiders. To sum
up, these theories give a rather pessimistic picture of mergers. They may be motivated by
hubris, or empire building, or an attempt to pre-empt other mergers. According to these
interpretations of the available evidence, both market power and cost savings may be
secondary motives for mergers. Nevertheless, even if the motives are different, the
mergers still affect both market power and costs.
4.2 Disentangling market power and cost reductions
4.2.1
 
Effects of Mergers on Product Prices
4.2.1.1
 
Direct Studies
There are surprisingly few studies of the effect of merger on product prices. But the few
studies that have been made, unambiguously indicate that price tends to rise as a result of
merger. These results are of course not inconsistent with mergers leading to more
efficient operations. Yet, the impact of efficiency gains on price is more than offset by
increased market power, at least in the cases studied in the economics literature. One
may conclude that wealth gains to the stockholders of merging firms do not arise through
value creation alone, and relaxation of antitrust policy may result in nontrivial wealth
transfers from consumers.
A general methodological difficulty with a study of the price effects of mergers is that
one should properly take into account other conditions that may have changed after the
merger, for example changes in factor prices. This problem has been tackled by studying
how the prices of the merged firms’ products have changed in comparison to other
prices.
Barton and Sherman (1984) estimate the price effects of two acquisitions that resulted in
substantial increases in the market share of the acquiring firm. Both acquisitions were
made by Xidex Corporation the world’s largest producer of duplicating microfilm. In
1976 Xidex acquired its major rival in so-called diazo microfilm, and thereby increased
its U.S. market share from 40 percent to 55. In 1979 it acquired its main rival in vesicular
microfilm, thereby increasing its U.S. market share from 67 percent to 93. The study
uses data on actual transaction prices during the ten-year period 1973 to 1982. To
control for the influence of general inflation, costs of inputs, and gains in productivity,
they used price ratios of vesicular and diazo microfilm. This methodology biases the
results against finding any effects from the mergers to the extent that the two products
are good substitutes. The results indicate that the increase in the price of diazo film at the
first merger was around 11 percent, and that the increase in the price of vesicular
microfilm at the second merger was around 23 percent. Both estimates are significant at
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the 0.01 level. One may also note that latter merger, which almost created a monopoly,
increased the price more than the former merger.
Kim and Singal (1993) examine price changes associated with all airline mergers, and all
routes affected by those mergers for which data are available, in the U.S. during 1985-
1988. This is a natural experiment since during that period the U.S. government did not
contest any proposed merger in the airline industry. Another advantage of studying the
airline industry is that each route can be considered a separate market. Moreover, each
merger affects hundreds of routes. Thus, each of the 14 mergers generates a large
number of observations. To identify price changes that can be attributed to mergers, they
compared the fare change of a sample route with the average fare change in a control
group. There are, on average, 196 unaffected routes for each merger to be included in
the control group. The results show that over the period from merger talks through
merger completion, the merging firms increased airfares by an average of 9 percent
relative to a control group of routes unaffected by the merger. Rival firms responded by
raising their prices by an average of 12 percent.32 The fare changes are also positively
related to the distance of routes, suggesting that airlines exploit greater market power on
longer routes for which substitution by other modes of transport is less likely. Kim and
Singal also study the announcement and completion periods separately to identify the
effects of market power and synergy. They show that during the announcement period—
when changes are primarily due to the market power effect—prices are increased (plus
11 percent), but that during the completion period—when changes are primarily due to
efficiency—prices decrease (minus 9 percent). These results concern mergers that do not
include failing firms.33 Another interesting result is that Kim and Singal show that there
exists a significant positive relation between fare changes and changes in concentration.
Finally, they reject the idea that the mergers generated gains in quality that offset the
price increases. The number of customer complaints filed with a governing agency
increased almost threefold during the studied period.
Borenstein (1990), and Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1991) study the effect on airfares
of two airline mergers that occurred in 1986: the TWA-Ozark and Northwest-Republic
mergers. They find a significant increase in relative airfares on routes affected by the
Northwest-Republic merger, but little or no evidence on fare increases associated with
the TWA-Ozark merger.
Finally, we should mention a very different type of study. Cotterill (1990) studies the
effect of 6 horizontal mergers, among supermarket in the U.S., on concentration, the
price level, and the consumer food bill. First, Cotterill observes pre- and post-merger
market concentration, and computes how the mergers change market concentration, as
measured by the Herfindahl index. Second, Cotterill uses a previously established
empirical relationship between market concentration and the market price level, to
predict the impact of the mergers on the price level. Finally, he computes the implied
increase in the consumer food bill. Using this methodology, and depending on the size of
the merger, Cotterill predicts price changes in the range from fractions of a percent up to
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 This result may be upward biased due to the fact that anti-competitive price increases may come
immediately after the merger while efficiency gains may only come in the long run.
33
 Financially distressed airlines show a completely different pattern. They were initially setting prices
well below the industry average. During the announcement period the merging firms cut their prices
by an average of 19 percent, further increasing the gap to the industry average. In failing firm
mergers, prices were increased by 40 percent during the completion phase.
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three percent. This methodology is obviously very indirect, and it does perhaps not
provide much evidence about the price effects of mergers. However, it is interesting
since it could be used by competition authorities as a way to predict the likely effect of
merger on price. However, to do so one first needs to validate the methodology by
comparing predictions with actual results.
4.2.1.2
 
Indirect Studies
The number of empirical studies of the effects of mergers on prices is surprisingly small.
For this reason it is worth to consider also the indirect but complementary evidence
obtained in studies that compare prices between geographically separated markets with
different concentration levels. If high concentration is associated with high prices, this is
indirect evidence that horizontal mergers increase price, that is the market power effect
dominates the efficiency effect.
Schmalensee (1989) has previously surveyed this cross-section literature. According to
Schmalensee the main stylised fact that appears from these studies is that there exists a
positive relation between concentration and the price level (stylised fact 5.1). Bresnahan
(1989) also argues that the cross-section studies confirm the existence of a relationship
between price and concentration. In order to provide some feeling for these studies, we
describe some of them here as well.
The U.S. food retailing industry has been the subject of two studies. Lamm (1981)
studies 18 major Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S., covering the period
from 1974 to 1977. He identifies a positive relationship between food prices and market
concentration. Moreover, the results indicate that increases in the market shares of any of
the three largest firms increase price, while an increase in the size of the fourth largest
firm reduces market price. This evidence may indicate that three firms may collude, but
that collusion becomes more difficult when there are four or more large firms. Lamm
also finds that increased average store size reduces the market price. To be more exact,
increasing average store size by ten percent, reduces the price by around five percent.
This is consistent with the existence of scale efficiencies. Hence, to the extent that a
merger realises scale efficiencies it may actually reduce price. Using individual firm price
levels, Cotterill (1986) studies 18 local food retail markets in Vermont, each market
being served by between one and seventeen super markets. He shows that different firms
in the same market charge different prices that are based upon firm specific
characteristics, such as chain-dependence, capacity utilisation, and store size. After
controlling for these factors, market concentration has a significant impact on a firm’s
price level. Marvel (1978) studies the retail gasoline market in 22 U.S. cities for the years
1964 to 1971, and finds a statistically significant relation between concentration, as
measured by the Herfindhal index, and price. In particular, he finds that high
concentration leads to relatively high prices in the “low-price segment” of the markets.
Geithman, Marvel and Weiss (1981) review and extend some previous papers and search
for so-called critical concentration ratios. They look at the markets for underwriting,
gasoline retailing, and supermarkets. If a critical concentration ratio were found, below
which concentration had no effect on price, it would be of great importance because of
its implications for competition policy. It would seem to follow that a horizontal merger
in a market where concentration was below the critical level and where the merger could
not increase concentration above the critical level could not increase market power, or at
least would lead to efficiencies that outweigh increased market power. They show that
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critical concentration ratios may exist in certain industries. For example, a four firm
concentration ratio about 50. In other industries, for example supermarkets, no critical
level was found. They conclude that a single critical concentration ratio for all of
manufacturing is likely to be incorrect.
More recently, two studies on European markets appeared. Verboven (1996) analyses
international differences in automobile prices in five European countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. He estimates price-cost margins and
finds that they tend to be larger for firms with higher market shares. In particular,
domestic firms with a large market share, such as Fiat Group in Italy, have strong
domestic market power. Belgium, which the lowest concentration, shows the lowest
price-cost margins for most automobile models. Asplund and Sandin (1996a) study 543
driving schools in 250 local Swedish markets for 1995. Driving schools are generally
small, family owned businesses with a median of two cars and two employees. The mean
market price per minute varies from SEK 4.5 to 8.0. However, there is almost no
variation within a market. The results show that if prices in nearby markets are low, and
the distance to them are short, it reduces price. It is also shown that prices are increasing
in firm concentration within a local market.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) propose another methodology. The novelty is that it
can be applied in cases when data on prices are not available. Again, the idea is to study
different geographically separated markets. In particular, they focus on how the number
of firms in each market relates to market size. To enter into a market a firm must be able
to cover its fixed costs. A monopolist can charge a high margin, i.e. it can set a high
price in relation to its marginal cost. As a result, the monopolist may need a relatively
small market to cover its fixed costs. For example, if the fixed cost is 100, and if the
(constant) marginal cost is 1, and if a monopolist can charge a price of 2, it must sell at
least 100 units to break even. If consumers buy at most 1 unit of the good, the market
size must be at least 100 consumers. Consider two scenarios. Assume first that the data
reveals that in order for a market to support two firms, the market size must be at least
400 consumers. Then we can infer that the duopoly price is 1.5. (That gives a margin of
0.5. This margin multiplied by 200 consumers (per firm) gives 100 which is exactly
enough to cover fixed costs.) Assume next that the data reveals that in order for a
market to support two firms, the market size must be at least 200 consumers. Then we
can infer that the duopoly price is 1 (equal to the monopoly price). In short, by studying
how the number of firms relate to market size, we may infer how market power relates to
the number of firms. Using this methodology, Bresnahan and Reiss study several markets
(medical, dentists, plumbers and tire-sales) in the U.S. They suggest that competition is
significantly increased when the second or the third firm enters into the market. At lower
concentration levels, however, the effect of the number of firms on the margins appears
to be marginal. Asplund and Sandin (1996b) obtain similar results for Swedish driving
schools. In the context of mergers, this may be taken to indicate that mergers in market
with three or two firms are detrimental to allocative efficiency. Such an interpretation
requires of course that new entry is not immediate.
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4.2.2
 
Effects of Mergers on Market Shares
There have been a few studies that analysed the effects of mergers on the market share of
the merged entity. If a merger is driven by market power, the merged firm will increase
its price and lower its output. This initial change will increase the residual demand for the
competitors. As a response to the demand increase, the competitors will normally
increase both their prices and their output. The exact mix of these two elements depends
on the nature of competition.34 A robust prediction is that the market share of the
merged firm will drop if the merger is driven by market power. In contrast, if the merger
generates sufficient variable cost synergies, the merging firms may increase their market
share. Actually, mergers that tend to increase the price level should also tend to reduce
the merging firms’ market share, and mergers that tend to decrease the price level should
also tend to increase the merging firms’ market share.35 Hence, studying the effect of
merger on market shares, in principle, gives very similar information as a study of
prices.36
Again, the number of studies is very small. Nevertheless, the available evidence, if
anything, seems to suggest that the market shares of firms engaged in horizontal mergers
decline. The evidence on the effects on market shares from non-horizontal mergers is
mixed.
Goldberg (1973, cited in Mueller 1985) examined a sample of 44 companies acquired in
the fifties and sixties and found no significant change in market shares or growth rates in
the (median three and a half) years following the mergers. Mueller (1985) uses surveys
for 1950 and 1972 of sales at the 5-digit level for the 1,000 largest companies in the U.S.
He constructs a sample of 209 acquired firms and 123 acquiring firms together with a
control group of firms that did not participate in mergers. Control groups are formed to
match the merging firms’ characteristics. The control-group to firms participating in
conglomerate or vertical mergers retained 88.5 percent of their 1950 market share in
1972. Firms participating in a non-horizontal merger, on the other hand only retained 18
percent of its market share. The corresponding figures for horizontal mergers are 55
percent and 14 percent respectively. Baldwin and Gorecki (1990, cited in Mueller 1997)
find significant declines in market shares for plants acquired in horizontal mergers, but no
significant changes for plants acquired in other sorts of mergers.
                                                       
34
 For example, the Cournot model predicts that competitors would respond by increasing their output
relatively much, whereas the Bertrand model predicts that competitors respond by increasing their
prices relatively much.
35
 This statement is at least true in simple models of oligopolistic competition.
36
 Another reason for why it is interesting to study market shares is that firm profitability is positively
related to market share (Mueller, 1983). Thus, a big reduction of market share may be taken to
indicate a reduction of profitability.
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4.2.3
 
Effects of Mergers on Outsiders’ Share Prices
The results on the merging firms’ stock price performance do not disentangle the gains
attributable to increased market power and the gains attributable to, for example,
technological efficiencies. As a solution, Eckbo (1983) proposes to indirectly disentangle
both types of effects on profitability by also considering the effect of stock prices on the
competitors that are not involved in the merger. The idea is that mergers driven by
market power motives are beneficial to competitors: any attempt to raise prices or
restrict production by the merging firms also benefits the competitors. In contrast, some
types of efficiencies should hurt the competitors, for example cost efficiencies that induce
the merged firm to lower its prices, in which case the stock price of the competitors
would drop.
Unfortunately, the available evidence on this point is not conclusive. Stillman (1983)
finds no statistically significant effect on outsiders' share prices. Eckbo (1983) finds a
small but statistically significant increase. However, the latter study is also inconclusive:
in those cases where competition authorities announce an investigation of the merger, the
outsiders' share prices are not affected in a significant way. Schumann (1993) confirms
this pattern.
Banerjee and Eckard (1998) show that the competitors during the Great Merger Wave of
1897 - 1903 suffered significant value losses, around 10 percent. This result may be
interpreted as evidence for the existence of price-reducing efficiencies. A potential
criticism to this approach is that anti-competitive mergers without efficiencies may hurt
the rival firms if they are of a predatory nature. Banerjee and Eckard (1998) argue that
the competitors’ losses during the great merger wave are not associated to predatory
practices of the merged firm. The reason is that there is no statistically significant
difference between the returns to outsiders when the merging parties have high market
shares (and where predation is more likely to be effective) and when the merging parties
have low market shares. These results are consistent with the idea that efficiency gains
were involved in the great merger wave.
Singal (1996) develops this methodology even further by combining stock-price data
with product market data. The study concerns 14 airline mergers in the U.S. during
1985-1988. Singal relates changes in stock-prices of merging and rival firms to the
change in market concentration (measured by Herfindhal index), and to the number of
common airports of the merging firms. The latter is considered to be an indication of the
presence of efficiency gains from a merger. The results show that common airports are
positively related to gains for insiders and losses for outsiders - interpreted as evidence of
efficiency gains. The results also show that a large increase in concentration is associated
with gains for outsiders and no effect on insiders - interpreted as the classical free-rider
problem, associated with mergers that increase market power.37
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 One may question to what extent Singal succeeds to identify market power and cost reduction. First,
if two airlines have a large number of common airports, they probably also have common routes.
Hence, common ports should not only indicate scope for efficiencies, but also for anticompetitive
effects. Second, the so-called free rider problem should be smaller, not bigger if the change in
concentration is big.
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4.2.4
 
Summary and conclusions
There is considerable dispute concerning the welfare effects of mergers. Are mergers
mainly motivated by market power or efficiency gains? The two strands of the empirical
literature, industrial economics and financial economics, reach apparently contradictory
results.
The industrial economics literature studies the effect of mergers on product prices and
market shares. There are surprisingly few such studies,38 but they unambiguously indicate
that prices tend to rise, and that insiders' market shares tend to fall as a result of
horizontal mergers. A reasonable interpretation of this evidence is that mergers create
market power, and that any cost reductions are insufficient to dominate (from a
consumer's perspective). However, the evidence is also consistent with the idea that
mergers increase rather than reduce costs. These studies indicate that horizontal mergers
reduce consumers’ welfare, by transferring wealth to firms, and by creating dead-weight
losses.
Financial economists use the event study methodology to disentangle market power and
cost saving effects in horizontal mergers. Eckbo (1983), Eckbo and Wier (1985),
Banerjee and Eckard (1998) and others use event studies to evaluate the welfare effects
of horizontal mergers, by examining how the outsiders' share prices move in response to
the announcement of a horizontal merger, and a subsequent announcement of an antitrust
complaint. If the outsiders' share prices increase (decrease) at the time of the first
(second) announcement, then the merger is deemed anti-competitive. The reason is that
an anti-competitive merger raises the product price, thereby increasing the outsiders'
profits. Unfortunately, the available evidence on this point is not conclusive. All studies
of modern mergers find no or only small effects on outsiders’ share prices. This can be
interpreted as either the absence of both market power and efficiency effects, or their
offsetting presence.39
The event study approach has been criticised by McAfee and Williams (1988), and
Fridolfsson and Stennek (1999). McAfee and Williams turn the event study procedure
around and ask whether rival firms' stock prices move in the predicted directions when a
horizontal merger with ex post known anti-competitive effects is announced and,
subsequently, challenged. The empirical results show absolutely no evidence of the
merger being anti-competitive. Indeed, the signs of the estimated coefficients are
generally opposite to their predicted values, given that the merger was anti-competitive.
This finding casts doubts on event studies being able to detect anti-competitive mergers,
and the policy implications of such studies. McAfee and Williams argue that their result
is likely due to the fact that the outsiders, in their sample, were large multi-product firms
that derived only a small fraction of their revenues from the affected market.
Fridolfsson’s and Stennek’s theoretical model provides an additional explanation why
event studies fail to detect anti-competitive mergers. In fact, they show that the effect of
an anti-competitive merger on the rivals' stock value may be the opposite to what is
generally believed, exactly as is suggested by McAfee's and Williams' empirical evidence.
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 Barton and Sherman (1984), and Kim and Singal (1993) study product prices. Mueller (1985)
studies market shares.
39
 Eckbo (1983) finds little evidence of horizontal mergers being anti-competitive. This is surprising,
since the sample only includes mergers that were challenged as anti-competitive. Based on this
evidence, Eckbo and Wier (1985) draw strong policy implications: “all but the ‘most overwhelmingly
large’ mergers should be allowed to go forward”.
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If a merger increases the price and has a positive externality on the outsider, but
becoming an insider is even more advantageous, then the outsiders' value is always
reduced. Assuming that the stock market is efficient: Anti-competitive mergers may
reduce the outsiders' stock market value. Intuitively, the pre-merger value of the outside
firm is high, since it reflects the possibility of becoming an insider. Once the merger has
taken place, this possibility is excluded, and the outsider's share price is reduced. The
new information in the merger announcement is which firms are insiders and which are
outsider. As a consequence, of this critique, we believe that the direct studies of the
effect of merger on prices are more reliable than the Stillman-Eckbo methodology.
A study by Singal (1996) combines stock-price data with product market data (for
example concentration). This study provides some evidence that 14 airline mergers in the
U.S. during 1985-1988 did create both market power and reduce cost.
4.3 Studies of Efficiency Gains and Pass-on
4.3.1
 
Effects of Mergers on Productivity
The most direct way of assessing the efficiency gains from mergers is by measuring
productivity gains and economies of scale realised following a merger.40 Some studies do
this using statistical techniques, others confine attention to particular cases.
Berger and Humphrey (1992) study 57 U.S. banking mega-mergers from 1981 to 1989.
They estimate a neo-classical cost function which allows them to consider two types of
efficiencies, namely scale economies, and X-efficiency (or slack).41 Earlier studies have
shown that there are not substantial cost efficiency gains to be make simply by increasing
the size of already large banks. In fact, there may be slight scale diseconomies of scale.
On the other hand, a growing literature on X-inefficiencies in banking, or variations in
cost ascribed to differences in managerial ability, finds that these efficiencies account for
cost variations of 20 percent or more and that these differences are stable over time.
Thus, if more efficient banks take over less efficient banks, a merger could have create
substantial efficiency gains. Berger and Humphrey produce three main results. First, the
ex ante choice of merger partners often did satisfy the condition for being conducive to
improving X-efficiency. In 55 to 72 percent of the cases, the acquiring bank was more
efficient than the acquired. Also, more than 70 percent of the mergers partners has some
geographical market overlap. Second, the mergers were not successful on average in
improving cost efficiency. The average X-efficiency improvement was less than five
percentage points and was not statistically significant. Moreover, because of
diseconomies of scale, the consolidated firms actually performed slightly worse on
average after the mergers, although also this effect was also small and often not
statistically significant. However, there do appear to be some very successful mergers as
well as some very unsuccessful ones. Third, Berger and Humphrey go one step further
and relate their ex post efficiency results to some ex ante conditions that are commonly
believed to be indicators of expected efficiency effects (large difference in X-efficiency
between the acquiring and the acquired banks, and a large degree of deposit market
overlap). They find that ex post cost efficiency gains are not significantly positively
associated with these ex ante conditions.
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 See Caves (1989) and Scherer and Ross (1990) for useful overviews.
41
 See also Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a profit function approach.
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A couple of papers study how productivity varies according to the diversification of
firms activities.42 Their results show that productivity declines as firms become more
diversified. However, since these studies concern diversification mergers, they need not
carry much information concerning the efficiency effects of horizontal mergers.
An example of a case study is provided by Scherer, Backstein, Kaufer, and Murphy
(1975, cited in Scherer and Ross, 1990). They study the 1969 merger of three English
anti-friction bearing manufacturers. The firms sold extensively overlapping lines of
general-purpose bearings. Immediately following the merger, production assignments
were revamped to eliminate duplication and lengthen runs. Within three years, output per
employee had been improved by some 40 percent, at least partly as a result of the
increased specialisation. Further improvements were expected after some time, as a
result of increased mechanisation. Similar, but less dramatic cases of cost-savings are
described in the same study.
Some economists argue that capital-raising (a form of purchasing economy) is much
cheaper for large than small firms. As a consequence, when a small firm joins a large
firm, the smaller firm is likely to benefit from the larger enterprise’s lower cost of capital.
Case studies by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) reveal that this may be one of the most
compelling advantages of mergers.
Finally, Fisher and Lande (1983) review a set of case studies of mergers (many from the
trade and general business press). They emphasise that it is dangerous to generalise from
examples. Nevertheless, they argue that many individual mergers create substantial
efficiencies, that many others are notable failures, and that the record of prediction is too
poor to give any confidence that we can predict the level of cost saving on a case-by-
case basis sufficiently accurately to make this prediction a major basis for public policy.
4.3.1.1
 
Indirect evidence
There exists an empirical literature that estimates returns to scale. This literature may be
used to assess indirectly the opportunity that mergers realise cost savings related to
returns of scale. A second advantage with this literature is that is can be used to say
something about individual industries. This evidence is reviewed in, for example, Scherer
and Ross (1990).
We may use the study by Scherer, Backstein, Kaufer, and Murphy (1975) to illustrate the
types of results that are obtained. The study is based on an interviewing program
covering twelve major industries in seven industrialised nations. The industries are beer
brewing, cigarettes, cotton, paints, petroleum refining, leather shoes, glass bottles,
Portland cement, integrated steel, anti-friction bearings, refrigerators, automobile storage
batteries. They report estimates of the minimum efficient scale, the percentage of 1967
U.S. demand covered by a minimum efficient scale plant, and the percentage increase in
cost that would result from operating a plant at one third of the minimum efficient scale.
The estimates indicate that the minimum efficient scale constitutes between 0.2 percent
of U.S. demand (leather shoes) and 14.1 percent (refrigerators). The percentage cost
increase of running at a smaller scale ranges from 1.5 percent (leather shoes) to 26
percent (Portland cement). In half the industries the cost-elevation is five percent or less.
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 See Caves and Barton (1990) and Lichtenberg (1992). Both studies are reviewed in Mueller (1997).
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The relevance of such results to assess the efficiency gains from merger is not obvious.
However, we believe that numbers like these may provide useful background information
for anti-trust authorities when evaluating the likely consequences of a merger. It may
therefore be useful to complement our preliminary description with an in depth
investigation to this literature, and to synthesise the results (i.e. collect more studies, in
particular more updated studies, arrange them by industry, and compare them with
relevant demand figures for Europe and parts of Europe) so that they may be used in
merger analysis.
4.3.2
 
Effects of Mergers on Innovation
According to Schumpeter (1942), it is essential to distinguish between the organisation
of industries most conducive to solving the problem of excessive pricing and those
organisational forms most conducive to rapid technological progress. In his view, a large
firm operating in a concentrated market is the most powerful engine of progress and
long-run expansion of output. There are several theoretical arguments to substantiate the
Schumpeterian claim. Large firms may have larger and more stable internal funds to
finance R&D projects. There may be scale economies in R&D. The returns from for
example process innovation may be higher if the firms is producing large quantities.
Finally, there may exist complementarities between R&D and other activities in the firm.
However, there are also some counter-arguments, for example the loss of control in large
organisations.
Since horizontal mergers increase the size of the merging firms and also the
concentration in the relevant market, horizontal mergers may potentially create important
efficiencies in promoting technological progress. Unfortunately we are not aware of any
empirical studies that focus directly on the effects of merger on technological progress.
However, there exists a large empirical literature that tests Schumpeter’s two hypothesis:
(1) innovation increases with firm size and (2) innovation increases with market
concentration. This literature may be used as indirect evidence. However, one should
point out that there are many methodological problems in this work. For example, one
fundamental problem is the absence of satisfactory measures of new knowledge and its
contribution to technological progress. The main conclusion from this literature is that
the effects of firm size and market concentration on innovation, if they exist at all, do not
appear to be important (Cohen and Levin, 1989).43
4.3.3
 
Pass-on
In order to understand the welfare effects of a merger, it is not sufficient to know
whether the merger creates any efficiency gains. It is also important to know if, for
example, cost savings are passed on to consumers in the form of a lower price. This is
important in order to assess the effect of a merger on the distribution of wealth in
society. Pass-on is also important since it affects the dead-weight loss of a merger.
From an empirical perspective, pass-on studies appear in various applications. In
international economics, for example, there exists a detailed literature estimating the
effects of exchange rate changes on prices, see for example, Goldberg and Verboven
(1998) and, for an overview, Goldberg and Knetter (1996). These studies show that
                                                       
43
 However, there is some evidence that expectations that successful R&D may increase a firm’s market
power may motivate R&D efforts.
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foreign firms generally do not fully pass-through exchange rate changes into local
consumer prices. Also in international economics, there are studies that analyse the
effects of import tariffs on prices. Feenstra (1989), for example, finds a symmetric degree
of incomplete pass-through of import tariffs as of exchange rate fluctuations, consistent
with theory. In public economics, there exists an empirical literature on tax incidence, i.e.
who bears the burden of value added taxes and excise taxes. Most of the traditional
literature focuses on tax incidence under perfect competition. More recently, Verboven
(1998) considered a model of imperfect competition for the car market, and found
significant tax incidence stemming from imperfect competition. Finally, in agricultural
economics there is a large literature on the incomplete transmission of raw goods prices
into final consumers prices, see e.g. McCoriston, Morgan and Rayner (1998). The results
from this literature should however be interpreted with care in the present context, since
raw goods typically constitute only part of marginal costs. For an attempt to take this
into account empirically, see for example Bettendorf and Verboven (1998).
The general empirical finding from this literature is that pass-on is indeed incomplete.
The examples cited above suggest that pass-on roughly varies between 30% and 70%.44
Yet we stress that a more detailed study is necessary to obtain a more complete picture.
4.3.4
 
Summary and conclusions
In our view, the empirical picture on the effect of merger on productivity and
technological progress is too incomplete to allow any far-reaching conclusions. The
general picture remains. There does not exist clear evidence that mergers, as a general
rule, create efficiency gains. However, at least some mergers do create efficiencies.
Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that (between 30 and 70 percent of) costs
savings are passed on to price.
To complement this picture we believe that it would be valuable to conduct a follow-up
study. Such a study should, in our view, focus on empirical estimates of returns to scale.
Such studies can be used at least as indirect evidence for the efficiency gains from
mergers. It would also be desirable to deepen the survey into pass-on. In both cases, it
should be possible to obtain results for specific industries.
4.4 Distribution
The discussion above has primarily focused on the issue if mergers create any efficiency
gains. However, we are also interested in how the social surplus (or losses) created by
the merger is divided between the firms’ different interest groups. Typically one would
expect that a merger affect the wealth of all the interest groups, including suppliers,
buyers, competitors, bondholders, employees and management. Actually, some of the
studies reviewed above also have implications for the distribution of the social surplus
created by the merger. In particular, two results are noteworthy.
First, studies of consumer prices (and the merging firms’ market shares) indicate that
horizontal mergers reduce consumers’ welfare. Hence, if mergers create efficiency gains,
consumers do not, at least as a general rule, receive a share of that surplus.45
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 That is if cost is reduced by ten percent, price is reduced by three to seven percent.
45
 Remember however that there are relatively few direct studies of how mergers affect consumer prices
(and the market shares of the insiders).
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Second, the event study evidence shows that the target firms' shareholders benefit, and
that the bidding firms' shareholders generally break even.46 The unequal distribution
suggests that competition authorities may want to condition the approval of an
international merger on whether the national firm is buying or being bought. In
particular, the competition authorities may be more favourable towards a merger in
which the national firm is being bought.47 Also in national mergers the unequal
distribution may have some consequences for distribution between wealth groups. The
bidder is often the bigger and financially stronger party, and the target may be a smaller
(perhaps family owned) firm.
Apart from the impact on consumers and shareholders, it may be of special interest to
analyse the effects of mergers on employees. In particular, for policy-makers potential
job-losses is an important issue. Unfortunately, not much useful empirical or theoretical
work has been done to analyse what impact horizontal mergers, and the efficiency gains
from such mergers, have on wages and employment. Therefore we confine ourselves to
sketching what these effects may be.
The effect of mergers on employees is a complex issue. A purely anti-competitive merger
reduces output and thus employment. A merger that creates some efficiency gains does
so either because the assets in the two firms (including employees) are complementary in
some sense, or because some duplicated functions can be eliminated. In the first case the
marginal products of the employees are increased. In the short run, that could lead to
higher wages. But in the longer run, when firm can hire more people, marginal
productivity should be forced back to the level determined by the market wage rate.
Thus the anti-competitive effect and the efficiency effect goes in opposite directions. The
total effect, one may expect, goes in the same direction as output. That is, if the merger
reduces output and increases consumers’ prices, then employment is likely to be reduced.
(A complication is that since productivity has increased, by assumption, output change is
an upward biased estimate of employment change.) Empirical results indicate that
horizontal mergers, on average, reduce output. Hence, one may expect that horizontal
mergers, on average, lead to reduced employment. In the second case, one would expect
that the firms lay off some employees. In this case, the anti-competitive effect and the
efficiency effect both points at reduced employment.48
We thus conclude that horizontal mergers, on average, may be expected to reduce
employment in the merging firms. At the same time, one should note, competitors to the
merging firms are likely to expand their output (if the merger increases consumers’
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 Remember however that the evidence only shows that mergers increase the aggregate stock value of
the insiders relative to the pre-merger situation. This does not imply that the aggregate stock value
after the merger is higher than it would have been in case of a strict merger control that would have
prevented the merger. The reason is that the pre-merger stock value in the first case takes into
account the probability that there will be a merger, while in the latter case the pre-merger value is
formed under the knowledge that there will not be a merger (Fridolfsson and Stennek, 1999).
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 In contrast, casual evidence suggests that many debaters are less favourable towards a merger in
which a national firm is being bought. This may be due to a fear that the country will lose job
opportunities, or to purely nationalistic reasons.
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 This discussion shows that efficiencies are likely to be important for how a merger affects
employment in the merging firms. However, the effect of efficiencies (abstracting from the anti-
competitive effect) is to increase employment in one case (complementary assets), and to reduce
employment in the other case (elimination of duplicated functions).
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prices). Hence, the first effect is likely to be mitigated by this response. Still, however,
the first effect may be likely to dominate. Now, if employment is reduced, we need to
know where these former employees go. If there is no unemployment (or only
unemployment due to frictions), they will soon get a new job at a similar wage.
However, if there is unemployment, the laid off workers may be hurt in a very significant
way by the merger.
The above discussion has presupposed that wages are set by the market, and that the
firms only adjust employment as a result of the merger. However, if wages are truly
negotiated, and if the employees have bargaining power in wage negotiations, the
analysis becomes more complicated. In this case, one may expect that the surplus that the
firms gain from having market power in the final goods markets, to some extent is
transferred to the employees. A merger that increases market power thus has the
potential to increase wages to those that remain employed in the firms. (Another way for
employees to extract these rents is to negotiate less lay-offs.) On the other hand, the
merger may increase the firms’ market power in the labour market (buying power).
Hence, the effect on wages is ambiguous. There is a larger surplus to bargain over, but
the firms’ have increased their bargaining power. Much of the empirical evidence seem to
support the hypothesis the employer bargaining strength hypothesis (Hekmat, 1995;
Gokhale, Growhen and Neumark, 1995; Becker, 1995; Peoples, Hekmat and Moini,
1993). Some evidence points in the opposite direction (Kole and Lehn, 1997)49
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 Moreover, one may argue that hostile take-overs are likely to be triggered in those cases where the
current management has negotiated wage contracts that are too generous. The take-over gain would
then consist in renegotiations of these contracts. In that case, employees are hurt by the transaction.
However, in order for that mechanism to work, it must be that the new management is more skilled
in wage negotiations. Empirical studies find little evidence that take-overs are motivated by the
expropriation of extra-marginal wages (Gokhale, Growhen and Neumark, 1995; Neumark and
Sharpe, 1996).
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5. EFFICIENCY DEFENCES IN PRACTICE
In this section, we review the efficiency defence in seven O.E.C.D. jurisdictions, namely
the United States, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.50 Each country is discussed separately in sections 5.1 to 5.7. This
review indicates what the difficulties are in order for efficiency gains to be considered by
competition policy agencies, and what administrative routines that are used to mitigate
these problems.
Our review shows that the different countries (and different authorities within a country)
differ in their objectives. In all cases, consumers’ welfare is argued to be important. In
some countries also the firms’ profits are considered as a part of the objectives. That is
usually referred to as the Williamsonian welfare standard. Some countries also put a
special emphasis on the domestic firms’ international competitiveness. Other countries do
not allow “national champion” arguments. In some countries it is explicitly mentioned
that the effect of a merger on unemployment is not considered.
An important difference between the different countries is between three types of
methodology to take efficiencies into account. First, efficiencies may be balanced against
anti-competitive effects on an case-by-case basis. This is the “pure” efficiency defence
methodology. Second, efficiencies are also (implicitly) taken into account by the choice
of thresholds (for example expressed in terms of market-shares or concentration) above
(below) which mergers are automatically rejected (approved). This method is referred to
as the general-presumption methodology. Finally, there is the intermediate case of the
sequential method. According to this method some cases are decided based solely on
structural indicators such as market shares. In the intermediate (or borderline) cases, a
second efficiency defence stage is applied.
In case there is an efficiency defence, one of the main aspects in the identification and
measurement of efficiencies is the so-called merger specificity. That is, an anti-
competitive merger can only be approved because of efficiencies, if those efficiencies
(absent the merger) would not be realised through less anti-competitive means. The
alternative means could be internal expansion, but also other external agreements
between  the firms, or alternative mergers are considered.
In order to use this experience from the O.E.C.D. countries efficiently, we synthesise the
country-by-country discussions in the form of a unified “check-list” for the design of an
efficiency defence. The check-list can be found in the final section (section 5.8). This list
includes 16 important issues. In addition to those already mentioned, for example what
types of efficiencies that are considered, burden of proof, standard of proof, and
efficiencies as an offence.
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 Some of the O.E.C.D. experience has previously been described by O.E.C.D. (1996). A more
complete description of the different merger control systems, but not focusing on efficiencies, can be
found in Rowley and Baker (1996).
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5.1 United States
5.1.1
 
The Clayton Act
United States merger policy is mainly carried out by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger
Notification Act, all “big” firms must report all “big” proposed acquisitions. A merger
cannot be consummated until one of the agencies has evaluated its likely effects on
competition. If a problem is found, the merging parties can withdraw the proposal,
negotiate a method of alleviating the agencies concern (for example some divestiture) or
litigate the acquisition’s legality. Very few cases are litigated. Between 1982 and 1986,
the agencies brought enforcement actions against only 56 mergers out of more than 7700
reported (Salop, 1987).
Mergers are evaluated under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. A merger is considered illegal
if it substantially decreases competition or tends to create a monopoly. The task to define
the law, within these vague statutes, is given to the federal courts. Hence, the role of
efficiencies in U.S. antitrust analysis of mergers is not set forth in a single law, but rather
requires examination of relevant case law, and enforcement policy statements.
5.1.2
 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
5.1.2.1
 
The Federal Merger Guidelines
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC jointly issue Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. The purpose of the Guidelines is to give merging parties and the general
public guidance on how the agencies analyse mergers, and how they decide whether or
not to challenge a proposed transaction. The Guidelines do not supersede the case law
and are not binding to the courts. However, many courts do find the analytical
framework of the Guidelines helpful (Kinne, 1998).
The first releases of the Guidelines in 1968 and 1982 opposed efficiency considerations
unless there were exceptional circumstances. The later releases of the Guidelines in 1984
and 1992 (which is still in use today) reveals a more sympathetic treatment of efficiency
claims. Coate and McChesney (1992) statistically analyse 70 merger investigations
(including all important horizontal mergers) at the FTC from 1982 to 1987. They find
that efficiency considerations, during that period, did not affect the agency’s decisions
whether or not to challenge mergers.51 Today, however, the picture may be different.
According to Chairman Pitofsky (1998), claims of efficiencies do influence the FTC
prosecutorial discretion, for example in some hospital mergers, and in the case of
Chrysler – Daimler Benz.
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 According to Coate and McChesney (1992) there are important differences between the Merger
Guidelines and FTC’s actual behaviour. For example FTC’s practice does not corroborate the
guidelines’ claim that a challenge will be made in all but the most “extraordinary circumstances”
when the post-merger Herfindahl index is over 1 800 and the change is greater than 100. If
concentration alone were judged high but barriers to entry judged low and collusion judged difficult,
a complaint would have no measurable chance of success. They also find that external political
pressures imposed on the FTC by Congress to block mergers, independent of the factors identified in
the guidelines as meriting a merger challenge, are a statistically significant factor in the FTC’s
decision whether to challenge a merger.
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5.1.2.2
 
Outline of the Efficiency Section (Section 4)
The efficiency section (Section 4) was the main subject of the revision of the 1992
Guidelines that appeared in 1997. The purpose of the revision was to clarify rather than
to change the standards. The new version discusses types of efficiencies, merger
specificity, verifiability, pass-on, and net effects.
Types of efficiencies: According to the guidelines a merger may generate efficiencies.
Not only cost savings are mentioned but also improved quality, enhanced service, and
new products. Cost savings that arise from reductions in output are not considered.
Certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be cognisable (merger-specific, verifiable,
and not arising from reduction in output) than others. The Guidelines give three
examples.
1. Efficiencies resulting from rationalisation and multi-plant economies of scale, that is
shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the
merging firms to reduce the marginal cost of production, are more likely to be
susceptible to verification, merger-specific, and substantial, and are less likely to result
from anti competitive reductions in output.
2. Efficiencies relating to research and development are potentially substantial but are
generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of anti competitive
output reductions.
3. Efficiencies relating to procurement, management, or capital cost are less likely to be
merger-specific or substantial.
Merger specificity: To be considered, efficiencies must be merger-specific. That is, the
efficiencies must be (1) likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger, and (2)
unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger, or another
means having comparable anti-competitive effects. This means that the efficiency claims
will be rejected if equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by the
parties through other means without the merger's potential adverse competitive effects.
Only alternatives that are practical in the business situation are considered. Examples of
alternatives may be internal expansion, joint ventures, licensing or divestiture.
Verifiability: The merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agencies
can verify (1) the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency; (2) how and
when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so); (3) how each would enhance
the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete; and (4) why each would be merger-
specific. It thus appears that it is the firms that have the burden of proving the existence
of efficiencies.
Pass-on and magnitude: The Agencies do not challenge a merger if efficiencies are of
such a character and magnitude that the merger is not likely to be “anti-competitive.”52
The efficiencies must be sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers,
for example by preventing price increases. That is, the Guidelines require that the
claimed efficiencies be passed on to consumers, rather than only benefit the parties to the
merger. The greater the adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be the
efficiencies. Actually, efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-
monopoly.
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 Anti-competitive is here not taken to mean an increase in market power.
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Net-effects: Efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced by the merger or incurred in
achieving those efficiencies.
5.1.2.3
 
The Guidelines at Work53
5.1.2.3.1 The Objectives
Consumer’s surplus vs. total surplus: The Agencies are flexible about the welfare
standard. The Merger Guidelines also indicates that the Agencies consider factors
beyond the effect on price. Hence, large cost savings can be used as a motivation for
mergers in marginal cases, where the merger would likely produce only a small increase
in price (Williamsonian trade-off). There have been at least two such cases. Note that the
decision taken by the Agencies is directed by their perceived chances of winning the case
in court. If the case is marginal, it may not be worth bringing to court.
International markets: No coherent policy has been formulated for international markets.
However, it has been argued on many occasions that only US consumers are counted.
This is considered to be a question of jurisdiction. It is not US authorities that have
jurisdiction over cases where the anti-competitive effects hurt consumers in other
countries.
If a merger has the effect of making U.S. companies better competitors abroad, that
effect is not considered by the Agencies. The idea of “national champions” does not
affect merger analysis.
5.1.2.3.2 Identification and measurement of efficiencies
Real vs. pecuniary gains: Purchasing economies, but not tax gains, are often discussed in
cases. A real purchasing economy would be present for example if it arises from
standardising a product. Pecuniary gains are not counted in favour of a merger. (Also in
this sense, the consumer’s surplus standard is not strict.) One example where purchasing
economies where discussed is Office Depot – Staples (FTC). However, frequently
purchasing economies are not considered since they are often not merger specific.
Countervailing power: There is no clear case law on how to treat countervailing power.
There have been cases in health care where the reduction of other agents’ market power
has been considered a benefit. However, in general market power is a bad thing, and
countervailing power may make things worse.
Verification of efficiencies: The Agencies consider any documents that the parties bring
forward, but may put more or less weight to it depending on various circumstances.
There are no absolute rules for which documents that are considered persuasive and
which documents that are given less weight. The Agencies thought about including such
rules in the Merger Guidelines but decided not to.
Any documents created after the firms’ decided to merge is less likely to be considered
important by the Agencies. Documents that where a part of the decision process is more
likely to be considered. Also if the plans are vague, they will be given less weight.
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 This section is a summary of a discussion with Gregory Werden (DOJ), Craig Conrath (DOJ),
Willard Tom (FTC) and Gregory Vistnes (FTC). The summary is based on our own notes, and it has
not been approved by the above participants.
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The problem of verification should also be considered in the light of the empirical
evidence showing that many mergers fail to deliver projected efficiencies. Hence, there
are two separate questions that need to be answered. Is the decision to merge based on
projected efficiencies (or only motivated by market power)? Are the efficiency estimates
held by the firms reasonable (taking into account the history of failure)?
Merger specificity and practicality of alternatives: There are no procedures for
constructing the “list” of practical alternatives.
The Agencies must rely on industry expertise to answer questions of the following sort.
What have other firms done to solve the same problems that the firms’ try to solve by the
merger? How have these alternatives worked out in the past?
Examples of other factors considered are the following. If the merging parties claim
efficiencies in a certain branch of their operations, they will have to explain why they do
not restrict the merger to that branch. If the alternative is another merger, and the
alternative partner has said no, then that alternative is deemed impractical. Looser forms
of Cupertino are considered practical only if one can expect competitors to co-operate.
Quantification: The Agencies do not spend much effort on quantifying efficiencies.
Arguing that efficiencies are small is not the Agencies favourite argument in Court. It is
more effective to discuss for example merger specificity.
5.1.2.3.3 Pass-on (competitive effects)
Quantification and balancing: The Agencies’ analysis is not quantitative.
Factors considered in judging pass-on: The agencies normally do not explicitly
construct pass-on rates. Actually, they usually do not even think in terms of pass-on. One
should remember that the Agencies do not have a quantitative measure of the anti-
competitive effects anyway.
The issue of pass-on can be avoided. The Agencies often have a sense of what is big and
what is small, and the balancing of efficiencies and anti-competitive effects is not
quantitative. The Agencies try to find concrete historic examples (even rather remote
examples are valued) that may indicate if a merger will increase or reduce prices.
The distinction between fixed and variable costs is important. Fixed costs are not likely
to be passed-on, at least not in the short run.
Only in one case there has been an attempt to estimate pass-on, namely Staples – Office
Depot. It is often difficult to estimate pass-on since it is the firm specific pass-on that is
relevant. Costs saving in different firms are usually highly correlated in the data.
In simulation analysis things are different. Then there is a quantitative measure of anti-
competitive effects. Pass-on is a part of the model. Then any factors are considered that
is part of the oligopoly model used.
5.1.2.3.4 Information problems
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Limits: The agencies consider efficiencies in all cases—even in mergers for monopoly.
However, in some cases it may be easy to conclude that efficiencies are not sufficient.
Burden of proof: Some commentators argue that the firms’ burden of proof includes the
balancing. (However, normally firms argue that there are no anti-competitive effects, and
hence do they do not present any balancing.) Others argue that it is the Agencies that
need to win the case on the balancing, since it is the Agencies that bring the cases to
Court. Once the firms have shown efficiencies, the Agencies have the burden of proof .
Types of efficiencies: There are no categories of efficiencies that are ex ante excluded
from being considered, due to problems of verification. For example, the Agencies have
considered managerial efficiencies when it has been clearly demonstrated that the
acquirer is superior to the rest of the industry.54
5.1.3
 
Federal Court Cases55
5.1.3.1
 
Supreme Court Cases
There have been three major merger decisions concerning the consideration of
efficiencies in merger litigation. In one case, Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., efficiencies were
viewed as an offence. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble efficiencies seem to have been
considered irrelevant.56 Since the Supreme Court has not addressed such claims again
since that time, the case law still stands today.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S. (1962), the Supreme Court sustained the government’s
challenge to the merger between two manufacturers and retailers of shoes. The Court
held that the merger was illegal because the large, post merger firm could undersell its
competitors. The Court concluded that Congress desired “to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses,” and the creation of a
large company with lower cost would frustrate this goal.” Congress appreciated that
occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets,” the Supreme Court acknowledged, but it “resolved these
competing considerations in favour of decentralisation.”
In FTC v. Proctor and Gamble (1967), the Court found the acquisition of Clorox
Chemical Company (the largest manufacturer of liquid household bleach in the U.S.) by
P&G (the largest producer of soaps) illegal. P&G had asserted that the merger would
yield large savings in promotion, sales, and distribution. While acknowledging possible
efficiencies, the Court considered the claimed cost savings not as real economies.
Although this argumentation could be interpreted as a consideration of efficiencies as a
relevant factor in merger litigation, the Court noted that "possible economies cannot be
used as a defence to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen
competition may also result in economies but struck the balance in favour of protecting
competition”.
Many observers have taken the P&G decision as rejecting an efficiency defence in merger
cases. However, some commentators argue that the Court only referred to “possible”
efficiencies and to economies that “may” result from mergers. Furthermore, a rejection of
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 Merger specificity is the most important part of that paragraph of the Merger Guidelines.
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 This section is based on Kinne (1998) , Hovenkamp (1994), and Pitovsky (1998).
56
 The same is true for U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank.
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an efficiency defence based on possibilities does not exclude a defence based on more
convincing proof.
According to Kinne (1998) it cannot be definitely said whether an efficiency defence is
rejected or permitted in merger evaluation. Reading the three Supreme Court’s decisions
without regard to their contexts could lead one to conclude that an efficiency defence is
precluded. However, although efficiencies were discussed in court, in none of the cases
was an efficiency defence directly raised in court by the government or the defendants.
Moreover, the decisions are based in large part on the understanding of legislative history
and formalistic rules rather than on economic theory.
5.1.3.2
 
Lower Court Cases
Lower courts have begun to examine efficiencies in merger cases, and in some cases
efficiencies have been acknowledged as a potential defence. However, as late as 1998, no
federal court had upheld an otherwise anti-competitive merger on the basis of
efficiencies.
In FTC V. University Health (1991), the appellees had argued that the proposed
acquisition of non-profit St. Joseph Hospital by non-profit University Health would
generate significant efficiencies and, therefor, would not impair competition. On appeal
by the FTC, the Court stated that “in certain circumstances, a defendant may rebut the
government’s prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would
create significant efficiencies in the relevant market.” In this regard, the defendants must
show that the intended merger would result in economies and that these economies
ultimately would benefit competition and consumers. All following mergers where
efficiencies played a role referred to the University Health opinion.
In FTC v. Staples (1997), the Court first pointed to the old Supreme Court cases, but
finally examined efficiencies with the approach undertaken in the Merger Guidelines. The
efficiency claims where rejected on two grounds, namely that they where exaggerated
when compared to internal documents not prepared with litigation in mind, and that the
merger was not necessary to realise the efficiencies (increased buying power) since both
firms where expanding rapidly. Thus, the Court adopted the government’s methodology
of reviewing claimed efficiencies.
The most interesting feature of Long Island Jewish Medical/North Shore Health is the
way in which the Court found that cost savings would be passed on to consumers. Since
the hospitals are not-for-profit organisations they where considered to have a genuine
commitment to help their communities, and moreover they had entered into an
agreement with the New York Attorney General that they would pass on to the
community the substantial cost savings that would be achieved.
In Lucy Lee/Doctors Regional Medical Center three important issues where discussed.
First, the Court held that the firms could reduce their excess capacity without a merger,
and hence rejected that as an efficiency defence. Second, the Court considered it unlikely
that the savings would be passed on to consumers since the post-merger competitive
pressure was insufficient. Third, the Court did not approve that pro-competitive effects
in one market could justify anti-competitive effects in a different market. One reason is
that there is not any practical formula available to do the trade-off. Another reason is
fairness between different consumers.
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5.1.3.3
 
Analysis of efficiencies in lower courts’ merger case law
Kinne (1998) analyses how lower courts have assessed efficiency claims. She argues that
the courts have developed standards that determine weight and priority in the efficiency
area, in an approach similar to the agencies’ approach in the Merger Guidelines. The
merger decisions reveal that judges deem economies most likely to be pro-competitive if
the claimed efficiencies are merger-specific, subject to reliable proof, and passed on to
consumers. A summary of her findings follows.
Types of efficiencies: Courts focus predominantly on production economies. For
example, economies of scale achieved by an increase in the volume of production have
been found relevant. The courts have repeatedly rejected pecuniary efficiencies, such as
cost savings from tax advantages. Capital-raising savings are generally not considered in
case law, absent a strong demonstration that the proposed transaction would address
identifiable capital market imperfections.
Merger specificity: The Courts begin to evaluate efficiencies by asking for the
“uniqueness” of the claimed efficiencies. In U.S. v Rockford Memorial (1989), the court
stated that relevant efficiencies “must be made possible only through the merger an in no
other manner.” In FTC v University Health (1991), the court stated that it is proper “to
require proof that the efficiencies to be gained by an acquisition cannot be secured by
means that inflict less damage to competition, such as internal expansion or merger with
smaller firms.”
The alternative to achieve the efficiencies may be internal expansion. In FTC v Staples
(1997), cost savings were asserted as a result of extracting better prices from vendors in
the future. Through a merger those cost savings would be achieved by reaching larger
scale immediately rather than over 3 to 4 years. As both merging parties were expanding
rapidly by opening new stores, the court argued that those efficiencies would have
occurred in any event as a result of internal expansion.
Often the lower courts have focused on the feasibility of external arrangements as an
alternative to merger. In U.S. v Long Island (1997), the government’s witness claimed
that the two hospitals could obtain comparable efficiencies through selling services to
each other and working together, even in the absence of a merger. The court, however,
accepted that the merger was the least restrictive alternative to achieve the claimed
efficiencies. The court doubted that two vigorous competitors would agree to share for
example clinical laboratory services without a merger.
Burden of proof: The existing case law imposes the burden of producing evidence of
efficiencies on the merging parties. As it is difficult to predict efficiencies before a merger
is consummated, the burden of proof is rather a persuasion standard. Courts have
deemed efficiencies credibly proven in cases where efficiency claims are non-speculative
and quantifiable. If the parties cannot expound the way to achieve the claimed savings,
the courts consider the claims speculative. According to Kinne’s (1998) review of the
merger decisions, the problem of proof is the principal reason why courts have
repeatedly rejected efficiency claims.
Pass on to consumers: The courts generally adopt the consumer surplus standard.
Though an increase in consumer welfare can be achieved through lower prices, new
products, or improved quality, it appears that the case law tends to favour price tests as
an indicator.
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5.2 Canada
5.2.1
 
The Competition Act57
On application by the Director of Investigation and Research (the federal government
official responsible for the enforcement of the Competition Act), the Competition
Tribunal may issue a prohibition or divestiture order with respect to a merger which it
deems likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially. The Act lists a number of
factors that may be considered in determining whether competition will be affected.58
In the event that the Tribunal finds that a merger is likely to prevent or lessen
competition substantially, Section 96 of the Act provides an efficiency defence. Section
96 directs the Tribunal not to issue an order
… if it finds that the merger … is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will
be greater than, and will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of
competition … and that the gains in efficiency would not likely be attained if the
order were made.
5.2.2
 
Merger Enforcement Guidelines
In 1991 the Director of Investigation and Research at the Competition Bureau issued
guidelines as to how he intended to interpret the merger provisions of the Act.
Standard: The Guidelines interpret the Act (section 96) as creating a “trade-off
framework” within which likely efficiency can be balanced against likely anti-competitive
effects. The anti-competitive effects are defined quite precisely in the Guidelines as the
dead-weight loss from increased prices to the Canadian economy as a whole. This
interpretation is, in fact, a Williamsonian approach in trading-off efficiencies with anti-
competitive effects. However, anti-competitive effects include price increases but also
reduction in service, quality, variety, innovation and other non-price dimensions of
competition.
Merger specificity: Claimed efficiency gains cannot be considered if the efficiencies
would likely be obtained also if the order (that would be required to remedy the anti-
competitive effects of the merger) were made. This assessment involves an evaluation of
whether any of the likely efficiency gains would also be likely to be attained through less
anti-competitive means if the order in question were made. Examples of alternatives are:
internal growth; a merger with an identified third party; a joint venture; a specialisation
agreement; or a licensing, lease or other contractual arrangement. Efficiencies are not
excluded from consideration on the basis that they theoretically could be attained
through other means. The other means must be a common industry practice. The parties
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 This section is based on Mc Fetridge (1998).
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 Two provisions distinguishes the Act from the statutes of many other countries. First, the Tribunal
may not reach a conclusion that a merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially
solely on the basis of market share or concentration evidence. Second, the Tribunal is obliged to
consider the extent of foreign competition, whether either of the parties is likely to fail, the
availability of acceptable substitutes, barriers to entry, the extent of remaining competition, whether
the merger eliminates a particularly vigorous competitor and the extent of change and innovation in
the market.
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should provide a verifiable explanation of why efficiencies would not be sought by
alternative means if the order were made.
Also efficiencies in other markets--if they are inextricably linked to the efficiencies in the
relevant market--are considered in the trade-off analysis.
Redistribution: Claimed efficiency gains cannot be considered if the claimed efficiencies
would likely be brought about by reason only of a redistribution of income between two
or more persons, and not represent a saving in resources. The Guidelines exemplifies
with increased bargaining power that enables the merged entity to extract wage
concessions, discounts from suppliers (not corresponding to a saving of resources), tax
gains, and savings following a reduction in service, or quality. It is less clear if cost
savings following a reduction in output are included. According to Section 5.3 such
savings should not be included. Section 5.5, on the other hand, states that cost savings
are measured across the reduced level of output that will be required to bring about the
price increase.
International aspects: In the determination of whether a merger is likely to bring about
gains in efficiency account should be taken of whether such gains will result in: (i) a
significant increase in the real value of exports; or, (ii) a significant substitution of
domestic products for imported products.
Timing: To compare efficiencies and anti-competitive effects that occur at different
points in time, one needs to remove the effects of anticipated future inflation, and apply a
standard real discount rate.
Net efficiencies: Retooling and other costs that must be incurred to achieve efficiency
gains are deducted from the total value of the efficiencies.
Documentation: Objective verification of particular sources of efficiency gains may be
provided by (1) plant and firm-level accounting statements, (2) internal studies, (3)
strategic plans, (4) capital appropriation requests, (5) management consultant studies
(where available), or (6) other available data. To facilitate the Bureau's review of
efficiency claims, information provided should describe the precise nature and magnitude
of each type of efficiency gain that it is expected will be brought about by the merger.
Types of efficiencies: The Guidelines use two broad classes of efficiency gains:
production efficiencies and dynamic efficiencies. Production efficiencies are generally the
focus of the evaluation, because they can be quantifiably measured, objectively
ascertained, and supported by engineering, accounting or other data. The Guidelines
distinguish between product-level, plant-level and multi-plant-level efficiencies. Concrete
examples of savings are: mechanisation, specialisation, the elimination of duplication,
reduced downtime, a smaller base of spare parts, smaller inventory requirements, the
avoidance of capital expenditures that would otherwise have been required, and plant
specialisation. Production-related efficiencies can also result from integrating activities
within the merged entity that were previously performed by third parties. Attainment of
these gains generally involves a reduction in transaction costs associated with matters
such as contracting for inputs, distribution and services. It is recognised that mergers can
give rise to savings attributable to the transfer of superior production techniques and
know-how from one of the merging parties to the other. However, claims that a merger
is likely to give rise to efficiencies by reason of "superior management" are generally
difficult to establish objectively. Dynamic efficiencies, include gains attained through the
optimal introduction of new products, the development of more efficient productive
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processes, and the improvement of product quality and service. However, claims that a
merger will lead to dynamic efficiencies are ordinarily extremely difficult to measure.
Accordingly, the weight given to claims regarding such efficiencies will generally be
qualitative in nature.
5.2.3
 
Tribunal and Court cases59
According to McFetridge (1998), the Merger Enforcement Guidelines have played a
minor role in the contested cases. To the extent that the Guidelines have been discussed
by the Tribunal or Courts, it has been to take issue with them. Two major issues have
been raised. The first is the question of product market definition when products are
differentiated. Of more interest here is that the Competition Tribunal decision in
Hillsdown rejects the choice of welfare standard in the efficiency defence.
The Tribunal argued that the anti-competitive effects should not be interpreted as
narrowly as in the Guidelines, that is as the dead-weight loss. The anti-competitive effect
of mergers should include also any redistribution in surplus resulting from increased
market power. McFetridge interprets the Tribunal’s position as any one of the following
three standards for the efficiency defence.
(1) Merger must not result in any reduction in consumer surplus. This is the U.S.
approach. The problem with this approach in Canada is that only mergers in highly
concentrated industries are challenged, and that the price standard should rule out an
efficiency defence in practice, since the efficiency requirements are very large.
(2) All efficiencies must be passed onto consumers. The problem with this standard is
that it could only be met if there were no market problem in the first place.
(3) Efficiencies must exceed the losses to consumers. This requirement, which later has
been called the Hillsdown standard, is an invention. It can be shown that it is stricter
than the Williamsonian total surplus standard, but more allowing than the price
standard.60
5.3 European Union
The extent to which E.U. merger control includes efficiency considerations is
controversial. The Merger Regulation may be interpreted to include, or not to include, an
efficiency defence. The case law produces an inconsistent picture.
5.3.1
 
The Merger Regulation
According to Articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, a concentration which
“creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded” shall be prohibited. Otherwise it shall be allowed.
According to Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission shall, in making
this appraisal, take into account:
(a)   the development of technical and economic progress, provided that
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 This section is based on Mc Fetridge (1998).
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 The “Hillsdown standard” is stricter than total surplus standard since efficiencies must cover the
redistribution from consumers to producers and not only the dead-weight loss.
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(b)   it is to consumers’ advantage, and
(c)   does not form an obstacle to competition.61
The question is if Article 2(1)(b) allows for efficiency considerations, and in particular if
it constitutes an efficiency defence.
At first glance, the answer appears to be no. In particular, if “form an obstacle to
competition” is synonymous to “significantly impeding effective competition,” the
development of technical and economic progress can only be considered in those
situations where the merger is to be allowed anyway. The main problem with this
interpretation is that it makes Article 2(1)(b) meaningless.62 Also according to the
Commission (1996), “(t)here is no real legal possibility of justifying an efficiency
defence under the Merger Regulation. Efficiencies are assumed for all mergers up to the
limit of dominance - the "concentration privilege". Any efficiency issues are considered
in the overall assessment to determine whether dominance has been created or
strengthened and not to justify or mitigate that dominance in order to clear a
concentration which would otherwise be prohibited.” The Commission also points out
that the dominance criterion is very strong. At that time (1996), the prohibition rate
amongst cases considered under the Merger Regulation was only one percent.63
However, in our view, the Merger Regulation may be re-interpreted to include an
efficiency defence. Hence, in our view, the introduction of an efficiency defence may not
require a change in the Merger Regulation. Remember that the term “competition” takes
on different meanings in the literature. In some literature the word competition is
synonymous to the absence of market power.64 Market power may be measured by the
price to cost mark-up that firms charge. With this definition, horizontal mergers most
often reduce competition (that is increase mark-ups) at least slightly,65 and some of them
significantly reduce competition (increase mark-ups). In other literature, however, the
word “competition” has been used in another sense, namely to mean the price level.66
Using this definition, horizontal mergers can be both pro-competitive (those that reduce
price) and anti-competitive (those that increase price). Now, if we assume that the
Merger Regulation uses the word “competition” in the first sense, this means that
mergers that significantly increase mark-ups shall be prohibited. Furthermore, Article
2(1)(b) cannot be used to save any horizontal mergers, since they do form an obstacle to
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 Moreover, according to preamble 13, the Commission must place its appraisal within the general
framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty,
including that of strengthening the Community’s economic and social cohesion, referred to in Article
130a.
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 The same point was made by Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993, p. 62). They argue that the
wording of the Merger Regulation is somewhat odd, since it suggests that the efficiency defence can
be used only when there is no conflict between efficiency and competition; that is when an efficiency
defence is unnecessary.
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 Also in cases brought under Article 86 the Commission has a dominance test and efficiency gains
will not justify the abuse of a dominant position. Under Article 85, by contrast, any agreement which
restricts competition will have to demonstrate efficiency benefits in direct proportion to the degree of
competition which is restricted.
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 Most economists would probably use this definition.
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 There are a few reasons for why a horizontal merger would not reduce competition, such as if the
merger triggers immediate entry, or if one of the firms is failing, or if the firms colluded perfectly
before the merger.
66
 This definition has at least implicitly been used in much anti-trust literature.
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competition, that is increase mark-ups. (This is just a restatement of the first
interpretation above.)
In contrast, if we assume that the Merger Regulation uses the word “competition” in the
second sense, then Articles 2(2-3) state that a merger shall be prohibited if, and only if,
the merger increases price. Article 2(1)(b) would amount to an efficiency defence. The
Commission should consider efficiencies (the development of technical and economic
progress), provided that these efficiencies do not lead to an increase in the price level.67
The condition(s) for efficiencies to be considered guarantees that the potential negative
side effects of efficiencies do not dominate the beneficial effects of efficiencies.68 Thus,
with this interpretation the Regulation allows an efficiency defence. However, a
comparison with the efficiency defence under Article 85(3), suggests that the efficiency
defence under the Merger Regulation (if any) is intended to be limited (see below).
5.3.2
 
Commission Cases
Efficiency issues have explicitly been discussed in four merger cases. Furthermore, some
commentators argue that in some cases favourable assessments of dominance hide
concerns for efficiency.
In AT&T/NCR69 the Commission argues that AT&T’s acquisition of NCR may give rise
to technical and marketing synergies from a combination of two products (workstations
and network facilities). Due to a flow of technical and marketing know-how,
AT&T/NCR may have a chance to develop more advanced communication features at
lower costs. According to the Commission, it is not excluded that such synergies may
create or strengthen a dominant position. However, these concerns are dismissed in the
particular case, since similar attempts to combine computer and telecommunications
business have failed, and since AT&T/NCR have to face important competitors that also
are active in the two fields. Hence, in this case efficiencies are considered relevant.
However, only as an offence. The synergies may potentially create or strengthen a
dominant position.
In Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland,70 the parties argued that one of the objectives with
the acquisition is to reduce costs. The potential cost saving from rationalising parts
procurement, marketing and product support is estimated at ECU 5 million per year,
amounting to around 0,5 percent of the combined turnover. The Commission dismissed
the claims on the ground that the alleged benefits were (1) insufficient, and that (2) the
cost savings could be achieved through other means. Furthermore, (3) even if there was
progress, this would not be to the consumers’ advantage. The fact that the efficiencies
where dismissed as insignificant, but not as irrelevant, seems to suggest that the
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 Cost savings are per se desirable. However, cost savings can have negative side effects. In particular,
if two firms merge and thereby lower their variable costs, they become a tougher competitor.
Actually, if the cost reduction is big enough, the merger may imply that competitors are driven out of
the market, or that new entry is blocked. In this sense, cost savings may be anti-competitive (price
increasing). In this context, it is interesting to note that (for example) technical advantages are
considered relevant in the assessment of dominance (see for example Hoffman La Roche v.
Commission).
69
 Case No IV/M 050 – AT&T/NCR, paragraphs 28-30.
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 Case No IV/M.053 - Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland, paragraphs 65-71.
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Commission does consider efficiency claims. The discussion of other means to achieve
the cost savings indicates that efficiencies must be merger-specific. Finally, the reference
to the consumers advantage indicates that the welfare standard is the consumer’s surplus
(price standard).71
In MSG Media Service,72 the Commission rejected the parties' claims saying that even if
the operation were to contribute to technical and economic progress, Article 2(1)(b)
goes on to state that no obstacle must be formed to competition. According to the
commission, the proposed transaction would create a dominant position and hinder
competition. This case indicates that the commission does not allow an efficiency
defence.
In Nordic Satellite Distribution,73 the Commission argues that the transaction would
undoubtedly have involved significant efficiencies. However, it would also have resulted
in the parties achieving or strengthening dominant positions on several markets. The
Commission in the end decided to prohibit the operation, since the anti-competitive
effects of the operation were not deemed necessary for the achievement of the
efficiencies. This case indicates that efficiencies must be merger-specific.
It thus appears that the Commission reached contradictory decisions in different cases. In
Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland, the Commission seems to allow (in principle) an
efficiency defence, while in MSG Media Service the commission does not allow an
efficiency defence. As a consequence, it is difficult to say whether or not the E.U. case
law includes an efficiency defence.
Some commentators argue that in some cases favourable assessments of dominance hide
concerns for efficiency (see Camesasca, 1999, and Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright, 1993,
p. 240).74
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 Case No IV/M.469 - MSG Media Service, paragraph 100-101.
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 Case No IV/M.490 – Nordic Satellite Distribution. Here we rely on the Commission’s summary of
the case in its contribution to O.E.C.D./GD(96)65.
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 Camesasca (1999) explicitly mentions several cases where, according to him, the Commission relied
on efficiencies to clear a merger. Examples are: Alcatel/Telettra, Mannesmann/Valourec/Ilva,
Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer, ABB/Daimler-Benz, and Agfa-Gevaert/DuPont.
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5.3.3
 
Court Cases
The issue of the existence of an efficiency defence has not been discussed by the courts.
5.3.4
 
Efficiency gains under Article 85 (now 81)
According to 85(1), all agreements between firms that restrict competition are illegal.
However, according to article 85(3) agreements may be exempted from this prohibition
provided that they meet four requirements.
(i) The agreement must improve the production or distribution of goods, or promote
technical or economic progress.
(ii) The agreement must allow consumers a fair share of the benefits.
(iii) The agreement must only impose restrictions on the firms that are indispensable
to attain the benefits.
(iv) The agreement must not give the firms the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Note that there are several ways in which article 85(3) seem to give more room for
efficiency arguments than article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.75 Requirement (i) of
article 85(3) includes both the improvement of production and distribution of goods, and
the promotion of technical or economic progress. Requirement (a) of article 2(1)(b) in
the Merger Regulation only includes the development of technical and economic
progress. It thus appears that the Merger Regulation, in contrast to article 85(3), only
includes “dynamic” and not “static” efficiency gains. Requirement (ii) of article 85(3)
indicates that the welfare standard puts some weight on consumer welfare. How big that
weight is, is not clear from the article in itself. However, the wording seems less
consumer-oriented that the Merger Regulation requirement (b) that “it is to consumers’
advantage.” Requirement (iv) of article 85(3) talks about eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products. Requirement (c) of article 2(1)(b) of the
Merger Regulation appears to refer to any obstacle to competition. Requirement (iii) of
article 85(3) requires gains to be agreement specific, i.e., there should not exist a less
anti-competitive way to generate the same gains. This requirement does not have a
counterpart in article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. However, it seems likely to us
that an efficiency defence under the Merger Regulation, in practice, would require
efficiencies to be merger-specific (see Nordic Satellite Distribution, below).
Exemptions may be achieved in two ways: either by appealing to the Commission for
individual exemption in respect of a particular agreement or by drafting an agreement
whose terms satisfy one of the block exemptions issued by the Commission.76 To qualify
for individual exemption, an agreement must satisfy the four requirements of Article
85(3). The burden of proof is on the applicants. Here follows a short summary of the
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 A full comparison between the Merger Regulation and Article 85 should also take into account that
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 Jacquemin (1997) has interpreted the possibility of block exemptions as a response to the difficulty to
make the trade-off between anti-competitive and positive effects. However, it is not clear to us that
one can do the aggregated trade-off if one cannot do the trade-off in particular cases.
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case law. According to Whish (1993), the benefits produced by the agreement
(requirement i) must be something of objective value to the Community as a whole, and
not just a private benefit to the parties themselves. Furthermore, the claimed advantages
must outweigh the detriments produced by the agreement. Several examples can be
mentioned. Specialisation agreements have been considered to improve the production of
goods. R&D projects have been considered to lead to technical and economic progress.
Exclusive dealing agreements have been considered to improve the distribution of goods.
According to Neven, Papandropoulos, and Seabright (1998), the Commission considers
scale economies, a reduction in the duplication of fixed costs, and the association of
complementary assets as important efficiency benefits. In other cases however, the
Commission refers in vague terms to general objectives having a remote and unspecified
link with economic efficiency. In all case the, the arguments are simply stated and there is
no attempt to evaluate their significance, let alone to quantify their importance.
According to Whish (1993), some writers suggest that the Commission has not paid
much attention to the consumers’ interests (requirement ii) in its decisions under Article
85(3). Furthermore, the Commission has not tried to give a definition of a “fair share”
for these purposes. According to Whish (1993), much of the Commission’s attention
when dealing with notifications for exemption goes into the issue of indispensability
(requirement iii). An effective way of discovering what types of clauses the Commission
objects to is to look at the so-called black lists in its block exemptions. According to
Neven, Papandropoulos, and Seabright (1998), however, the Commission sometimes
does not consider that when assets can be bought freely in the market, the agreement
does not necessarily bring additional benefits.
According to some commentators (see especially Neven, Papandropoulos, and Seabright
1998), the Commission’s analysis of efficiencies under Article 85(3) is superficial.
Therefore, the case law developed under Article 85(3) may not be useful for the
Commission in handling an efficiency defence under the Merger Regulation.
5.4 France
5.4.1
 
Ordonnance No. 86-1286
The French Control of Concentrations is now governed by the provisions of Title V of
the amended Ordonnance No. 86-1286 of December 1986.
5.4.1.1
 
Definition of a concentration and thresholds for investigation
Articles 38 and 39 of the French Control of Concentrations describe the definition of a
concentration and the thresholds that make a concentration controllable. First, Article 39
of the Ordonnance of 1 December 1986 defines a concentration as follows:
“A concentration results from any transaction, regardless of the form, that entails a
transfer of ownership or possession of all or part of the goods, rights and obligations of a
firm or whose purpose or effect is to enable a firm or a group of firms to exercise,
directly or indirectly, a determining influence over one or more firms.”
There are two alternative criteria. The first is the transfer of ownership or possession of
all or part of the goods, rights and obligations of a firm. The second is the acquisition of
a determining influence by one or more firms over another, hitherto not subject to this
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influence. This definition naturally includes creations of structural joint ventures and
significant changes in capital holding by one or more firms.
Article 38 states the conditions under which a concentration operation is controllable. If
either of the following two alternative thresholds are attained, the concentration is
controllable:
- a market share threshold: the firms that are party to the operation hold a joint
share of 25% of a national goods or service market
- the firms that are party to the operation together make an ex-tax turnover in
France of at least seven billion French Francs, provided that at least two of the
firms party to the concentration have made a turnover of at least two billion
French Francs.
Note that an analysis as to whether the market share threshold is met, can be rather
involved. In practice, it requires an assessment regarding what constitutes the relevant
market.
Notification of a concentration operation is optional. If notification is made, the Minister
in charge of the Economy has two months to inform the parties whether there will be a
referral to the Competition Council for opinion. In case of such a referral the time limit is
extended by four months, making a total as of six months as of justification. If no
notification is made, the Minister in charge of the Economy may at any time order an
inquiry procedure, not subject to inquiry time limits.
5.4.1.2
 
“Le bilan concurrentiel” and “le bilan economique”
When a controllable concentration operation is found, the Minister in charge of the
Economy refers to the Competition Council for opinion. According to Article 41, the
Council has to determine if the concentration or the proposed concentration involves
risks for restraints to competition.
If it is found that the concentration stimulates competition (positive bilan concurrentiel)
or that it is neutral, then the analysis is finished. If it is found that the concentration
restricts competition (negative bilan concurrentiel), then the Council has to establish a
“bilan economique”. According to Article 41:
“Le Conseil de la concurrence apprécie si le project de concentration ou la
concentration apporte au progrès économique une contribution suffisante pour
compenser les atteintes à la concurrence. Le Conseil tient compte également de la
compétitivité des entreprises en cause au regard de la concurrence
internationale.”
This means the Council has to examine if the contribution to economic progress or
international competitiveness is of a nature to compensate the expected adverse effects
on competition. Effectively, this means there is an efficiency defence. Notice furthermore
that the efficiency defence is used when there is a risk to restrictions in competition. This
implies that the welfare criterion takes into account both consumers and producers.
73
According to the 1997 Annual Report of the Council, this amounts to an analysis on the
economic effects of the concentration, not only on the firms involved, but on the
economy as a whole, in particular on the consumers. Two conclusions may then take
place: (1) the favourable economic consequences are found to be insufficient to
compensate the negative effects on competition, (2) the favourable economic
consequences are found to be sufficient.
5.4.2
 
Cases
Opinions of the Council are published as “Advices” and consist of two parts. The first
part consists of general findings. The second part motivates the advice to the Minister, in
several sections to determine:
1. the nature of the operation
2. the relevant market to verify whether the thresholds are met
3. the effects on competition
4. the contribution to economic progress and international competitiveness, if it is
found that there is a risk of restriction to competition.
In the case Tefipar-Seperef 1997, the Council advised that there are no risks for anti-
competitive effects despite the fact that the company would become the second largest
firm on the market for PVC tubes. This is because, according to the Council, there
remain numerous other producers in France, imports are growing, and little investment is
required to enter the market. Based on this conclusion, it is not necessary to investigate
the effects on economic progress or international competitiveness, and the operation can
be accepted. This case illustrates the general procedure that efficiencies in the sense of
“economic progress” or “international competitiveness” are not assessed if no risks for
anti-competitive effects are found.
In the next four cases we discuss here, the Council concluded that there are risks for
anti-competitive effects, and a further investigation into economic progress and
international competitiveness was undertaken.
In the first two cases, the contribution to economic progress was found to be sufficient
to compensate for anti-competitive effects. In the Rowntree plc/Nestlé SA 1989 case, the
Council found that the combined market shares in three of the relevant chocolate markets
would become excessive and restrain competition. However, the Council found that the
contribution to economic progress would be sufficient to compensate the expected
restraints on competition. The proposed merger was expected to increase productivity
and competitive capacity in the world-wide market of chocolate products, which was
dominated by a few world-wide companies.
Regarding the acquisition of Compagnie Française de Sucrerie by Eridiana Béghin-Say
(EBS) 1997, the Council concluded that there were risks for restrictions to competition
in the markets for “sucre de bouche” and sugar destined for the industry. However, in its
analysis of the “bilan économique”, the Council considered that the anti-competitive risks
were compensated by economic progress since there was a plan for restructuring to
increase productivity, with a shut-down of the least performing plants. This would at the
same time increase international competitiveness of the whole French sugar industry,
which was argued to be less performant and less concentrated than the industries in other
European countries.
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In the remaining two cases we discuss, the Council found the contribution to economic
progress insufficient to compensate for the adverse competition effects. In the proposed
acquisition by Callebaut AG of the group Barry in 1997, the Council found that the new
company would create a risk to restrict competition, since it would become three times
larger than its second competitor, with similar positions in other European countries.
Regarding the argument that the operation would allow economic progress through a
rationalisation of production across the plants of the new group, and a centralisation of
research, the Council argued that it was not shown that this operation was necessary to
attain these objectives. This is because the parties themselves argued that scale
economies are no longer present above a certain threshold. In addition, research
expenditures are limited and may be subcontracted or conducted in collaboration with
users. Regarding the argument of an improvement of international competitiveness, the
Council argued that there was no convincing evidence that the operation would increase
exports, especially since the group Barry was already strongly present in foreign markets.
For these reasons, the Council found that the risks to restriction in competition would
not be sufficiently compensated.
In the proposed acquisition by the Coca Cola Company of the brand Orangina owned by
Pernod Ricard in 1998, the Council found that there was a risk of restriction of
competition. Therefore an analysis into economic progress and international
competitiveness was conducted. The Council noted the arguments made by Pernod
Ricard that it wants to exit the segment of non-alcoholic beverages and obtain financial
resources to expand and remain competitive in the segment of alcoholic beverages. The
Council also noted the arguments by the Coca Cola company that its distribution system
and experience in marketing will promote the international expansion of the products of
Orangina, which would require substantial investments otherwise. The Council however
argues that the Coca Cola company could realise international expansion and distribution
economies through internal growth, through the brand “Fanta”. Furthermore, the Coca
Cola company had not demonstrated the viability of the project to promote the brand
Orangina in other countries. The Council accepted the argument that Pernod Ricard
realises only weak synergies between its alcoholic and non-alcoholic synergies, and that
it obtains a high price for the sale of its brand, which allows for substantial support to
concentrate on its alcoholic activities. The Council however argues that there had been
no contacts to sell its brand to other firms, including a possible sale to a non-competing
firm. Furthermore, the Council argues that if the price paid by Coca Cola is in fact
significantly higher than what can be obtained through other formulas for leaving the
non-alcoholic sector, then one should consider this price premium not as a contribution
to economic progress, but rather as the cost of a weakening in competition.
Both the Callebaut and the Coca Cola decisions illustrate that the Council investigates
whether efficiencies cannot be realised otherwise. Also a comparison of these decisions
with the positive decisions illustrates the importance of the criterion of international
competitiveness, in addition to the criterion of economic progress.
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5.5 Germany77
In Germany, competition is protected in the Act Against Restraints of Competition,
which came into force in 1958. Merger control was introduced in a revision of the Act in
1973.78 The enforcement agency is the Federal Cartel Office. In the first stage, the Office
determines its decision solely on competition-based criteria. However, if a merger is
prohibited, authorisation of the merger may be given by the Minister of Economics on
very broad grounds.
Under section 24(1) of the Act, a merger must be prohibited if it can be expected to
result in the creation or strengthening of a dominant market position.79 There is only one
exception: if the merging parties can prove that the merger would also lead to
improvements in the competitive structure of one or more markets and if such
improvements outweigh the negative effects of market dominance. Improvement of
competitive conditions may be achieved in the same market in which the position of
market dominance is created. This may be the case where a merger is necessary to
safeguard the survival of an enterprise as a viable competitor (failing firm
considerations). However, according to Canenbley and Schutte (1996), it is very difficult
to prove such an outcome in practice. Considerations such as economies of scale or
employment are not valid defences under German merger control. The improvement of
the parties’ market position in foreign markets is not taken into account. Merging parties
may seek to overturn prohibition orders issued by the Office in two different ways. The
firms may seek judicial review by the Court of Appeal in Berlin—an appeal in which the
legal and factual basis off the prohibition order would be reviewed.
Under section 24(3) of the Act, the firms may also apply for special permission from the
Minister of the Economy (who is a member of the Federal Cabinet). Such permission will
only be granted if the Minister finds that the restraints on competition resulting from the
merger are outweighed by overall economic advantages, or that it is justified by an
overriding public interest. According to Canenbley and Schutte (1996), these standards
give the Minister a large opportunity to make essentially political judgements. However,
in practice, it is nowadays exceptional for the Minister to grant such special permission.80
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competition law to E.U. law. A translation to English may be found at
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5.6 Sweden
5.6.1
 
The Competition Act
The new Swedish Competition Act (Konkurrenslagen) was introduced in 1993, and is
modelled according to E.U. competition law. E.U. case law serves as guidance.
However, in the case of the merger control there are some important differences.81
The Act (34 §) stipulates mandatory notification of all mergers where the companies
involved have an aggregate turnover exceeding SEK 4 billion and the acquired company
has a turnover of at least SEK 100 million. Mergers that create or strengthen a dominant
position, thereby having a significant adverse effect on competition, in the long term, on
the Swedish market or a substantial part of it, may be prohibited.
However, there is a second provision as well, namely that the merger must “operate
against the public interest.” This second provision allows an efficiency defence. The
Swedish Government Proposition (1992/93:56, pp. 42, 100) states that a “significant
adverse effect on competition” normally should be taken to mean that the merger
“operates against the public interest.” However, mergers could be defended in a case-by-
case way if they have positive economic effects. It is explicitly said that positive effects
may be traded off against negative effects on competition. Examples of positive effects
that may be considered are stated, such as structural rationalisation, productive efficiency
and the competitiveness of Swedish firms on the international market. Other examples
include national security interests. But it is also stated that for example effects on
unemployment should not be taken into account.
According to the Proposition, the assessment should also include the possibility for the
acquirer to attain the same productive efficiencies by co-operation or mergers with
foreign firms. The Proposition does not, however, state a more general test that
efficiencies should be merger-specific.
It should also be noted that the Act does not require the consumers to obtain a share of
the efficiencies in order to be accepted.
A decision to prohibit a merger is taken by the court (Stockholm’s tingsrätt or
Marknadsdomstolen) following a claim by the Swedish competition agency,
Konkurrensverket (KKV). KKV has the primary burden of proving that the merger
should be prohibited.
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 The most notable difference is that the Swedish merger control only concern mergers in a narrow
sense, and does not encompass joint ventures. However, recently a Government commission
suggested that the Swedish law should be changed in accordance with the Merger Regulation also on
this point, SOU 1998:98.
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5.6.2
 
KKV cases82
KKV takes into account efficiency gains in assessing whether a merger operates against
the public interest. Although not formalised, KKV use a price test, that is cost savings
must be sufficient for the price not to increase as a result of the merger. However, the
judgement is qualitative, since it is difficult to quantify the anti-competitive effects of a
merger.
According to KKV there must be enough competition after the merger in order for the
merging firms to actually have an incentive to reduce costs after the merger, and also for
reduced costs to affect price. On the negative side, KKV also consider costs of
integrating the merging firms.
According to the act, any types of cost saving should be considered. In practice, only
production costs have been discussed so far. However, there is nothing to prevent that,
for example, costs associated with R&D are considered in the future.
It is not clear who has the burden of proof. According to the wording of the Act, KKV
has the burden of proving that a merger strengthens a dominant position, harms
competition, and operates against the public interest. This seems to imply that it is KKV
that should demonstrate the absence of cost savings. However, KKV argues that it is the
firms that have the burden of proof concerning cost savings.
It has not been formalised what type of evidence that is needed to establish existence or
non-existence of cost savings. KKV regularly ask firms to submit all information that was
presented to the board, which usually contains some information about cost savings.
Usually, KKV also ask firms to concretise their assessments further, and to ask for the
opinion from competitors and others. In the courts, additional information is gained by
having external experts as witnesses. However, a serious problem is that it is often
difficult to find independent experts.
KKV does not consider efficiency gains in its dominance- or competition-tests. That
cannot be ruled out in the future, but it is considered unlikely.
So far, there have been very few cases where cost savings have been an issue. In
Securitas Lock Group/Metra, KKV found that the expected cost savings would not
benefit the consumers due to insufficient competition after a merger.
KKV has cleared only one merger with reference to efficiency gains namely ICA’s
acquisition of a number of KIAB-wholesalers.
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 This section is built on an interview with Eric Sahlin (the head of the merger department) and Mats
Bergman (chief economist) at KKV.
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5.6.3
 
Court cases
There have been two court cases where cost savings have been an issue.
In Optirock/NCC83, the Court found that Optirock’s acquisition of Stråbruken only
created marginal dominance, and that it did not have a significant adverse effect on
competition. The Court also held that the merger, due to certain positive effects, did not
operate against the public interest under any circumstances. Even if there was no actual
need to trade off positive and negative effects, it appears that the Court considered the
positive effects to be so strong that they would have been sufficient to render the merger
legal, even in the presence of anti competitive effects. The Court mentions three positive
effects.
1. There is a need for structural rationalisation of the Swedish brick industry. Due to
over capacity, a couple of plants must be closed down, and production must be
concentrated in the remaining plants. Moreover, during 1997 Stråbruken made
losses.
2. In the more expansive markets, so called dry products, it is necessary to develop
production methods and product varieties.
3. It may be possible for the firms to increase their export. That would require large
volumes and a strong market position.
It appears that the first point is a mixture of a failing firm defence and an efficiency
defence. The second point appears to be an efficiency defence. The third point appears to
be an application of the so-called national champion doctrine.
In Sveriges Television/Schibsted/Skandinaviska Filmlaboratorier84, the Court approved
the merger between Swelab and FilmTeknik, thereby leaving only one full-range supplier
of technical processing of cinematic film in Sweden. It appears that the main reason for
the approval was that the competitive pressure from foreign firms, and from Swedish
niche firms, was considered sufficient. The Court also found that a merger would reduce
the firms’ costs. The saving is quantified as a reduction of the personnel by 25 persons.
Moreover, this cost reduction, the Court argues, gives scope for necessary investments
in new technology. Finally, the Court found the probability for Swelab and FilmTeknik to
survive as independent competitors to be very small. The reason was that the firms had
difficulties to follow the fast technological development, and increased competition from
foreign firms.
Analysis of efficiencies  Swedish merger control includes an efficiency defence.
However, the exact content of this defence is unclear, and it has not been used very
often. Most mergers pass the dominance and competition tests, and cost savings need
not be discussed. Moreover, in those cases where the merger raises anti-competitive
concerns, the case may be cleared with a divestiture agreement between the firms and
KKV.
Moreover, in the court cases where efficiency gains have been an issue, it is not even
clear that the outcome was crucially dependent on these efficiencies. Rather, it appears
that the courts approved the mergers already in the dominance and competition tests.
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 Stockholm’s Tingsrätt, Mål nr T 8-1002-97.
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 Stockholm’s Tingsrätt, Mål nr T 8-669-96.
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Efficiency considerations where only used to reinforce the arguments. One may say that
the efficiency defence has not yet been applied/tested by the courts.
Furthermore, the details of the Swedish efficiency defence are unclear. It is unclear if
efficiencies must be merger-specific, who has the burden of proof, and if the cost savings
must be passed on to consumers.
The Competition Act does not require the consumers to obtain a share of the efficiencies
in order to be accepted. Nevertheless, KKV uses a consumer’s surplus standard. The
Courts have not explicitly addressed the issue. But the fact that they do not refer to the
effect on consumers can be interpreted to mean that the courts find the distribution of the
gains irrelevant.85
The wording of the Act indicates that it is KKV who has the burden of proof concerning
efficiencies. However, KKV argued in Optirock/NCC that it is the defendants. The Court
did not explicitly address the issue.
Moreover, the courts seem to mix failing firm considerations with efficiency
considerations.
The courts provide very little information concerning, for example, how the efficiencies
are to be achieved. It is not clear if the decisions are based on more information than the
courts account for, or if they accept efficiency claims based on very sparse information.
5.7 United Kingdom
5.7.1
 
The Fair Trading Act86
The Fair Trading Act from 1973 (FTA) contains provisions for control of mergers.87 The
system is predisposed in favour of mergers. The Secretary of State may refer a merger to
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) where he thinks fit. The Secretary of
State is advised by the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT). A merger may be
prohibited if at least two thirds majority of the MMC considers that it might operate
against the public interest. Even at that stage the Secretary of State has the discretion not
to prohibit the merger.
Mergers may be referred by the Secretary of State (and only by him) which either will
result in the creation or strengthening of a monopoly situation in relation to goods or
services in the U.K. or a substantial part of it or in the take-over of assets with a balance
sheet value of GBP 30 million or more. A merger reference may be limited in various
ways.
If the MMC reports that a merger may be expected to operate against the public interest
then the Secretary of State has the power to make an order preventing the merger,
attaching conditions to it, or even unscrambling a merger that has already taken place. In
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 Another interpretation is that in the particular cases handled by the courts, there was sufficient
competitive pressure for the cost savings to reduce price. Hence, the total surplus and the consumer
surplus standards could have coincided in these cases. For this reason, it was not necessary for the
courts to specify that they used the consumer surplus standard.
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 This section is based on Whish (1993).
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 The control of mergers of newspaper and water companies has specific provisions not discussed here.
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practice, the Secretary of State rarely exercises these formal powers. Instead he will ask
the DGFT to enter into negotiations with the firms to secure appropriate undertakings.
A new legislation, the Competition Act 1998, will come into force in early 2000. The
new Act brings U.K. competition law more into line with E.U. competition law.88
5.7.2
 
MMC Cases
In assessing the merger’s impact on the public interest, the MMC is guided by the criteria
of the FTA, which provide that “the Commission shall take into account all matters
which appear to them in the particular circumstances to be relevant.” According to
Whish (1993) this pragmatism of the FTA has made it difficult to extract a case-law from
MMC’s decisions, although it is possible to identify certain issues that MMC is likely to
take into account, most important of which is the impact of the merger on competition.89
On many occasions the MMC has considered the impact which a merger would have
upon the economic efficiency of the companies concerned. The case law suggests that in
order for efficiency gains to be decisive, they must be sufficiently large (Mid Kent
Holdings/General Utilities/SAUR), merger-specific (Capital/Virgin Holdings), and
passed on to consumers (P&O/Stena). Interestingly, there are cases where efficiency
gains have been considered to outweigh loss of (potential) competition
(Stagecoach/Chesterfield Transport).90
MMC has also condemned mergers because of their likely adverse effects upon
efficiency. For example, the MMC has concluded that a merger may lead to inefficiency
because of clash of management styles between the two parties. This type of case may
arise in a so-called hostile take-over, where the target company is using the MMC
investigation as a defence against the take-over.
5.8 A “check-list”
Based on our review of the efficiency defences in seven O.E.C.D. merger control
systems, we now synthesise the discussion to produce a “check-list” over the important
dimensions that must be considered in order to design a control system that takes
efficiencies into account. We should emphasise that the main purpose of this section is to
identify the important dimensions, and to illustrate them with examples from our earlier
review. The purpose is not to describe what every country is doing in every dimension.
The discussion also includes some preliminary economic analysis. We often refer to what
competition authorities “should do” if they aim for a full cost-benefit analysis of the
merger.
Our discussion is often phrased in terms of cost savings, however that should only be
viewed as an example of efficiencies in general.
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 Other issues include the balance of payments, and take-overs of U.K. firms by overseas ones.
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 Some additional cases are discussed by Bridgeman (1999).
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5.8.1
 
Objectives
Any merger control system is, at least implicitly, based on some welfare considerations.
A merger affects the well-being of many individuals. In fact, any person that belongs to
at least one of the firms’ interest groups (consumers, share-holders, management,
workers, suppliers, creditors, and also competitors) is likely to be affected. The purpose
with an explicit welfare standard is to indicate which of these effects that are to be taken
into account by competition authorities, and how one is to weigh the positive effects for
some individuals against the negative effects for other individuals. If a complete cost-
benefit analysis is to be made, all effects must be considered, and added to a social net
effect. Furthermore, if the policy maker is concerned with the distribution of wealth in
society, the effect on each individual should be given a weight corresponding to that
individuals position in the wealth distribution.91 In practice, however, competition
authorities analyse the effects of a merger at the level of interest groups, and not at the
level of individuals. Moreover, they do not include all interest groups in the analysis.
1. Welfare Standard. All competition authorities analyse the effects of a merger on two
interest groups, namely consumers and share-holders.92 At least four different welfare
standards have been used (or discussed) in different jurisdictions to weigh consumers’
interests against share-holders’ interests.
i. Total surplus (or Williamson’s) standard. According to this standard a merger
should be allowed if it creates more wealth to producers than it destroys for
consumers. Hence, distribution does not matter. It should be emphasised that
according to this standard also a merger that raises the price may be approved.
ii. Consumer’s surplus (or price) standard. According to this standard a proposed
merger should be allowed if and only if consumers gain. The reason to adopt this
standard is if one is concerned with distribution, and if consumers in general are
poorer than the owners of the firms.
iii. Hillsdown standard. According to this standard, efficiencies must exceed the
losses to consumers. It can be shown that this standard is stricter than the total
surplus standard, but more allowing than the price standard. Expressed
differently, this means that there are distributional concerns, but not as strong as
in the consumer’s surplus standard.
iv. Killer standard. According to this standard, a merger should be allowed only if
all efficiencies are passed on to consumers. This standard is built on very strong
distributional concerns.
One may rank these standards according to the strength of distributional concerns: total
surplus (distribution does not matter), Hillsdown, consumer’s surplus, killer (distribution
very important). The total surplus standard is articulated in the Canadian merger
guidelines. However, in Hillsdown this interpretation of the Canadian competition Act
was questioned by the Court. According to McFetridge (1998), a reasonable
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 In some jurisdictions also other groups’ (apart from consumers and shareholders) interests are taken
into account. In some jurisdictions, it is explicitly stated that also the effects on workers is included
(E.U.), while in other jurisdictions it is explicitly said that for example unemployment risks should
not be considered (Sweden). In some jurisdictions (U.S.) the effect of merger on small competitors is
taken into account.
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interpretation of the Court’s decision is a “new” standard – called Hillsdown above. The
U.S. merger guidelines apply the consumers’ surplus standard. It appears that the Courts
in Sweden employ the total surplus standard, while the Swedish competition authority
applies the consumers’ surplus standard.
The choice of welfare standard affects how often an efficiency defence can be expected
to be used. For example, in the U.S. (consumer’s surplus standard) there are numerous
cases where efficiencies have been an issue. However, also the U.S. choice of fairly strict
concentration thresholds matters. In the E.U., that looks for dominance, many of these
mergers would not be contested in the first place. Those that would be contested would
require large cost savings to meet a consumers’ surplus standard (cf. McFetridge, 1998,
p. 52). The killer standard is only applicable when the market is perfectly competitive
anyway. Hence, with the killer standard an efficiency defence would never be used.
2. International Competitiveness. In international markets the welfare trade-offs are
somewhat different from the welfare trade-offs made in national markets. There are two
reasons for this. First, in a market where mainly national firms sell to mainly foreign
consumers, an anti-competitive merger enhances national welfare, even if there are
strong distributional concerns (within the country). Second, in a market where national
firms compete with foreign firms, a merger of national firms that leads to substantial
cost-savings, enhances the national firms’ competitiveness. In some jurisdictions, the
international competitiveness93 of the domestic firms is considered an objective for the
merger control.
In the Canadian Merger Guidelines it is said that: In the determination of whether a
merger is likely to bring about gains in efficiency account should be taken of whether
such gains will result in: (i) a significant increase in the real value of exports; or, (ii) a
significant substitution of domestic products for imported products. In France the
efficiency defence explicitly states that, in addition to economic progress, a contribution
to international competitiveness is considered a part of the efficiency defence. Also in the
U.K. and in Sweden international competitiveness is an objective for merger control. In
the U.S., on the other hand, international competitiveness is not considered.
Although related, international competitiveness is a distinct policy objective from
productive efficiency (cost-savings). For analytical clarity it may be convenient to treat
them separately.
3. Future Viability. Cost savings may also be necessary for the merging firms to survive
in the long run. An example of such a situation is if there are important returns to scale,
and if the merging firms are small in comparison to their competitors. Such
considerations are made in Sweden.
Taking the firms’ future viability into account, as a part of an efficiency defence, is not
necessary if the merger control includes a failing firm defence.94
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 For terminological simplicity we let international competitiveness refer to both the international
aspects mentioned.
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 In that case, competition authorities can simply wait to approve the merger until at least one of the
firms is starting to lose money. On the other hand, if it is clear at an early stage that the firms are not
viable as separate entities, then a quick merger might be preferred since that would reduce
uncertainty for the firms’ interest groups. This, however, seems to be an issue for the proper design
of the failing firm defence.
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4. Inefficiencies. In some cases the competition authorities suspect that a merger will
produce net inefficiencies rather than net efficiencies. Our review of the empirical and the
theoretical literature has shown that such merger do occur. The question is then, should
competition authorities condemn a merger based inter alia on the argument that the
merger creates inefficiencies. Expressed differently, should competition policy be used as
a means to eliminate mergers that reduce firms’ internal efficiency. Merger control in the
U.K. includes such a possibility.
5.8.2
 
Identification and Measurement of Efficiencies
5. Types of efficiencies. An efficiency defence must state what types of efficiencies are
included. If a complete cost-benefit analysis is to be made, any social efficiency that the
merger generates should be included. Efficiencies may come in the form of cost savings,
improved quality, or improved services. Cost savings, in turn, may stem from
rationalisation, or scale economies, or technological progress, and so on.
In this section we discuss six forms of restrictions that competition authorities,
nevertheless, may put on what types of efficiencies they consider.
1. Redistributive (or pecuniary) gains. It is important to distinguish between true social
efficiencies and redistributive gains. This is, for example, done in a clear way in the
Canadian merger guidelines. Only the first category should be included in an efficiency
defence. For example, cost savings should only be included if they represent a saving of
resources. If firms save on costs because the merger increases their bargaining power and
enables the merged entity to extract wage concessions, or discounts from suppliers (not
corresponding to cost savings), that is only a wealth transfer and it should not be counted
as a social efficiency. Another example is tax gains.95
2. Quantity reductions. Another issue concerns cost savings that stem from an anti-
competitive reduction in quantity. In a complete cost-benefit analysis, such cost savings
should be considered. Of course, they should be balanced against the reduction of
consumers’ surplus, and if these are the only cost-savings they will never suffice to make
the merger socially desirable. But the point remains, they should be counted as a cost
saving. However, there are two different ways to do this. One way is to include these
cost savings in the “stage-one” analysis that attempts to compute the dead-weight loss
due to the merger. If that is done, these cost savings should not be counted once again in
the efficiency defence. The other way is to exclude these cost savings from the first
stage, and to include them instead in the efficiency defence.96
3. Fixed costs. If competition authorities use a consumers’ surplus standard, only savings
in variable costs are normally to be considered. This means that some types of
efficiencies, e.g. duplication of administrative routines, usually do not need to be
discussed, since they do usually not affect variable costs.
4. Other markets. Another subtle issue is cost savings (or other efficiencies) that are
realised in other markets. On the one hand, one may argue, that it does not matter where
                                                       
95
 If competition authorities use a consumers’ surplus standard this issue is not entirely clear. Also
reductions in the firms’ costs that originate from redistribution (e.g. tax gains) do benefit consumers.
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 It appears that the first method is used in the U.S. However, in the merger guidelines it is only stated
that these cost savings are not included in the efficiency defence. It is not explicitly stated that they
are considered in the first stage. In the Canadian merger guidelines there is some confusion on this
point.
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the saving of resources occur. In a complete cost-benefit analysis, these savings should
be included. This view is taken in the Canadian merger guidelines. However, there are at
least two arguments against this view. First, if competition authorities need to study the
effect of the merger on more markets (than the so-called relevant market), the analysis
would be more complex and hence costly. Moreover, if cost-savings in other markets are
included one may argue that also other issues related to these other markets should be
addressed by the competition authorities.97 Second, including efficiencies in other
markets makes it necessary to weigh the gains for consumers in those other market
against the losses for consumers in the market where competition is harmed (see the U.S.
case Lucy Lee/Doctors Medical Center above). In Germany, the Office balances anti-
competitive effects in one market against pro-competitive effects in other markets.
5. Industry level efficiencies. Another issue concerns the distinction between efficiencies
at the level of the merging firms and efficiencies at the level of the market. An example of
the efficiencies at the level of the merging firms could be cost savings as a result of
specialisation between the plants that are owned by the merged entity. An example of
efficiencies at the level of the industry is that the merger between two firms may affect
the R&D incentives for the competitors (see Section 1). It appears that U.S. and
Canadian efficiency considerations only refer to firm-level efficiencies, while Swedish and
U.K. efficiency considerations, in principle but perhaps not in practise, include both
types.98 A possible reason for why only firm-level efficiencies are considered is that they
are easier to verify. Even if both types are considered, one may argue that market-level
efficiencies should be treated separately, at least in assigning the burden of proof. The
reason is that it is probably only concerning the firm-level efficiencies that the firms are
(much) better informed than the competition authorities.
6. Problem of proof. In practice some efficiencies are more difficult to verify. Some
competition authorities have chosen to explicitly state which types of efficiencies that are
less likely to be considered due to such problems (see below).
6. Net effects. An efficiency defence may take into account retooling and other costs that
must be incurred to achieve efficiency gains, and deduct them from the total value of the
efficiencies—computing the net efficiency. That is done in the U.S., Canada and in
Sweden. Note, however, that if these costs only affect fixed costs, they will not be
passed on to consumers. Hence, including these costs is not important if competition
agencies use a consumer’s surplus standard.
7. Measurement. In some jurisdictions it is explicitly indicated what firms should prove,
and what kind of documentation they should use.
In the U.S. merger guidelines it is said that the merging firms must substantiate efficiency
claims so that the agencies can verify (1) the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted
efficiency, (2) how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), (3)
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 Today competition agencies focus attention on the effects of the merger on the so-called relevant
markets (the market where competition is harmed). A reduction in competition is normally believed
to produce dead-weight losses (allocative inefficiencies). However, from an economic perspective this
is a very partial analysis. In particular, according to the theory of second-best, a reduction of
competition in one market may actually be beneficial for allocative efficiency, if competition is
already low in markets for close substitutes. If competition authorities would include efficiencies in
other markets, one may argue that they also should also take into account second-best considerations.
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 The threshold criteria proposed by Farrell and Shapiro do take some external efficiencies
(reallocation of production between merging and non-merging firms) into account.
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how each would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, and (4) why
each would be merger-specific.
In the Canadian merger guidelines it is said that objective verification of particular
sources of efficiency gains may be provided by (1) plant and firm-level accounting
statements, (2) internal studies, (3) strategic plans, (4) capital appropriation requests, (5)
management consultant studies (where available), or (6) other available data.
8. Merger specificity. In some jurisdictions, it is argued that an anti-competitive merger
should only be approved because of the efficiencies that it creates, if those efficiencies
would not be realised through less anti-competitive means.
It may be difficult for competition authorities to judge what alternatives that should be
considered. For this reason it is explicitly stated in the Canadian merger guidelines that
only if the other mean is a common industry practice it will be considered. Examples of
alternatives are: internal growth; a merger with an identified third party; a joint venture; a
specialisation agreement; or a licensing, lease or other contractual arrangement.
Note that the “merger-specificity” requirement entails that an efficiency defence is
invoked only if the anti-competitive concerns cannot be resolved through divestiture or
other remedies.
9. Discounting. In the Canadian merger guidelines it is explicitly stated that to compare
efficiencies and anti-competitive effects that occur at different points in time, one needs
to remove the effects of anticipated future inflation, and apply a standard real discount
rate.
5.8.3
 
Analysis of Competition
In this section we discuss how to analyse linkage between efficiency gains and
competition.
10. Mode of competition. Already an analysis of the effect of a merger on competition
(assuming that there are no cost savings) requires that competition authorities have
information about the mode of competition in the market. Also the analysis of the effect
of cost savings brought about by the merger depends on the mode of competition.
There are several issues involved. The first issue concerns if the firms on the market
compete or if they collude. In the U.S. merger guidelines the first possibility is discussed
under the heading “unilateral effects” and the second under the heading “co-ordinated
effects.” Second, if firms compete, analysis of oligopolistic interaction can be performed
either according to the Bertrand model or the Cournot model (see the Theory section).
In the U.S. it appears that the agencies use the Cournot model for homogenous goods
markets, and the Bertrand model for differentiated products. Third, in some markets
(typically markets for intermediate goods) also the buyers (or sellers, if the merging firms
are buyers) have market power. In that case, the analysis needs to take countervailing
power into account.
11. Efficiencies as an offence (anti-competitive effects). Cost savings are per se
desirable. However, cost savings can have negative side effects. In particular, if two
firms merge and thereby lower their variable costs, they become a tougher competitor.
Actually, if the cost reduction is big enough, the merger may imply that competitors are
driven out of the market, or that new entry is blocked. In this sense, cost savings may be
anti-competitive. In a complete cost-benefit analysis such anti-competitive effects should
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be included in the analysis of a merger, and there is no inconsistency if efficiencies are
treated both as an offence and as a defence. Cost savings have been treated as an offence
both in the U.S. (Brown shoe) and in the E.U. (MSG Media Service).
The fact that cost savings may have anti-competitive effects may complicate the analysis.
It means that the analysis of the merger’s anti-competitive effects cannot be completely
separated from an analysis of the merger’s effect on costs. That is, a preliminary analysis
of the effect of the merger on competition, based on the assumption that costs are not
affected, may underestimate the true anti-competitive effects of the merger. If a merger is
cleared at this stage, before cost savings have been estimated, there is a risk that mergers
that should have been blocked are never detected as anti-competitive.
12. Pass-on (pro-competitive effects). Competition authorities need not only assess the
existence and magnitude of efficiencies. They also need to assess the extent to which the
cost savings are passed on to consumers.99
In a non-collusive market (unilateral effects), four issues are important for assessing
pass-on. First, it is necessary to distinguish between variable and fixed costs. Only
reductions in variable costs are (directly) passed through to consumers. Second, it is
necessary to estimate the degree of post merger competition. The more competition
there is ex post, the more the cost savings will be passed on to consumers. For example,
if competition is very intense, a reduction of marginal cost by 1 Euro would lead to a
reduction of the price by 1 Euro. If the merger creates a monopoly (and if demand is
very price insensitive) the price may essentially be unaffected by the cost savings. Third,
pass-on also depends on the exact “shape” of the demand function. In particular, if the
price elasticity of demand is higher at higher price levels, then the effect of a reduction in
cost on price tends to be small (everything else equal). Fourth, also the slope of the
marginal cost function affects pass-on.
In a collusive market, all three aspects mentioned above are still crucial. In order to
estimate the degree of post merger competition, it is also necessary to estimate the
degree of post merger collusion. The more collusion there is, the less a given reduction in
cost will be passed-on to consumers (much like the non-collusive case). It may be more
difficult to assess the effect of efficiencies on the price level in a collusive market. The
reason is that cost savings may reduce the likelihood that collusion is successful.100
However, economic theory is not well developed to analyse these issues.
In one U.S. case (Long Island Jewish Medical/North Shore Health) pass on was
considered likely since the merging parties where not-for-profit organisations.
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 This view is expressed in the U.S. merger guidelines. It is said that marginal cost reductions may
make co-ordination less likely or effective by enhancing the incentive of a maverick to lower prices
or by creating a new maverick firm. These ideas are more elaborated in an FTC Staff Report (1997).
It is said that lowered costs may disrupt market conditions so as to make collusion less likely or to
disturb the terms by which firms previously were able to co-ordinate conduct. Likewise, if merger-
related efficiencies eliminated a technology disadvantage, the merged firm might become a more
significant constraint on market leaders.
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5.8.4
 
Informational Aspects
In this section we discuss issues related to the fact that competition authorities have little
(in particular, less than the firms) information concerning the efficiency gains from
mergers.
13. General-presumptions versus Case-by-case methodology. Essentially all
horizontal mergers increase market power and reduce allocative efficiency. If this was
the only effect of horizontal mergers, a general prohibition against horizontal mergers
would be the natural policy. However, mergers also lead to cost-savings and other
efficiencies. There are two main methods by which efficiencies are balanced against the
reductions in allocative efficiency in merger control today:
i. The general-presumptions method: Not all horizontal mergers are prohibited.
Typically, only those mergers that significantly reduce competition may be challenged.
For mergers that only reduce competition insignificantly (according to some indicator
such as the Herfindahl measure of concentration or the merging firms’ market shares),
cost-savings are presumed to be more important than the anti-competitive effects. The
global method is used in by the Bundeskartellamt in Germany. According to some,
including the E.U. Commission, the global method is used in the E.U. merger control.
ii. The case-by-case method: Efficiencies may be balanced against anti-competitive
effects on a case-by-case basis (efficiency defence). Elements of the case-by-case method
is used in the U.S, Canada, France, U.K., and Sweden.
The main argument in favour of the global method is that the case-by-case method
requires much information and hence may be costly, or even impossible, to implement.
Against this argument one may say that the global method only produces a reasonable
outcome if the indicator (e.g. such as the Herfindahl measure of concentration or the
merging firms’ market shares) that are used to indirectly assess anti-competitive effects
are reliable, and if the threshold is set in a reasonable way. Also that requires
information. The type of information needed is, however, different. It is not necessary to
collect data about the proposed mergers. It is sufficient to use statistical information, for
example from economic research. Unfortunately, as we have already argued, there is not
much such information.
Typically, case-by-case considerations of efficiency gains are combined with some
general presumptions about the effect of merger on efficiency. This intermediary form
may be called the sequential method.
iii. The sequential method: For mergers that only reduce competition insignificantly,
cost-savings are presumed to be more important than the anti-competitive effects. Case-
by-case considerations of efficiencies are initiated as a second step, in case the analysis of
a first step suggests that the proposed merger causes non-negligible concern for anti-
competitive effects.
Symmetrically, one may use general presumptions to define a level above which anti-
competitive effects are presumed to dominate (and case-by-case analysis is not allowed).
In case both a high and a low threshold are defined, case-by-case considerations are
allowed only in intermediate (or perhaps marginal) cases. For example, according to the
U.S. merger guidelines efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-
monopoly. Similarly, according to Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, an anti-
competitive agreement cannot be exempted if the agreement gives the firms the
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possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.
The motive for the two-step procedure is that efficiencies are difficult to evaluate. The
two-step procedure means that efficiencies need only be assessed in those cases where
the anti-competitive effects are neither negligible nor very strong.
However, there is a potential risk with such a procedure. Since efficiencies may have
anti-competitive effects, those effects may not be noted (see the discussion about
efficiency offence above). Naturally, if the thresholds are strict, this problem is less
important.
14. Burden of Proof. The key problem with an efficiency defence is information. In
many jurisdictions, it is the firms that have the burden of proving that a merger (already
found to be anti-competitive) produces sufficient efficiencies not to be blocked. This is
the case in the U.S. and Canada, and in E.U. concerning exemptions from agreements
that hinder competition. A likely reason for this is that it is the firms that have the best
information.
In some jurisdictions it is explicitly indicated what firms should prove, and what kind of
documentation they should use (see above).
Nevertheless, even with such clarifications, lack of information remains as the key
problem with an efficiency defence. For example, Kinne (1998) argues that it is the
problem of proofs that is the principal reason why courts in the U.S. have repeatedly
rejected efficiency claims.
15. Standard of Proof. Whenever decisions are to be based on evidence, one of the
fundamental questions is what standard of proof to require. As it is difficult to predict
efficiencies precisely before a merger is consummated, one should rather talk about a
persuasion standard. But the question remains, for an efficiencies defence, should one
require that the cost savings be possible, probable, or virtually certain? In the U.S. the
standard has changed over time, from requiring “clear and convincing evidence” to
requiring that claims are “credible” or “clearly demonstrated.”101
16. Full versus Partial Defence. In practice some efficiency gains are more difficult to
verify. Some competition authorities have chosen to explicitly state which types of
efficiencies that are less likely to be considered due to such problems. That may help to
clarify the standard of proof that is used, and it may save time for both firms and the
competition agency.102
According to the U.S. Merger Guidelines: Efficiencies resulting from rationalisation and
multi-plant economies of scale, that is shifting production among facilities formerly
owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the marginal cost of
production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification. Efficiencies relating to
research and development are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to
verification.
The Canadian Guidelines use two broad classes of efficiency gains: production
efficiencies and dynamic efficiencies. Production efficiencies are generally the focus of
the evaluation, because they can be quantifiably measured, objectively ascertained, and
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 See Kinne (1988).
102
 See also Fisher and Lande (1983).
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supported by engineering, accounting or other data. Dynamic efficiencies, include gains
attained through the optimal introduction of new products, the development of more
efficient productive processes, and the improvement of product quality and service.
However, claims that a merger will lead to dynamic efficiencies are ordinarily extremely
difficult to measure. Accordingly, the weight given to claims regarding such efficiencies
will generally be qualitative in nature.
5.8.5
 
Other Procedural Aspects
17. Prosecutorial discretion versus Litigation. Efficiencies may be considered either
by the competition agencies, or by the courts, or by both.103
18. Rebuttal versus Defence. There are at least two different ways that one may frame
an efficiency justification for a merger, namely as rebuttal or as defence. The difference
between the two frames originates from the fact that the term “competition” can be used
in two different meanings.
i. According to one definition, the degree of competition is measured by the price
level (or perhaps consumers’ satisfaction). Using this definition, horizontal
mergers can be both pro-competitive (those that reduce price), and anti-
competitive (those that increase price).
ii. According to another definition, the term “competition” refers to the degree of
market power. Market power may be measured by the price to cost mark-up that
firms charge. With this definition, all horizontal mergers reduce competition (i.e.
increase mark-ups) at least slightly,104 and some of them significantly reduce
competition.
Merger control forbids mergers that reduce competition (significantly). The exact
meaning of this prohibition depends on which of the two meanings that one gives the
term “competition.” Consider a merger that increases mark-ups significantly, but reduces
price (due to large counteracting cost savings). Since mark-ups are increased, such a
merger would be blocked using the second interpretation of the term “competition."
Since price is reduced, such a merger would be permitted using the first interpretation of
the term “competition.”
Furthermore, depending on the interpretation of the term “competition,” an efficiency
justification of a merger must be framed differently. If competition refers to the price
level, a merger should be blocked if, and only if, it raises the price (significantly). With
this definition one may justify a horizontal merger by rebutting a claim that it reduces
competition.
i. Rebuttal: Because of the efficiencies, the merger does not lessen competition (it
does not increase price), and should be allowed.
 In contrast, if competition refers to the degree of market power (mark-up), almost all
horizontal mergers reduce competition, and are consequently hit by the prohibition. With
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 See Fisher and Lande (1983).
104
 There are a few “theoretical” reasons for why a horizontal merger would not reduce competition,
such as if the merger triggers immediate entry, or if one of the firms is failing, or if the firms
colluded perfectly before the merger.
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this definition rebuttal is not available.105 Instead, one may express the justification of a
horizontal merger as an efficiency defence.
ii. Defence: The merger lessens competition (it increases mark-ups). However, due
to the efficiencies, it is nevertheless desirable, and should be allowed.
As we see it, the difference between the two frames is only a difference in terminology.106
It seems that there has been a drift away from the defence-frame to the rebuttal-frame in
the 1997 revision of the U.S. 1992 merger guidelines.107 It also seems that the rebuttal
frame was used in the landmark case FTC v University Health (see above). It is not
possible for us to say if there has been any related change in the substance (for example
that pass-on to consumers is considered more important now, or that the timing of the
analysis has changed108). One may speculate that such a change in terminology may make
it easier to re-conciliate the Supreme Court case law (negative to efficiency justifications
of mergers) with FTC-DOJ policy and the emerging lower court case law (more
favourable to efficiencies).
Actually, the rebuttal-frame may also be a more convenient way, than the defence-frame,
for efficiency justifications under the E.U. Merger Regulation (see section 5.3.1,
above).109
19. Merger guidelines/Notices. Several competition agencies, notably Canada and the
U.S.,110 have chosen to publish the way they analyse mergers, including the way
efficiencies are considered. In Europe, the Commission has published Notices concerning
certain aspects of their analysis, e.g. market delineation. If the firms have the burden of
proving the existence of efficiencies, such merger guidelines may help the firms, the
competition agencies, and the Courts. Apart from reducing the firms’ uncertainty, it may
help them focusing on the relevant matters.
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 Of course, the merger may not raise the mark-up significantly. In that case, a rebuttal is available.
However, it is unlikely that the small increase in mark-ups is due to cost savings. It is more likely
that a modest increase in mark-up is due to intense ex post competition.
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 However, the rebuttal frame is only convenient if the welfare standard is a price standard.
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 See FTC Staff report (1997).
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 The rebuttal-frame may provoke that efficiencies are considered earlier in the process, and not as a
second stage. However, as we see it, the issue of timing and the issue of frame may be decided
separately.
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 For convenience, we have phrased our discussion in terms of an efficiency defence and not as a
rebuttal.
110
 Merger guidelines are also on their way in Sweden.
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6. A FRAMEWORK FOR MERGER ANALYSIS
The previous chapters discussed theoretical aspects, empirical evidence and current
practices concerning the treatment of efficiencies from mergers. This chapter aims to
bring the threads together and propose a framework that may be used in incorporating
efficiencies into merger analysis. Broadly speaking, three approaches may be
distinguished. The case-by-case approach explicitly analyses the magnitude and effects of
efficiencies in every merger case. The general presumption approach makes use of
general structural indicators (such as market shares) with an implicit recognition on the
existence of average efficiencies in mergers. The first approach has the potential problem
of high information costs in measuring efficiencies and their effects. The second
approach has the potential problem that there is a lot of aggregate uncertainty concerning
efficiencies from mergers, in which case the structural indicators are not perfect
predictors of the net benefits from mergers.
A third approach is the “sequential” approach, which aims to combine the relative
advantages of both extremes by minimising on both information costs and errors that
may arise from the unreliability of structural indicators. In a first step, structural
indicators are used to arrive at an initial decision. In a second step, an “efficiency
defence”111 with a more detailed investigation may be allowed.112
Section 6.1 of this chapter reviews in detail the various approaches to incorporate
efficiencies. Based on our conclusions from the empirical literature that efficiencies may
need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, we construct an information-economising
framework for evaluating mergers. In a first stage, notified mergers are assessed using
routine tools with modest information requirements. Mergers that do not pass the first
stage test are subject to further investigation, including an efficiency defence. We note
that the transition from a general presumptions approach (where explicit efficiency
arguments are ruled out) to a sequential approach with explicit efficiency considerations
for some mergers, does not imply a more lax policy towards mergers. Generally
speaking, such a transition does require a revision of the currently used threshold criteria.
Rather than a single “dominance” threshold level, delineating acceptable from
unacceptable mergers, two thresholds levels are now required: a first threshold to
delineate automatically acceptable mergers from those subject to an efficiency defence;
and a second threshold to delineate the mergers subject to an efficiency defence from
those that are automatically unacceptable. The first threshold typically lies below the
currently used “dominance” threshold level, whereas the second threshold level would lie
above the current level.
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 go into more detail in informational aspects that need to be
addressed if one decides to incorporate an efficiency defence in merger evaluation. This
analysis is partly based on our theoretical findings and partly based on the practice in
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 Unless we explicitly say so, we use the term “efficiency defence” to also include “rebuttal” (see the
check-list) in this chapter.
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 In practice, sequential decision making may occur in more than two step, to consider various
dimensions of the merger effects in detail. These steps may include a market share test, an entry
barrier test, a failing firm test and an efficiency test. In our discussion here, we abstract from issues
related to for example entry and failing firms.
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O.E.C.D. countries. We focus on the implementation of an efficiency defence assuming
that the merger authority has a price standard, rather than a total welfare standard. We
emphasise that there are two essential components to the analysis of efficiencies: the
calculation of minimum required efficiencies or MREs (section 6.2), i.e. efficiencies
required to compensate for market power effects; and the measurement and verification
of actual efficiencies (section 6.3.). An efficiency investigation should explicitly balance
these two components in an as transparent way as possible.
The calculation of minimum required efficiencies (MREs) requires essentially an
assessment of the likely expected market power (or anti-competitive) effects. The
difficult task for the merger authorities is to obtain a good idea of the nature of
competitive interaction before and after the merger. This is not an obvious task, given
the various possible models of competition as shown in the theoretical chapter. To
resolve this problem, we propose that the merger authorities focus on calculating the
MREs in a worst case scenario about anti-competitive effects. We provide a simple
methodology to implement this idea, which essentially only requires information on the
expected degree of pass-on of cost changes into consumer prices. Our worst-case-
scenario approach may yield too high efficiency standards for the merging firms. We
therefore also provide formulae for MREs based on specific and simple models of
competition, requiring information on market shares, concentration and price elasticities;
in addition we outline the simulation approach for computing MREs in more complicated
models of competition. Nevertheless, these alternative procedures require a considerably
more complex investigation (including robustness analysis) than our proposed simple
worst-case-scenario approach. For this reason, it seems desirable to place the burden of
proof on the merging firms when these more complex techniques are used.
The computed MREs may then be confronted with the actual expected efficiencies
involved in the mergers. To measure actual efficiencies in a direct way, it is important to
assess the various types of efficiencies, since not all types will have the same effects.
Given the verifiability issues, it would be desirable to put the burden of proof regarding
the types and the magnitude of expected efficiencies on the merging firms, who should
follow procedures set out by the merger authority.
Section 6.4 synthesises the discusses and provides informational arguments in favour and
against the efficiency defence. Also political arguments are considered. Finally, section
6.4 provides some directions on what needs to be done to incorporate the possible
presence of efficiencies. In order to improve merger policy regarding the account of
efficiencies, various concrete actions seem worth to consider. First, it would be
important to think carefully about Art. 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation. Either a
reinterpretation of this article or a modification would be desirable to recognise the
potential role of efficiencies, without outlining how efficiency considerations should be
taken into account. A separate Notice (similar to “Guidelines”) could then be published
in which more detailed procedures are formulated on how efficiencies are to be treated in
the evaluation of mergers. Finally, we argue that it would be desirable to systematically
perform post-merger evaluation, which could, for example, include an analysis into
actually realised efficiencies from mergers, and their pass-on to consumers.
6.1 The treatment of efficiencies
The purpose of this section is to provide possible alternative approaches to the treatment
of efficiencies in merger analysis. The central problem for the merger authorities is to
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economise on information costs, without relying too heavily on indicators of expected
net benefits in circumstances where these are unreliable.
6.1.1
 
Merger decision-making and types of errors
By its very nature, merger policy offers only a limited set of choices to influence
competition. The competition authority either accepts the merger, rejects it, or, as a
compromise, accepts the merger conditional on certain requirements such as divestiture.
The limited, discrete set of alternatives in merger policy is in stark contrast with
regulation, where a larger and more flexible set of policy instruments is available to
influence competition. The regulation of prices, for example, allows for an infinite
number of alternatives.
Whatever the goals of merger policy are (to protect consumer interests, international
competitiveness, or total surplus), the merger authority faces the tremendous task of
computing the net effects of a merger, by comparing the effects on market power with
the effects on various types of efficiencies. The empirical evidence in chapter 3 indicates
that even for firms it may not be an obvious task to compute their net private benefits
from merger. The task for the merger authority is even larger, since they have
considerably less knowledge regarding the markets in which the firms operate.
Given the difficulties in computing the net effects of a merger, and given the limited set
of  alternatives available to the  competition authority, one may distinguish between two
types of error:
• Type 1 error: Accept a merger that has net harmful effects.
• Type 2 error: Reject a merger that has net beneficial effects.
The challenge is to design and apply a policy that minimises the consequences of the two
types of errors. This does not mean that it is necessary to minimise the number of errors
per se. Rather, it means that a good policy should minimise type 1 errors in those cases
where significant net harmful effects are likely; and minimise type 2 errors in those cases
where significant net beneficial effects are likely. At the same time, it is necessary to
economise on information costs.
6.1.2
 
Alternative approaches
6.1.2.1
 
The case-by-case approach
A first way to analyse the net effects of mergers, including both market power and
efficiencies, is to simultaneously consider all factors for each individual merger that is
proposed. Such a case-by-case approach explicitly recognises the possible presence of
efficiencies in every single case. One cannot speak, however, of an efficiency defence,
since efficiencies are considered in the merger analysis in a fully integrated way. A case-
by-case approach would, in principle, allow one to keep type 1 and type 2 errors at a
minimum, at least to the extent that the investigation is successful without any
unforeseen contingencies.
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In practice, however, a case-by-case approach entails tremendous information costs.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of information gathering activities: information
gathering regarding market power effects, and information gathering regarding
efficiencies. First, it is necessary to quantify the market power effects associated with the
merger. We will introduce the concept of minimum required efficiencies (MRE), i.e. the
amount of efficiencies necessary to compensate for the market power (or anti-
competitive) effects of the merger. In principle, this requires a good understanding of the
nature and the degree of competitive interaction in the industry. However, we will
propose a tractable and general procedure which requires that the merger authorities
focus on a “worst case scenario”, which does not require the anti-trust authority to make
specific behavioural assumptions.
Second, it is necessary to identify and measure the actual efficiencies that will be realised.
Both types of information gathering activities may involve significant costs if there is a
lot of uncertainty associated to future effects. Furthermore, the merging parties are likely
to be in a better position to assess certain aspects of the merger effects than the merger
authorities. Problems of information costs are discussed in detail in sections 1.2 and 1.3.
6.1.2.2
 
The general presumptions approach
An alternative approach to evaluate mergers and incorporate efficiencies is by relying on
general presumptions about their likely effects. An extreme example would be to forbid
all horizontal mergers (net effects are presumed to be negative) or to allow all mergers
(net effects are presumed to be positive). A better variant, however, is to make the
approval contingent on some easily observable indicators that contain some (but
imperfect) information about the likely net effects of the merger. In particular, based on
past experience regarding the types, the magnitude and the effects of efficiencies
associated with mergers, one may construct structural indicators, such as market shares
or concentration indices, that measure the average net benefits from mergers. The
general presumptions approach is therefore based on the implicit recognition of
efficiencies.
The general presumptions approach obviously eliminates the high information costs
involved in assessing mergers on a case-by-case basis. Instead, there is now a need for a
set of structural indicators that measure the average net expected benefits from mergers.
The quality of these structural indicators as a predictor of the net benefits from a specific
merger depends on the degree of aggregate uncertainty regarding merger effects. A high
aggregate uncertainty may arise for two main reasons: uncertainty related to average
market power effects and uncertainty related to average efficiencies.
First, as documented in the theoretical chapter 2, each oligopolistic industry is
characterised by its own behavioural peculiarities, such as price-setting versus quantity-
setting behaviour, collusive or noncollusive behaviour, homogeneous goods or product
differentiation, etc. Simple and general formulae of a merger’s market power effects, in
terms of observables such as market shares and concentration indices, can therefore not
be expected to be a good approximation for every industry.113
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 An analysis on the usefulness of simple structural indicators along these lines has been done, among
others, by Werden and Froeb (1996).
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Second, mergers generally differ in the actual efficiencies they realise. Mergers generally
create different types of efficiencies with different effects on competition. Moreover, the
size of efficiencies (and inefficiencies) may differ significantly across mergers.
6.1.2.3
 
The sequential approach
The information costs associated with the case-by-case approach and the aggregate
uncertainty problems associated with the general presumptions approach raise the
question whether there exists an intermediate approach that combines the advantages of
both extremes. The sequential decision-making approach aims to combine aspects of
both approaches. Broadly speaking, a sequential decision approach starts by assessing
mergers based on general structural criteria. If the merger meets the criteria, then it is
accepted. If not, a more detailed analysis is allowed into some, though not necessary all,
aspects of the merger.
Most countries do, in fact, adopt some version of the sequential approach in evaluating
mergers. For example, a first stage of the procedure consists of some routine tasks to
check whether, for example, the total turnover of the merging firms does not exceed a
critical level. Only if the firms do not meet these criteria, a further investigation is
followed. The reason for this procedure is that information costs are too high to justify a
detailed investigation of all (even “minor”) cases, yet aggregate uncertainty about the
merger’s effect is too high to limit the analysis to a routine test on all (in particular
borderline) cases.
Once a merger fails the routine tests in the first stage, a more detailed investigation
starts. Again the question arises whether the merger authorities should simultaneously
consider all factors to assess the net benefits of the merger, or whether, in contrast, a
more limited investigation based on general presumptions is preferable. In principle, the
various dimensions that may be investigated either simultaneously or in sequential steps
include: the definition of the relevant market and a market share test, an entry barriers
test, a more detailed test on expected market power effects (e.g. a collusion test), a
failing firm test.114
At one of these stages a detailed test on the presence of efficiencies may also occur. This
then amounts to the recognition of an efficiency defence. The decision whether or not to
consider various dimensions simultaneously, sequentially, or not at all, will in general
depend on the relative importance of the information costs and aggregate uncertainty
associated with structural criteria. We now discuss in more detail the implications of
applying a sequential approach for the treatment of efficiencies.
6.1.3
 
The efficiency defence
For simplicity, we limit our attention to two central dimensions in merger analysis:
market power (or “anti-competitive”) effects and efficiencies. The sequential approach
then amounts to a two-step approach. In the first step simple structural indicators are
computed which implicitly aim to incorporate both market power effects and efficiencies.
During this step, there is no explicit analysis of efficiencies, but rather some general
presumptions. If the structural indicators meet certain thresholds, then the merger is
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automatically accepted or rejected. In other cases an efficiency defence is allowed in a
second step. In this step market power and efficiency effects are balanced in a detailed
and explicit manner. 115
Two central questions arise in the implementation of the efficiency defence.
(i) How should the thresholds for the structural indicators be
determined in the first step?
(ii) How should the detailed analysis of market power and efficiency
effects be performed in the second step.
We go into detail regarding the second question in sections 6.2 and 6.3. In the present
section we discuss the merger analysis in the first step, in particular the determination of
the thresholds for the structural indicators. The determination of the thresholds is of
course also of importance in the general presumptions approach. However, as we will
show, the actual criteria for acceptance or rejection may differ because of the possibility
of a defence in the second step.
To focus ideas, assume that the merger authorities use a specific structural indicator as a
measure of the expected net benefits from a merger. For example, the European
Commission generally uses market shares of the merging firms. In the United States, the
use of concentration indices, in addition to the market share of the merging firms has
been popular. In particular, the Herfindahl index of concentration (defined as the sum of
all firms’ squared market shares) has received a lot of attention.
Figure 2 considers three possible ways on how these structural criteria may be set in the
first stage of the investigation. Each line describes the range that the structural indicator
may take. For example, if the structural indicator is the merging firms’ joint market
share, the range is between zero and one. The points L and H depict the lower and upper
threshold levels between which the merger authority decides to pursue a more detailed
investigation into efficiencies in the second step.
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 Note that it is also possible to consider three-step procedures. In a first step, general structural
indicators are computed. A second step would consider the analysis of market power effects in more
detail. A third step would consider the measurement of efficiencies and the balancing with market
power effects. In France, such an approach is adopted. The second and third stage could also be
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FIGURE 2. ALTERNATIVE EFFICIENCY DEFENCES
a
ACCEPT EFFICIENCY DEF .
L H
b
REJECTEFFICIENCY DEF .
L H
c
ACCEPT EFFICIENCY DEF . REJECT
L H
Consider first figure 2a. In this case, mergers are always accepted without a further
investigation if the structural indicator (e.g. the merging firms’ joint market share) does
not exceed a certain threshold level L. An efficiency defence is always allowed if the
structural indicator exceeds the threshold L. This is what is most commonly understood
under an efficiency defence. It would mean for example that the merger authorities
always pass a merger that does not lead to a dominant position; in case of a dominant
position an efficiency defence is required. This type of efficiency defence reflects the
merger authorities’ belief that low structural indicators predict net benefits with a
reasonable degree of confidence, whereas high structural indicators have little predictive
power on net benefits. This may occur for example when the structural indicator is a very
good measure of market power effects, and when the merger authorities believe that
efficiencies have a high average and a high variance.
Figure 2b considers the other extreme case in which mergers are always rejected if the
structural indicator exceeds a certain threshold level H. An efficiency defence is allowed
for sufficiently low levels of the structural indicator. It would mean for example that a
merger authority never allows a merger to monopoly; other mergers are allowed an
efficiency defence. This type of efficiency defence reflects the merger authorities’ belief
that a high structural indicator predicts net harmful effects with a reasonable degree of
confidence, whereas a low structural indicator has little predictive power. This may
occur for example when the structural indicator is again a very good measure of market
power effects, but when the merger authorities believe that efficiencies have a very low
(possibly negative) average combined with a high variance.
Figure 2c considers a two-sided efficiency defence. Mergers are always accepted if the
structural indicator is below a threshold L, and always rejected if it is above a threshold
H. Intermediate levels of the structural indicator require an efficiency defence before a
decision is made. This would mean for example that all mergers among small firms are
automatically accepted, whereas all mergers to monopoly are always rejected, and a
detailed investigation into efficiencies is required in intermediate, or marginal, cases.
98
Note that if the thresholds L and H are moved closer to each other in figure 2c (as
indicated by the arrows), then the scope for an efficiency defence becomes more limited.
In the extreme case when L and H would become equal to each other, there is no longer
an efficiency defence, and instead a general presumption approach is applied. The two-
sided efficiency defence may thus be viewed as the most immediate generalisation of the
general presumptions approach, where the strict single threshold for acceptance and
rejection is broadened to a “grey” zone in which an efficiency defence is allowed. A two-
sided efficiency defence would thus reflect the merger authorities’ belief that the
structural indicators perform relatively well, except in borderline cases.
The above discussion shows that an efficiency defence in a second step may be
implemented in various different ways. As discussed in the above paragraphs, the specific
type of efficiency defence to be used, one-side or two-sided, depends on the expected net
benefits that are predicted by the observed structural indicator. A preliminary question is
however whether it is worthwhile to adopt an efficiency defence in the first place. If
information costs in carrying out an efficiency investigation are considered to be
prohibitively high, then an efficiency defence should not be adopted and we are
essentially in the extreme case of Figure 2c, in which L is equal to H (assuming both
thresholds are not at the left or right extreme at which all mergers would either be
accepted or rejected). Now consider a drop in the information costs that induces the
merger authorities to introduce an efficiency defence. Such a drop in information costs
may for example stem from improved measurement methods such as simulation analysis,
to be discussed in the next section. When information costs drop sufficiently, the
threshold levels L and H no longer coincide: L starts to shift to the left and H starts to
shift to the right (i.e. the reverse movement of the arrows indicated on Figure 2c).
The introduction of an efficiency defence, if induced by a drop in information costs, thus
calls for two threshold standards instead of one: (1) a threshold level L, which is lower
than the previous single threshold so that fewer mergers should be automatically
accepted; (2) a threshold level H, which is higher than the previous single threshold so
that fewer mergers are automatically rejected once an efficiency defence is introduced. In
this sence one could say that the introduction of an efficiency defence in the European
Union (based on the consideration that information costs are no longer prohibitive)
should lead antitrust authorities to also revise their current threshold approach based on
the notion of dominance. On the one hand, the threshold level of dominance (H) above
which mergers are automatically blocked without appeal to efficiency considerations
should be increased. On the other hand, a “new” threshold level referring to lack of any
dominance (L) would need to be installed, below which mergers are accepted without
efficiency considerations.
As we have seen in the discussion of the case-by-case approach, information costs in
computing both market power and efficiency effects may in fact be high, and may thus
make an efficiency defence unpractical (so that L equals H). In sections 6.2 and 6.3 we
turn to the issue of how a detailed investigation can be implemented, in particular the
question how to compute the actual efficiencies and the efficiency standards that are
required to compensate for the market power effects. This discussion should also serve
to indicate the potential importance of information costs in introducing an efficiency
defence.
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6.2 Calculating minimum required efficiencies (MREs)
6.2.1
 
Introduction
If a merger has failed the test for acceptance or rejection in the first step, then a second
step with an efficiency defence may be started. This step requires a more thorough, case-
by-case investigation into the possible net beneficial effects arising from efficiencies. It
should be emphasised that this step does not simply require an adequate measurement of
the actual (expected) efficiencies from the merger, but also a good calculation of the
market power (or anti-competitive) effects. Both aspects should be measured in
comparable units so as to arrive at an overall assessment of the net benefits.
Conceptually, one may thus distinguish between:
(1)  the measurement of actual efficiencies, and
(2)  the calculation of minimum required efficiencies (MREs) in order to
compensate for market power effects.
In this section we consider the calculation of MREs116 in more detail. We focus on
MREs for price to decrease, since we interpret the Merger Regulation to be founded on
a consumer welfare standard. Nevertheless we also briefly consider MREs for a positive
externality.
6.2.2
 
Minimum required efficiencies in a worst case scenario
6.2.2.1
 
Expected price increase in a worst case scenario
The expected percentage price increase following a merger may be decomposed into two
separate components. First, there is the expected price increase arising from increased
(unilateral or collusive) market power, holding costs constant. Second, there is the
reduction in marginal cost multiplied by the expected pass-on to consumers.117
The problem with computing the first component is that one needs to have an idea of the
current and future expected intensity of competition. Are firms currently competing
according to the Cournot model or according to the Bertrand model? Are they currently
colluding or behaving in another, less well-defined way? How will firms behave after the
merger? Is the merger likely to increase the likelihood of collusion, or are only unilateral
market power effects to be expected?
To avoid these difficult questions, the merger authorities may opt for a “worst case
scenario”. Such a worst case scenario can actually be formulated quite naturally from the
way the size of the relevant market is currently defined by the European Commission. A
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 The calculation of the minimum required efficiencies may also be phrased as the question what
should be the efficiency standard.
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 Assume that the merger tends to increase by dP/P percent as a result of the first effect. Then, for the
net effect to be non-positive, it is necessary that  (dc/c)(dP/dc)(c/p) £ -dP/P, where (dc/c) is the
percentage cost reduction, and b =(dP/dc)(c/p) is the pass-on elasticity. The pass-on elasticity
indicates by how many percent the price would be reduced if cost is reduced by one percent.
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recent Commission Notice118 sets out the basic principles for market definition. The
relevant antitrust market consists of the minimum number of products for which a
hypothetical joint price increase above current levels – in the range of 5-10% – would be
profitable (assuming no changes in efficiencies).119 Thus if the two merging firms would
not be able to profitably increase their prices by 5-10%, then the relevant antitrust market
would be larger than these two firms, and one can conclude that there is at least no
merger to “monopoly.” The competition agency has to continue to include additional
competing products to the definition of the relevant market until a sufficient number of
products is reached so as to make the hypothetical joint price increase profitable.
If the relevant antitrust market is defined according to this procedure, the worst case
scenario would be that all firms in the market would increase their price by 5-10%
(assuming no changes in efficiencies). This is because a larger price increase would by
the definition of the relevant antitrust market not be profitable to the firms. Generally
speaking, it seems likely that firms would in fact not increase their prices by as much as
5-10%. Even if a collusive (i.e. joint profit maximising) price is set after the merger, this
would generally result in a price increase by less than 5-10%. Lower price increases may
also be expected if the merger does not result in collusive price setting.
It might be argued that the worst-case-scenario price increase of 5-10% is an arbitrary
number; if the competition agencies had chosen the number of, say, 20% to define the
relevant antitrust market, then the market definition would have included more firms but
the worst-case scenario price increase would also have been higher. However, such a
reasoning fails to take into account why the competition agency has chosen the 5-10%
number for market definition in the first place. We now go into some detail in how one
may interpret this number.
One may view the number of 5-10% as the intolerance level for maximum price
increases, to be used during the initial phase of the investigation. This intolerance level is
set at around 5-10%, based on some (implicit) general presumption that efficiencies are
very likely going to be insufficient to compensate for the 5-10% price rise that would
take place without any change in efficiencies. The important question for the competition
agency is what is the size of the merger, relative to the size of the relevant antitrust
market. First, the proposed merger may involve all firms or more firms than those that
are included in the definition of the relevant antitrust market, i.e. a merger to monopoly
or “beyond”. Our interpretation is that the competition agency would (almost) certainly
reject such a merger during the initial phase of the investigation because the intolerance
level of 5-10% price increases (absent efficiencies) would have been exceeded.120
Second, the proposed merger may involve only part of the firms included in the definition
of the relevant antitrust market, i.e. a merger to less than monopoly. The merger may
then be accepted or rejected depending on the outcome of a test whether or not the
merger creates or strengthens dominance in the relevant market. If the merger passes the
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 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for purposes of Community competition
law, published in Official Journal 372 on 9/12/1997.
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 There has been a debate whether one should consider price increases above current or above
competitive levels. See for example Hovenkamp (1994) and Sleuwaegen (1994), and the references
therein, for a discussion. In practice, it has been usually chosen to take current levels as the point of
reference.
120
 The 5-10% number thus corresponds to the threshold H in figure 2c, above which mergers are
certainly rejected.
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dominance test, it would be approved without a more detailed investigation. One may
thus interpret the dominance test as the tolerance level for price increases, below which
there is a general presumption that the expected anti-competitive effects are small
relative to the expected efficiencies.121
If the merger fails to pass the dominance test, then it is made subject to a more detailed
investigation. In particular, we know that such a merger will, absent cost savings, likely
lead to a moderate or significant price increase of at most 5-10%. Expressed differently,
the worst case scenario for these mergers is that they increase price by 5-10%.
6.2.2.2
 
The importance of pass-on
By how much does marginal cost have to drop in order to compensate for the expected
worst case scenario price increase? As indicated above, this will depend on the degree of
pass-on of costs into consumer prices. For example, suppose that pass-on is 50%. In
other words, suppose that if cost is decreased by e.g. 10%, then price is reduced by only
5%. A 50% pass-on would imply that the minimum required reduction in marginal cost,
i.e. the MRE, is in the range of 10-20%, i.e. the 5-10% range divided by 50%. More
generally, suppose that we know that pass-on of a marginal cost reduction into consumer
prices is equal to the parameter b .122 The required drop in marginal costs to compensate
for the price increase in a worst case scenario is then equal to the 5-10% range divided
by b . Thus the greater the pass-on parameter b , the greater will be the efficiency
standard for price to increase.
Using the procedure of the worst case scenario, the question of computing MREs boils
down to estimating the degree of pass-on. This greatly simplifies matters since this is a
question that has received a lot of attention in the economic literature. A detailed review
on the size of the pass-on parameter b  is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless,
we want to emphasise that there exist several studies that have analysed pass-on from
both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
6.2.2.3
 
Assessing pass-on in practice
The empirical literature on pass-on is large, and is scattered over various fields in
economics, see section (4.3.3) for a more detailed discussion. The general empirical
finding from this literature is that pass-on is indeed incomplete. The examples cited
above suggest that the pass-on parameter b  roughly varies between 30% and 70%. Yet
we stress that a more detailed study is necessary to obtain a more complete picture. If
the conclusions would turn out to be robust, then one could conclude that the efficiency
standard for price to increase would vary between 7% and 17% if a 5% rule for defining
the relevant market is used; it would vary between 14% and 33% if a 10% rule is used.
One may note that these numbers are rather high. The reason is that they come from the
worst case scenario. Nevertheless, there are mergers that may meet such high
requirements.
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 If the dominance test entails a tolerance level for price increases of, say, 2%, then the number 2%
corresponds to the threshold L in figure 2 above.
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 Full pass-on means that that the pass-on parameter b =1. No pass-on means that b =0. Partial pass-on
means that b  is some number between 0 and 1. More than full pass-on, which is possible at least in
theory, means that b >1. Negative pass-on is inconsistent with most models of firm behaviour.
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The more confidence one would obtain regarding the estimate of the pass-on parameter
across sectors, the easier it would be for the merger authority to revert to a general
presumptions approach regarding the MREs (though not necessarily of course regarding
actual efficiencies). For example, if it would be found from empirical studies that it is
fairly safe to assume a pass-on parameter of 50%, then the efficiency standard would
simply amount to twice the hypothetical joint price increase that was used when defining
the relevant market. If, in contrast, a detailed review of the literature would point out
that the pass-on parameter varies substantially across sectors, then the merger authority
may prefer to do a case-by-case analysis in the second step for determining the pass-on
parameter. The following considerations may be taken into account under such a case-
by-case investigation.
(1) Previous empirical results on pass-on may be used if these are available for the sector
in which the merger takes place.
(2) The merging firms may be requested to provide the necessary information for
estimating pass-on based on historical data. A descriptive empirical approach to
estimating past pass-on behaviour would require fairly standard econometric procedures
based on data that the firms should have readily available.
(3) A qualitative analysis may be undertaken on the likelihood that pass-on in the sector
of the merging firms will deviate from the mean pass-on parameter in the economy. Such
a qualitative analysis may be based on several theoretical arguments.
Theory predicts that the importance of the following three variables in determining the
degree of pass-on of a marginal cost reduction into consumer prices: the slope of
marginal costs, the intensity of competition and the curvature of the price elasticity of
demand. First, assume there is perfect competition and marginal costs are constant. In
this case marginal cost changes will be fully passed on into consumer prices ( b =100%).
Second, assume there is still perfect competition but that marginal costs are increasing
(reflecting capacity constraints). In this case pass-on will be incomplete, provided at least
that industry demand is not perfectly inelastic ( b <100%). Intuitively, suppose that the
competitive firms decide to lower their prices by the extent of the reduction in marginal
costs. This price increase would raise industry demand (unless it is perfectly inelastic). In
order to meet the increased demand the firms would need to produce more. When
marginal cost are increasing due to capacity constraints, this requires firms to charge a
higher price than the original decreased price, so that pass-on is incomplete.
Third, assume that there is imperfect competition. In this case firms may have incentives
to absorb cost changes by adjusting their mark-ups. The degree of mark-up absorption
depends on the curvature of the price elasticity of demand. To see this, note that
percentage mark-ups over marginal costs are given by the inverse of the price elasticity
of demand. If the price elasticity of demand is constant, then percentage mark-ups will
also be constant. In this case there is no mark-up absorption of cost changes. If, in
contrast, the price elasticity of demand is increasing in price, then firms find it optimal to
reduce their mark-ups when costs increase, and increase their mark-ups when costs
decrease. Consequently, pass-on is incomplete.123
                                                       
123
 To see this intuitively, suppose the firm would fully pass on a cost decrease in a price decrease, hence
keeping mark-ups constant. The result would be that the elasticity of demand is reduced at this lower
prices. But according to the inverse elasticity rule this would imply it is no longer optimal to charge
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These theoretical considerations teach us that pass-on is expected to be weak when the
industry is characterised by increasing marginal costs (capacity constraints), when there
is a significant degree of market power, and when there is mark-up absorption due to an
increasing price elasticity of demand. The first two conditions are intuitive and possibly
relatively easy to observe variables. The third condition seems more difficult.
Nevertheless, even for this case there are some interesting theoretical results that suggest
to link the degree of mark-up absorption to the firms market shares. For example,
Feenstra, Gagnon and Knetter (1994) show that the degree of mark-up absorption
depends on the market share of the firms according to a U-shaped pattern.
6.2.2.4
 
Caveats regarding the worst-case scenario approach
The above procedure proposes to compute the MRE, i.e. the required drop in marginal
cost for price to decrease, by focusing on a worst case scenario about the anti-
competitive effects from the merger. The MRE in this worst case scenario is equal to the
maximal profitable joint price increase divided by the pass-on parameter b . The maximal
profitable joint price increase is equal to 5-10%, because that is how the relevant market
has been delineated based on an (implicit) intolerance level of the competition agency,
above which a merger would be almost certainly rejected. In this subsection we are more
explicit about possible objections against our worst-case-scenario approach.
First, it should be noted that the 5-10% method for market delineation used by the
Commission pre-supposes that the competition agencies, explicitly or implicitly, make an
assumption (or know) how the firms outside the (candidate) relevant market respond to
a joint increase in price by the firms inside the (candidate) market. For example, the
competition agency may presume that the outsiders keep their prices constant when the
insiders increase their price by 5-10%. Alternatively, the competition agency may
presume that the outsiders respond collusively (i.e. also by 5-10%). Finally, the
competition agency may presume that outsiders respond according to Bertrand or
Cournot or some other model of strategic behaviour. When we construct our worst case
scenario, we assume that the merger authority did use correct information in the market
delineation step, also about possible responses by outsiders. This is also how theoretical
work prescribes to define the relevant market, see Sleuwaegen (1994) for a discussion.
If, however, this is not the case in practice, our methodology may need to be modified.
This would occur, for example, if the competition agencies incorrectly assumed that all
outsiders keep their prices constant, whereas in practice some would respond collusively
to the 5-10% price increase.
A second difficulty with the worst-case-scenario approach is that the 5-10% price
increase is only a lower bound for the maximal jointly profitable price increase, and may
thus not always be a good approximation of the worst-case-scenario price increase. To
see this, suppose that 5-10% procedure leads one to find that the market consists of N
firms. Strictly speaking, one can only be certain that N-1 firms would not find it
profitable to raise their price by 5-10%. If potential joint market power rises extremely
rapidly with the inclusion of the N-th firm, then it may be that firms would now suddenly
                                                                                                                                                                  
the same mark-up, but rather to increase the mark-up. This implies that an optimising firm will
reduce its price by less than the cost decrease.
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find a joint price increase of drastically more than 5% profitable.124 One may refer to this
problem as the integer problem from moving from N-1 to N firms.
In practice, this integer problem should not be exaggerated if one accepts that adding
additional firms to the market definition increases joint market power in a more or less
smooth manner. The main exception would be in case the definition of the relevant
market is just equal to the number of merging firms, so that it concerns a merger to
monopoly (in the sense of the relevant market definition). In this case, the two merging
firms may indeed possibly find it profitable to increase their prices by significantly more
than 5-10%; the 5-10% price increase is still a lower bound to the worst case scenario,
but the actual worst case price increase may be even higher. The intolerance level of the
competition agency is then likely to be exceeded and the merger would need to be
rejected without an efficiency defence.
Finally, we note that the European Commission Notice defines the relevant market by
considering maximum profitable joint price increases; in other countries, the relevant
market is defined by considering optimal joint price increases.125 Both approaches may
however be interpreted as a worst-case scenario, although one needs to make a
somewhat different assumption on the firms’ rationality. In the first approach, one
assumes that the worst that can happen is that firms increase their price up to the point
where this is no longer profitable compared to the pre-merger situation. In the second
approach, one assumes that the worst that can happen is that the firms set their price in a
jointly optimal way.
6.2.3
 
Minimum required efficiencies based on specific models
of competition
6.2.3.1
 
Introduction
The procedure outlined in the previous subsection requires a minimal amount of
information in order to compute the MREs for price to decrease. Essentially, only the
degree of pass-on needs to be estimated. A disadvantage of the approach is that it starts
from a worst case scenario. In reality, it is possible and perhaps even likely that firms
would raise their price by less than the assumed 5-10% amount (ignoring changes in
efficiencies). This would especially be the case when the relevant market includes a high
number of firms, since in this case post-merger collusion can presumably be ruled out,
and a non-collusive model of oligopoly may be more likely to apply. Therefore, the
procedure outlined in the previous section may impose too high MREs and lead to a
rejection of mergers with potential net benefits.
Nevertheless, the construction of MREs based on specific non-collusive models of
competition is subject to some reservation. In the E.U. a merger can only be blocked if it
creates or strengthens a dominant position. Hence, only in case of dominance there is
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 This can be illustrated in a simplified model of N price-setting firms without capacity constraints
selling homogeneous goods. Including less than N firms in the market definition will not alter the
firms’ joint market power. When all N firms are included, they suddenly obtain market power, the
degree of which depends on the elasticity of market demand; if market demand is very inelastic (little
outside substitutes), the maximally profitable joint price increase may be significantly higher than
5%.
125
 In practice, the European Commission may not have enough information to distinguish between
maximum profitable and optimal joint price increases.
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need for an efficiency defence. A firm is dominant if it has a large degree of market
power. In such case one talks more precisely of single firm dominance. More recently the
Commission has widened the concept of dominance to also include joint, or oligopolistic,
dominance. The relevance of joint dominance in merger cases was recently confirmed by
the Court in Kali+Salz. According to Morgan (1996) joint dominance has, using
economic terminology, been interpreted as collusion. If this is correct, only mergers that
create single firm dominance, or that lead to collusion, risk being blocked in the E.U.
Hence, there may only be a need to construct an efficiency defence for collusive markets,
and not for markets characterised by for example Cournot or Bertrand type of
competition. If this is correct, then the worst case scenario described above is
appropriate.
It is nevertheless instructive to also consider the construction of MREs based on non-
collusive models of competition. One reason for this is that the interpretation of joint
dominance as only including collusion, and not non-collusive oligopolies, might be
subject to revisions in the future. In fact, there is no obvious economic ground for this
restriction. If a merger leads to increased prices and harms consumers, it is not important
to the consumers if the price increase is due to a unilateral action by the merging firms,
or if it is due to co-ordinated actions among all firms.
In what follows, we consider some specific models of competition to derive explicit
formulae of the MREs for price to decrease. If these models of competition can be
shown to apply with a reasonable degree of confidence to the industry in which the
merger takes place, then these derived MREs may be more accurate. However, we
would recommend to place the burden of proof for applying these formulae to the
merging firms rather than to the merger authorities. First, the merging firms are likely too
have better information about the nature of competition in their industry. Furthermore,
the merging firms may be supposed to have carefully assessed anti-competitive effects of
the mergers (see e.g. Song Shin, 1998, for a formal argument along these lines).
We distinguish between two types of models: industries with homogeneous goods and
Cournot competition, and industries with product differentiation and Bertrand
competition.126 We make some simplifying assumptions in order to derive explicit
formulae. The derived formulae for the efficiency standards are easy to interpret, they are
based on relatively easy to observe variables, and they can be easily and quickly
implemented. The disadvantage is that the formulae for the efficiency standards may be
quite sensitive to the assumptions regarding pre-merger and post-merger competition. In
the next subsection we describe the computationally more complex simulation approach.
This approach shares much of the economic intuition of the simple models, and at the
same time allows for significantly more flexibility and realism in modelling competition.
6.2.3.2
 
Homogeneous products and Cournot competition
Consider a merger between firm A and firm B. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider a
homogeneous goods market with Cournot competition. Denote the (single) pre-merger
price of the homogeneous good by P; the marginal cost of firm A and B by MCA and
MCB, respectively; and the marginal cost of the merged entity (at the pre-merger
production level) by MCM. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) find that a merger reduces price if,
and only if, the merged firm’s mark-up (at the pre-merger production level) would be
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greater than the sum of the mark-ups of the constituent firms before the merger, i.e.
P MC P MC P MCM A B- > - + -( ) ( ) . Let us say that firm A has a marginal cost that is
lower than (or equal to) firm B’s. The condition may then be rewritten in terms of the
required cost reduction below the lowest cost firm:
MC MC P MCA
M
B- > - .
In words, the reduction in the marginal cost of the lowest cost firm, firm A, must exceed
firm B’s pre-merger mark-up. This condition is intuitive: the required marginal cost
reduction is larger the larger is the firms pre-merger market power. A problem with the
formula is that it depends on not so easy to observe variables: marginal cost data cannot
easily be retrieved from accounting cost data. Yet, using the equilibrium conditions for
mark-ups of the Cournot model it is possible to rewrite the above condition as:
A
B
A
M
A
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where sA and sB are the market shares of firm A and B, and e  is the price elasticity of
market demand, i.e. the effect of an increase in P by one percent on market demand in
percent (in absolute terms). In words, the required percentage reduction in marginal cost
below the low cost firm A’s marginal cost must exceed an easy-to-compute threshold
sB/( e -sB). All one needs to know is the market share of each partner before the merger,
and the market elasticity of demand. Intuitively, as the market share of either firm A or
firm B increases, or as the price elasticity of market demand decreases, the required
percentage cost reduction increases.127
One may distinguish between two extreme cases. On the one hand, if the market share of
firm B becomes very small, then the required reduction in the marginal cost below the
low cost firm A’s pre-merger marginal cost can be very small. The acquisition of a small
firm thus puts very low MREs. On the other hand, if the joint market share of the
merging firms exceeds the price elasticity of market demand (sA+sB>e ), then the merger
can never reduce price, even if the marginal cost would drop to zero after the merger.128
In less extreme cases, the threshold efficiency level needs to be computed. For example,
if firm A and B have a market share of 30 percent and 10 percent, and if the price
elasticity of market demand equals one, then the required percentage reduction in A’s
marginal cost is 33 percent; if the merging firms’ joint market share of 40 percent is
evenly distributed (i.e. each firm has 20 percent), then the required marginal cost
reduction is 25 percent.
From a practical perspective, it is necessary to compute the firms market shares and the
price elasticity of market demand. A prerequisite to both is a proper definition of what
constitutes the relevant market. In the previous subsection we discussed how the relevant
market is defined according to a recent notice.129 To compute the price elasticity of
demand (once the market is defined), one may follow an econometric approach after
gathering historical information on prices, total market demand and other variables such
as income. In many cases, price elasticities of market demand may also be available from
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 Note that this formula is also consistent with frequently used structural indicators, i.e. market shares
and elasticities.
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 In a Cournot equilibrium, it is also the case that sA< e  and sB< e .
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 For a review, see for example also Sleuwaegen (1994).
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academic publications or from industry sources. If none of these possibilities is available,
reasonable values for elasticities may be assumed and the robustness regarding
alternative assumptions will need to be assessed.
6.2.3.3
 
Differentiated products and Bertrand competition
The above simple formula applies if firms produce homogeneous goods. When products
are differentiated several modifications need to be made. There is no longer a single price
for both products. As a consequence, there is no single notion for the price elasticity of
market demand. More fundamentally, one needs to address the issue of how products are
differentiated. At the one extreme, products may be differentiated symmetrically, with all
products in the industry being equally close (or distant) substitutes for one another. At
the other extreme, product differentiation may be asymmetric, with each product having
only one or two direct competitors and competition being highly localised.
Generally speaking, with product differentiation the effects of mergers on prices may be
phrased in terms of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for the products. The
own-price elasticity of demand for product A,  e AA, is the effect on the demand for
product A (in percentage terms) when its price is increased by one percent. The cross-
price elasticity of demand for product B with respect to the price of product A, e AB, is
the effect on product B’s demand (in percentage terms) when price of product A is
increased by one percent. The diversion ratio d A is the ratio e AB/ e AA, i.e. the proportion of
lost sales that is captured by product B, when product A’s price is increased. Put
differently, the diversion ratio is the proportion of consumers for which product B is the
second best alternative to product A. Similar concepts may be defined to measure the
effect of changes in the price of product B ( e BB, e BA, d B).
The diversion ratio d A is very important in merger analysis since it provides a measure of
the intensity of pre-merger competition between A and B. Suppose that product A and B
are merged into a single company. If the diversion ratio is very small, then A and B are
no close competitors and the merger should have no significant impact on product A’s
market power. If the diversion ratio is high, and if, in addition, firm A and B do not face
much competition from other products in the market, then a significant increase in
market power may be expected. What cost efficiencies are required for the merger to
reduce price despite a possible increase in market power? If one is willing to assume that
the own- and cross-price elasticities do not vary as prices increase, then the following
formula for the MRE may be derived:130
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In the special case in which products A and B are symmetric, this formula would simplify
to:
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.
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 This formula assumes firms compete in price, rather than in quantities. The derivation of the formula
is tedious and is available on request. For some related work, see Fisher et al. (1989), Stockum
(1993), Werden (1996) and Bian and McFetridge (1995, 1997).
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For example, suppose that the price elasticity of demand e AA is 3 (implying a pre-merger
markup of 33 percent); and that the diversion ratio d A is 0.2 (20 percent of the sales lost
go to product B when A increases its price). The efficiency standard is then a marginal
cost reduction of 12.5 percent. More generally speaking, the above formulae imply that
the efficiency standard for the price of product A to decrease is greater, as the elasticity
of product A’s demand decreases and as the diversion ratio increases. This is intuitive
since a low price elasticity reflects high pre-merger market power, and a high diversion
ratio reflects intense competition between the merging products.
If one makes the further (strong) assumption that the ratio of two products market
shares are independent of the available products in the market, then one can compute the
diversion ratio in terms of market shares. Under this independence assumption the
diversion ratio d A would equal sB/(1-sA), i.e. the probability that B is second best for
product A equals the market share of product B relative to the joint market share of all
goods except A. Willig (1991) has made this observation to provide a foundation of
traditional merger analysis based on market shares. Indeed, substituting out the diversion
ratio d A in the above formula, one obtains:
MC MC
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This formula shows some resemblance to the efficiency standard formula for
homogeneous goods (and Cournot competition). It emphasises once again that
information on the price elasticity and market shares are critical in assessing the required
efficiencies.
The above formulae assume that the elasticities of demand are constant. This may be a
good approximation for evaluating small changes around the initial pre-merger
equilibrium. However, when merger occur, a nontrivial change in equilibrium takes
place, so that the constant elasticity assumption is no longer innocuous. To the extent
that the elasticity of demand for a product increases as the price of that product
increases, post-merger market power would be overestimated under a constant elasticity
assumption, and the required efficiencies for price to decrease may be less than implied
by the above formulae. If the constant elasticity assumption is believed to be unrealistic,
then a more general approach needs to be adopted, presumably requiring simulation
analysis (see below).
6.2.3.4
 
Assessing elasticities of demand
An important practical problem with the above formulae is how to compute the own-and
cross-price elasticities of demand, and the implied diversion ratio. We provided a simple
procedure above to compute the diversion ratio in terms of market shares in a simplified
model of product differentiation. Such a procedure may be useful as a first
approximation, or when data are not easily available. Similarly, one may make use of
survey data or “common sense” to estimate the diversion ratio as the proportion of
consumers for which product B would be the second choice to product A.
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If detailed data on prices and market shares of all products in the market are available,
then one may be able to estimate all own- and cross-price elasticities (and the implied
diversion ratio) through an econometric model of product differentiation. Such models of
product differentiation have been estimated econometrically for the automobile market
by Bresnahan (1981), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Verboven (1996), among
others; for the ready-to-eat cereal industry by Nevo (1998). The limited number of
studies is largely due to the high data requirements, but more studies may be expected as
more data become available (for example due to the detailed scanner data from
supermarkets).
Another approach that has been used to estimate elasticities is called “residual demand
analysis”. This approach131 proposes to focus only on the own- and cross- elasticities
faced by the merging firms, after substituting out the responses by the competitors. The
other elasticities need not to be known for the purposes of merger analysis, so that the
information requirements are greatly reduced. The only data that are needed are
historical data on the merging firms market shares and prices (which may be requested
during the investigation), as well as some market-level variables affecting the industry.
Data on the competitors prices and market shares are not needed. Intuitively, residual
demand analysis makes it possible to determine whether or not the firms proposing to
merge have been close competitors in the past and face little competition from others (in
which case the merger would require high efficiencies). In fact, the obtained estimates for
the own- and cross-price elasticities may be used to compute the diversion ratio and
substituted into the simple formulae for minimum required efficiencies derived in section
1.2.3.3. Such an analysis would require a careful analysis by economists.
6.2.4
 
Minimum required efficiencies using simulation analysis
6.2.4.1
 
Introduction
As shown above, for some special cases of oligopolistic behaviour it is relatively easy to
compute the efficiency standards for prices to decrease. Several simplifications were
necessary to derive these formulae, such as the assumption that goods are homogeneous,
or, under differentiated products, the assumption of a constant elasticity of demand.
Furthermore, we did not consider models in which there is both product differentiation
and Cournot behaviour (capacity constraints). Finally, we did not consider explicit
formulas for total welfare to increase. No simple formulae to compute efficiency
standards for welfare to increase are available. For these reasons, these formulae should
only be treated as indicators, not as definite tests in borderline cases. A thorough
robustness analysis, by considering alternative (plausible) values of elasticities, market
shares, etc…, would certainly help in obtaining greater confidence in the obtained
threshold conditions.
At the same time, it may be worthwhile in certain cases to follow a more realistic, in-
depth calculation of efficiency standards by applying simulation analysis. Simulation
analysis allows one to specify the nature of competitive interaction in the industry
without a need to make strong simplifying assumptions. The approach has become
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 Baker and Bresnahan (1985) originally proposed this procedure and applied it to the beer industry.
The methodology has been applied in several cases, see for example Hausman, Leonard and Zona
(1994) for the beer industry, or Hausman (1994) for the ready-to-eat cereal industry.
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increasingly popular in evaluating mergers in the U.S. in response to increasing criticism
against the use of simplified formulae that do not apply to the industry under
investigation. More recently, simulation analysis has also been applied in Canadian
investigations. As computer programs develop and become more user-friendly, there
seems to be little reason for not considering simulations in merger analysis in various
cases.
A simulation analysis for mergers can be broken down in three separate steps: (1)
development of the model of competitive interaction, (2) model parameter calibration,
and (3) simulation of post-merger equilibrium, including the computation of efficiency
standards.132
6.2.4.2
 
Development of the model of competitive interaction
In this step, one investigates how the nature of competitive interaction can be best
described. In chapter 2 various models where discussed. First, one needs to determine
whether products are homogenous or differentiated. If they are differentiated, it is
necessary to find out the precise nature of differentiation, i.e. is competition symmetric
between all firms in the industry, or is competition localised between smaller subsets of
products or firms. Second, it is necessary to specify the cost conditions of the firms. Can
firms compete in prices without accounting for capacity constraints? Or do firms face
binding capacity constraints so resemble Cournot quantity-setting firms? Do firms set
prices (or quantities) unilaterally, or in a co-ordinated manner? A great advantage of
simulation analysis is that it allows one to consider, at least in principle,  all these
possibilities.
To facilitate the task in this step, the investigator may decide to apply one of the existing
programs that has been used in other investigations. For example, Froeb and Werden
(1993, 1994) have intensively used the logit and nested logit model of product
differentiation. The first model allows for product differentiation, but assumes that all
products compete symmetrically; the second model allows for localised competition
between groups or subgroups of products.
6.2.4.3
 
Model parameter calibration
In this step, data on the products’ current prices and markets shares are substituted into
the model, as well as a measure for the price elasticity of market demand. The data
requirements are thus limited and are no larger than needed when one would stick with
the simple threshold conditions discussed in the previous subsection. After these data are
substituted into the model, it is possible to calibrate the model and retrieve the firm-
specific parameter values for marginal cost and demand.
To understand this, suppose there are 10 products in the market. Assume that each
product has a different marginal cost and possibly also a different valuation (quality),
                                                       
132
 Froeb and Werden (1994) provide a detailed description on how to perform model simulations. They
make use of the Mathematica software package.
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which are not directly observed by the investigator. Assume that other parameters, such
as a measure for the price elasticity of market demand, have known values. The
investigator observes each product’s own price and its own market share, which are
interpreted as the equilibrium outcome of consumer demand and firm pricing decisions.
Calibrating the model now consists of inverting the system of 10 demand and pricing
equations to retrieve 10 firm-specific valuations and marginal cost parameters.
Intuitively, if two products have the same price but one has a higher market share, then
calibration would reveal that the more popular model has a higher valuation. The
unobserved marginal cost and demand parameters may thus be inferred from the
observed equilibrium values for prices and demand, assuming any other parameters are
known.
In fact, the own- and cross-price elasticities are thus retrieved from the current data on
the firms’ prices and market shares, usually augmented with some indication of the price
elasticity of the overall market demand. There is thus in principle no need for detailed
data to econometrically estimate all elasticities. A disadvantage may be that the retrieved
elasticities are not as reliable as those obtained through an econometric procedure. This
issue can be overcome through a detailed sensitivity analysis.
6.2.4.4
 
Simulation of post-merger equilibrium
The previous two steps fully quantify the model of competitive interaction through a
mixture of specification assumptions and parameter calibrations based on the pre-merger
equilibrium. The final step is to specify the changes to the model as implied by the
merger and compute the new prices and market shares. One may then easily compute
changes in prices, consumer surplus and total welfare following the merger.
The first change that needs to be made to the model is the assumption of price-setting.
Where the merging firms previously set prices independently, they now may be expected
to act in a co-ordinated way and take into account the effects on each others’ profit. This
change will tend to increase prices.
A second change may be the presence of efficiencies realised by the merger. The most
direct way of simulation analysis would be to re-compute the equilibrium prices and
market shares for alternative levels of efficiencies that may involved in the merger. In
particular, as the reduction in marginal cost realised by one or both of the firms increases,
the expected price increase falls. There will be a critical level for marginal costs for which
the merger just leaves the prices of the merging products unaffected. This critical level is
a generalisation of the efficiency standards for price to decrease derived in the discussion
based on simple formulae. A simulation analysis also allows one to compute minimum
required reductions in marginal or average costs for mergers to exhibit a positive
externality or to increase total surplus. We are thus left with a very powerful and
generally applicable instrument for analysing the likely effects of mergers and calculating
the efficiency standards for price to decrease or total surplus to increase.133
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 Of particular interest are also the simulations done by Froeb and Werden (1993) to assess the validity
traditional structural criteria (as implemented in the first step of merger assessment). They find that
the increase in the Herfindahl index is a far better predictor for beneficial mergers than either the
combined market share of the merging firms or the post-merger Herfindahl index.
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6.2.4.5
 
A hypothetical example
To illustrate the simulation approach regarding merger analysis, Werden and Froeb
(1994) simulate the effect of mergers of long distance carriers. They start from an
oligopoly model with product differentiation and price-setting firms. They use the logit
model as the specific model partly because the U.S. 1992 merger guidelines use this as
the reference model for differentiated products analysis, and partly because it has modest
data requirements: prices, market shares, a measure of aggregate price elasticity of
demand, and a cross elasticity parameter. Furthermore, even though the logit model does
not generate analytic solutions for equilibrium prices, consumer surplus and welfare, it
has proved to be a tractable model for numerical analysis.
The model has various general predictions regarding mergers: (1) prices of all products
increase as a results of the merger, but the magnitudes of the price increases are very
different across products. The price of the small merging partner increases by more than
the price of the larger partner. The weighted average of the merging partners’ price
increases much more than the prices of the non-merging outsiders. The larger non-
merging firms increase price more than the smaller firms. Mergers that increase price
may at the same time increase welfare because of output reallocation effects. To
understand the net outcome on consumer surplus and/or welfare, a simulation analysis
very helpful.
Froeb and Werden consider hypothetical mergers among U.S. long-distance carriers. For
this industry good data on market shares and prices are available; commonly accepted
measures on price elasticities are available. In a first scenario they assume that the
merger has no effect on costs. Under this scenario, they find that all mergers involving
AT&T have significant adverse welfare effects, and mergers not involving AT&T have
only small effects. In a second scenario, they assume that the merging partners marginal
costs equal the minimum of the two merging firms marginal costs before the merger. In
this scenario all mergers of pairs of long-distance carriers increase social welfare, except
a merger between AT&T and MCI. Table 1 below illustrates these computations.
113
Table 1. Price and welfare effects of hypothetical mergers in the U.S. long-distance
carrier market
No cost advantage from merger Cost advantages from merger
Change in: consumer
surplus
total welfare consumer
surplus
total welfare
AT&T—MCI -5.63 -2.296 -5.06 -0.587
AT&T—Sprint -3.40 -1.243 -2.91 0.130
AT&T—Minor -1.45 -0.488 -1.21 0.162
MCI—Sprint -0.98 -0.046 -0.56 0.306
MCI—Minor -0.43 -0.011 -0.20 0.195
Sprint—Minor -0.27 -0.000 -.20 0.047
Minor—Minor -0.12 +0.003 -0.13 0.003
Note: all numbers are in percent of premerger revenues. Minor=representative other firm.
Source: Werden and Froeb (1994), Tables 3 and 5.
A merger between AT&T and MCI has significant price effects both with and without
the above mentioned possible cost savings. Also a merger between AT&T and Sprint has
significant price effects. Regarding welfare effects, only a merger without cost savings
between AT&T and MCI would cause significant adverse effects.
Note that these computations are only hypothetical and one should not generalise their
findings to hypothetical mergers in other industries. Yet the calculations illustrate that
simulation analysis does provide a potentially powerful tool to merger analysis. An
extension of Froeb and Werden’s analysis could have been to simulate the minimum
required cost savings for consumer surplus or welfare to increase. These would than fit
directly into our framework. In addition, it would be wise to perform a more detailed
robustness analysis regarding merger effects. For example, one could redo their
calculation based on the hypothesis that the industry becomes collusive after the merger.
6.2.4.6
 
Simulation analysis in practice
Simulation analysis has been applied several times in the U.S. In U.S. v. Interstate
Bakeries, The Justice Department blocked a merger between white pan bread companies
in Chicago using this analysis. In the L'Oreal acquisition of Maybelline, the methodology
was again used by the Justice Department to allow a merger between competing
cosmetics firms, a merger that probably would have been blocked using the structural
analysis of the Guidelines. More recently, simulation analysis has also been applied in
Canadian merger cases. The explanation for the recent trend towards simulation analysis
is related to the recent theoretical advances in modelling the competitive effects of
mergers, combined with improvements in computational methods.
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6.2.5
 
Minimum required efficiencies for a positive externality
The efficiency standard for price to decrease may of course not always be met.
Economists often argue that the relevant objective for the government is total social
surplus, which is the sum of both consumer and producer surplus. For this reason one
may allow the merging firms to appeal to the fact that the merger could create a positive
externality to the consumers and the competing firms jointly. Farrell and Shapiro
considered this possibility (assuming homogeneous goods). As explained in chapter 2,
mergers that increase price may still create a positive externality since the outsider firms
may expand their output after the merger. To the extent that these outsider firms are
relatively more efficient than the insiders, the merger may exhibit a positive externality. A
positive externality is a sufficient (though not a necessary) condition for total surplus to
increase, assuming that the proposed merger is privately profitable.
Farrell and Shapiro derive the condition that the sum of the merging firms market shares
sA+sB should not exceed a concentration index CIO of the outsider firms market shares
for the merger to create a positive externality. More specifically, the critical index is:
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where h  is the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve, and m i is the elasticity of
outsider firm i’s marginal cost with respect to output.
This index requires quite detailed knowledge about several specific structural features of
the industry, both concerning cost and demand conditions. In some interesting special
cases this index can be simplified. Let HO be the sum the outsiders’ squared market
shares (i.e. the Herfindahl index of the outsiders) and  HO* be the sum of the outsiders
cubed market shares. The following matrix then provides measures of CIO in terms of
these indices and elasticities for four alternative cases, depending on whether the
marginal cost function is constant or (linearly) upward sloping, and whether the demand
curve is linear or of a constant elasticity form.
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Consider first the left column, for linear demand. If marginal cost is constant, then the
market share of the merging firms should be less than 50 percent for the merger to create
a positive externality. In this specific case, all that matters is the market share of the
merging firms relative to the outsiders; the distribution of output across competitors is
irrelevant. In contrast, if marginal cost is upward sloping, then the distribution of output
across the outsiders does matter. The  market share of the merging firms should not
exceed the Herfindahl index of concentration among the outsider firms (normalised by
the price elasticity of market demand). The more concentration there is across the
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outsiders, the more likely the merger will create a positive externality. The right column
shows that the conditions are stricter in the case of a constant elasticity demand.
The strength of the approach proposed by Farrell and Shapiro is that it derives sufficient
conditions for a positive externality that are expressed in relatively easy-to-observe
variables, without requiring any knowledge of the actual cost efficiencies arising from the
merger.
There are however also several disadvantages with their approach. First, the above
examples showed that it is difficult to draw a general conclusion other than that the
merging firms market shares should be small relative to some concentration index CIO.
Nevertheless, this problem may be resolved by applying some robustness analysis using
the above (or related) formulae. For example, it would be relatively safe to conclude that
the merger creates a positive externality (assuming homogeneous goods and Cournot
competition) if the joint market share of the merging firms does not exceed any of the
four concentration indices in the above matrix.
A more important problem with the above externality analysis is that simple formulas are
only available for a market with quantity competition and homogeneous goods. No
simple rules exist under price competition and product differentiation. For these cases,
one would need to resort to simulation analysis. Werden and Froeb (1994) consider
simulation analysis to explore the effects of hypothetical mergers among U.S. long
distance carriers, and find examples of mergers that increase both price and welfare,
without internal cost savings, similar to Farrell and Shapiro’s result.
Another important problem with the approach of Farrell and Shapiro is that it looks at
the total externality of a merger, assuming it leads to an increase in price. Since merger
authorities seem to be primarily interested in consumer surplus, this is perhaps the main
reason why their formulae have not been applied.
6.3 Evaluating actual efficiencies
The required efficiency standards computed using one of the methods proposed in the
previous section, ought to be confronted with the actual efficiencies realised by the
merger. We discuss the evaluation of actual efficiencies in three subsections. First, we
discuss what types of efficiencies are most likely to have beneficial effects. Second, we
consider the question to which extent beneficial efficiencies are likely to be merger-
specific. Third, we discuss the issue of verification of efficiencies.
For obvious reasons, much of the discussion draws directly from the discussion in the
“check-list” in chapter 4.
6.3.1
 
What types of efficiencies are most likely to be beneficial?
6.3.1.1
 
Efficiencies and pass-on
In section 6.2 we discussed a methodology for calculating efficiency standards, i.e. the
minimum required efficiencies for mergers to decrease price. Broadly speaking, it was
shown that the efficiencies should be sufficiently passed-on to consumers. Which types of
efficiencies are more likely to result in pass-on?
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First, it is necessary to distinguish between fixed and variable costs. Fixed cost savings,
such as the avoidance of a duplication of administrative routines, do not affect the
marginal costs of the firms. The possibility that these savings will be passed on to
consumers is therefore limited. One possibility of pass-on of fixed costs may arise if there
is market power also at the other side of the market. In this case bargaining between the
firm and its customers may lead to lower prices. Nevertheless, such a consideration
should be treated with care. Savings in variable costs directly affect the pricing decisions
of the firm. For this reason, variable cost savings should be given priority in the
assessment of efficiencies.
Second, it is important to know the magnitude of (variable) cost savings. Some examples
illustrate what considerations may be taken into account. (1) If the merging firms argue
that they will realise discounts from buying certain inputs, then one has to provide
detailed documentation on the share of the cost of these inputs in overall costs. (2) If it
concerns the realisation of scale economies, then it is of course important to be
convincing about the extent of scale economies. Also, since long-run economies of scale
affect marginal costs only after some time, information on the expected timing of the cost
savings must be given. (3) If the cost savings stem merely from rationalisation of
production, then it is known from theory that this will never be sufficient to generate
price decreases, though it obviously may contribute to other factors.
Third, not only cost savings should be considered. Improvements in product quality
constitute a synergy with similar economic effects. The relevant question in this case is
whether the claimed efficiencies have the potential of lowering “quality-adjusted prices”,
see e.g. Rosen (1974).
6.3.1.2
 
Other considerations
Priority should be given to efficiencies that have real effects, rather than only
redistributive (pecuniary) effects. For this reason, one should be careful in taking into
account tax savings. Although these may be passed on to consumers, they of course also
imply a transfer from the tax payer to the firm.
Another issue concerns the distinction between efficiencies at the level of the merging
firms and efficiencies at the level of the market. An example of the efficiencies at the
level of the merging firms could be cost savings as a result of specialisation between the
plants that are owned by the merged entity. An example of efficiencies at the level of the
industry is that the merger between two firms may affect the R&D incentives for the
competitors. We discussed this in detail in Section 3.1.3.2. These types of efficiencies are
potentially very important in some high tech industries. To investigate the role of these
efficiencies in practice is not an easy task. One way could be to adopt a simulation
analysis, extending the typical oligopoly models used in simulations to a dynamic setting.
A possible reason for why only firm-level efficiencies are considered by most
jurisdictions is that they are easier to verify. Even if both types are considered, one may
argue that market-level efficiencies should be treated separately, at least in assigning the
burden of proof. The reason is that it is probably only concerning the firm-level
efficiencies that the firms are (much) better informed than the competition authorities.
Another subtle issue is cost savings (or other efficiencies) that are realised in other
markets. On the one hand, one may argue, that it does not matter where the saving of
resources occur. In a complete cost-benefit analysis, these savings should be included.
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However, there are at least two arguments against this view. First, if competition
authorities need to study the effect of the merger on more markets (than the so-called
relevant market), the analysis would be more complex and hence costly. Moreover, if
cost-savings in other markets are included one may argue that also other issues related to
these other markets should be addressed by the competition authorities.134 Second,
including efficiencies in other markets makes it necessary to weigh the gains for
consumers in those other market against the losses for consumers in the market where
competition is harmed.
Efficiencies arising from output reductions should not be given any weight if the focus is
on price effects. If however also producer surplus is taken into account, then these
savings do matter. Yet note that they are never sufficient to outweigh the reduction in
consumers’ surplus.135
6.3.2
 
Can efficiencies be created through alternative means?
A question of central importance is whether efficiencies can be achieved through other
means than the proposed merger. It is important not to put any a priori restrictions on
the alternative possibilities and the practical feasibility. The following alternative
possibilities may exist for realising the claimed efficiencies: (1) internal growth, (2) a
joint venture, (3) a specialisation agreement, (4) a licensing, lease or other contractual
agreement, (5) another merger.
Three elements need to be addressed when comparing the proposed merger with the
alternative possibilities. First, it is necessary to determine which alternative arrangements
would be chosen if the merger is blocked (e.g. another merger). Some guidance about
which alternatives are most practical may be gained by considering the regular practice of
other firms in the industry. Unfortunately, however, economic theory can not give much
guidance on this issue.136 Second, it is necessary to determine the relative costs (e.g.
restructuring costs) and expected efficiency benefits from setting up these alternative
arrangements. Third, it is necessary to assess the possible anti-competitive effects of
these alternative arrangements.
Whenever firms use efficiency arguments, they should be as explicit and as complete as
possible regarding these alternative possibilities and their effects. For example, an
alternative merger might be preferably with respect to anti-competitive effects when this
would involve the integration with a smaller firm or with a foreign firm (more distant
competitor). In such a case it should be stated why this alternative merger does not
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 Today competition agencies focus attention on the effects of the merger on the so-called relevant
markets (the market where competition is harmed). A reduction in competition is normally believed
to produce dead-weight losses (allocative inefficiencies). However, from an economic perspective this
is a very partial analysis. In particular, according to the theory of second-best, a reduction of
competition in one market may actually be beneficial for allocative efficiency, if competition is
already low in markets for close substitutes. If competition authorities would include efficiencies in
other markets, one may argue that they also should take into account second-best considerations.
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 The difference is the dead-weight loss.
136
 The reason is that the theory of endogenous mergers is still very incomplete. That theory aims at
explaining not only which mergers are likely to occur, but also, as an integral part of the analysis,
what would happen absent the merger. Early contributions include Stigler (1950), and Deneckere
and Davidson (1985b). More recent contributions are Kamien and Zang (1990, 1991, 1993),
Fridolffson and Stennek (1998a-b, 1999), Horn and Persson (1996, 1997), Gowrisankaran (1999).
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create the potential for equal efficiencies at a similar restructuring cost and with less anti-
competitive harm.
6.3.3
 
How can efficiencies be verified?
The most difficult issue regarding the analysis of efficiencies is their verification. Special
care has to be taken so that the analysis of efficiencies can be undertaken with a
reasonable degree of confidence and without relying on too costly information collection
activities.
6.3.3.1
 
Burden of proof
It is acknowledged by most merger authorities that the merging firms have the burden of
proof regarding the type, likelihood and magnitude of efficiencies, as well as the merger-
specificity of the claimed efficiencies. The merging firms may be presumed to have more
information about their businesses, especially about efficiencies if that was an important
factor in deciding upon the merger.137
6.3.3.2
 
Standard of proof
Nevertheless, even if the merging firms have the burden of proof, informational problems
remain a key problem, because of the asymmetry of information between the merging
firms and the merger authorities. White (1987) and Fisher (1987) argue that efficiencies
are typically easy to claim, but hard to prove. Fisher (1987) argues in favour of very high
standards for proving actual efficiencies, based on several examples where efficiencies
were claimed but presumably were not materialised or could have been materialised in
another way. 138 U.S. policy has gradually shifted from a standard of “clear and
convincing” evidence, to a standard requiring that efficiencies are “credible” or “clearly
demonstrated”.
Alternative standards are, of course, rather vague. In what follows below, we explain
which elements may be taken into account so as to be able to assess efficiency claims in
an as reliable way as possible.
6.3.3.3
 
The partial efficiency defence
Not all efficiencies are equally easy to verify. For this reason, it would be desirable to
distinguish between alternative types of efficiencies not only based on their expected
effects, but also based on their verifiability. For example, Areeda and Turner would
especially favour efficiencies relating to economies of scale, at least if demand is not
growing rapidly. Both the U.S. and the Canadian merger guidelines emphasise
production efficiencies (economies of scale and rationalisation) as sources of efficiency
that may be more easy to verify, in contrast to dynamic efficiencies (research and
development).
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 A theoretical foundation for this principle is given by Son Shin (1997).
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 Scherer and Ross (1991) provide other cases. For example, the New York Central-Pennsylvania
Railroad merger promised cost savings of about 4 percent, but the actual results from the merger
were highly rising costs eventually leading to a quasi-nationalisation.
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6.3.3.4
 
Verification and certification of information
To alleviate the asymmetric information problem between the merging firms and the
merger authorities, it may be desirable to put different weight on the amount on
efficiency claims, depending on the source that certifies the validity of the information.
The Canadian merger guidelines distinguish between the following sources of
information: (1) plant- and firm-level accounting statements, (2) internal studies, (3)
strategic plans, (4) capital appropriation requests, (5) management consulting studies
(where available), or (6) other available data. There may be an important advantage of
information that is certified by outsiders such as management consultants, since they
need to protect a reputation of future reliability.
It may also be argued that less weight should be assigned to studies on efficiencies that
have been prepared after the merger has been taken to a detailed investigation by the
competition agency. This is because this would reveal that they were not the ostensible
basis for the merger decision. Later documents should however not be distinguished
altogether, since they may, for example, be prepared to make efficiency claims more
specific or in line with the formalities set out by merger guidelines or notices.
6.3.3.5
 
Post-merger preview
Scherer (1991) has proposed to first approve mergers only on a temporary basis.
Mergers for which persuasive preliminary evidence on expected efficiencies can be
provided may be allowed for a temporary trial period of, for example, three years. At the
end of this period, an evaluation can be conducted to find out whether the promised
efficiencies have, in fact, been realised. If so, the merger could be definitely accepted.
Otherwise, the company may be required to divest again into the two independent parties
that existed before the merger.
A main advantage of such a system is that it forces the merging firms to think well ahead
of potential future efficiencies, and to make only credible efficiency claims, since making
empty promises may be punished later through a costly divestiture decision. At the same
time, the competition policy authorities can economise significantly on information costs.
There is no need to attempt to verify current claims on future efficiencies, since the final
decision is made when the relevant information on realised efficiencies is available.
A disadvantage is that the merger process may be very costly.139 These costs may well be
sunk in case the ex post decision goes against the merger. Nevertheless, these costs may
in fact serve to make the promised efficiencies credible, since the firms know the rules of
the game, including the fact that they may need to divest if false promises are made.
Furthermore, the costs of divestiture need not to be exaggerated in modern times, as
Scherer argues. Companies now have experience in applying a large variety of
reorganisations, such as sell-offs, spin-offs, or leveraged buy-outs, to make parts of their
company independent organisations.
The system proposed by Scherer may fit however better into the U.S. antitrust system
which already allows the possibility to break up existing firms to reduce market power.
Nevertheless, we believe that it is worth thinking about the possibility of allowing
mergers only conditionally for a trial period before definite approval.
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 For example, the merger between Pharmacia and Upjohn is estimated to have cost 1.6 billion dollars
during the three years 1995-97 (Affärsvarlden, 1998).
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6.3.3.6
 
Merger license fees
Direct verification, certification, or post-merger review all have in common that they
require an direct evaluation (either ex ante or ex post) of the actual efficiencies that are
(expected to be) realised through the merger. A drastically different approach in
screening mergers would be to implement a revelation mechanism through the institution
of merger license fees to be paid to the government.
It is not clear how the license fee for the merger to be accepted should be determined.
This will for example depend on the objective the merger authority has in mind
(maximisation of consumer surplus and total welfare). To understand the determination
of optimal merger licence fees, a more thorough theoretical analysis is required. One may
expect that many of the insights from the asymmetric information (screening) literature
would apply.
In practice, (small) fees for approving mergers (dependent on the merger size) have been
used in the U.K., though presumably not explicitly for screening purposes.
6.4 Should there be an efficiency defence?
6.4.1
 
Arguments for and against an efficiency defence
6.4.1.1
 
Informational aspects
The above analysis has shown the important potential role of efficiencies in the merger
process. Even if there is no evidence that mergers create strong efficiencies on average,
some particular mergers do just that. In practice, efficiency considerations are often
implicit in merger evaluation. The relevant question is thus not whether, but rather how
potential efficiencies should be taken into account in merger control.
We have emphasised the central role of procedures which serve to economise on
information costs. The general presumptions approach avoids potentially high
information costs, but relies on possibly unreliable structural indicators for prediction the
net benefits (including efficiencies). The case-by-case approach may imply significant
information costs to measure efficiencies, but does not rely on structural indicators. The
sequential approach aims to combine the advantages of both procedures by relying on
general presumptions, with the exception of the borderline (or marginal) cases where a
case-by-case analysis is taken regarding the anti-competitive and the efficiency effects.
Which approach is actually taken, depends on the information costs and the reliability of
the structural indicators. This may require some value judgements, but also common
sense and experience with actual cases should help to determine which procedure is
preferable.
If the intermediate solution of the sequential approach is found desirable, then a
reconsideration of the threshold levels is required. As argued in more detail in section
6.1.3, the introduction of an efficiency defence (if based on improved information
collection methods) requires a revision of the current single threshold referring to
“dominance”, which delineates those mergers to be accepted without efficiency analysis
from those mergers to be rejected without efficiency analysis. Instead of this single
threshold, two thresholds should now be used: a first threshold (L), below which mergers
are automatically accepted, and a second threshold (H), above which mergers are
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automatically rejected. For the in-between cases an efficiency analysis would then be
undertaken. We note that the lower threshold L will typically be below the “dominance”
threshold as currently adopted, whereas the upper threshold H (which one could possibly
still label the dominance threshold) should exceed the dominance threshold as currently
adopted. Note that the merger authorities could keep flexibility in determining the
threshold levels L and H between which efficiency considerations are allowed. The more
optimistic they are about information costs involved in analysing efficiencies, the further
apart L and H could be. In an extreme case L could be very small and H very large so
that effectively all proposed mergers are allowed efficiency considerations. There is then
a full case-by-case approach as currently in the U.S.
For those mergers that fall within the range in which an efficiency defence is allowed we
propose an approach in which minimum required efficiencies (MREs) need to be
compared with actual efficiencies in borderline cases. We propose a relatively simple
approach to compute these MREs. This approach focuses on a worst-case scenario
regarding anti-competitive effects, and would leave the burden of proof for
demonstrating lower anti-competitive effects on the merging firms. The measurement
and verification of actual efficiencies may follow rules that partly draw on the experience
in other countries.
6.4.1.2
 
Political considerations
The above discussion has compared the case-by-case, the general presumptions and the
sequential approach from an informational point of view. Each approach has its own
strengths and weaknesses in treating the possible presence of efficiencies in a reliable, yet
computationally tractable way. In this section we point out that there are also political
reasons why it may be advantageous (or not) to recognise the presence of efficiencies, at
least in principle.
First, there has been the Kali+Salz decision, which the Court for the first time accepted
the concept of joint, or oligopolistic, dominance, rather than single firm dominance. This
suggests that the policy has recently become more strict regarding mergers. This
development may make it more natural to consider efficiencies more explicitly today.
Second, many merging firms try to make use of efficiency arguments in convincing the
merger authorities on the likely net benefits from the merger. At present, the Commission
is simply not positioned to consider these efficiency claims in a formal way. It would
potentially improve the transparency of merger review that efficiency considerations can
be dealt using a clear procedure. See, for example, Neven et al. (1993) or Camesasca
(1999) on this.
Third, there is a political argument why it may not be desirable to allow efficiency
considerations. One has to be careful that introducing efficiency considerations in a
formal way does not open up the possibility of a more active industrial policy. Yet such a
problem may be overcome as long as there is sufficient transparency in the procedures.
According to Camesasca, the main problem with the current “between-lines” approach is
that the Commission has no fall-back line to defend itself against accusations of industrial
policy considerations. Furthermore, the perception of political influence on the antitrust
review of mergers and regulatory capture by a host of interest groups is aggravated by
the limited judicial review of the Commission’s decisions. He argues that it is necessary
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to clarify that “efficiencies” are just that, and as such no open gateway for “other
competing values.”
6.4.2
 
Formalities
In this section we discuss some possible actions that may be undertaken so as to take
into account some of the findings of this report.
6.4.2.1
 
The Merger Regulation
We have discussed in some detail in chapter 4 the importance of article 2(1)(b) of the
merger regulation. Our conclusion was that at present the interpretation of this article is
not clear regarding the treatment of efficiencies. If one is to introduce an efficiency
defence, two approaches may be taken.
The first approach is to reinterpret article 2(1)(b) to mean that efficiency considerations
may be considered. We have argued in chapter 4 that such a reinterpretation is possible,
i.e. does not contradict the other articles of the legislation, as long as efficiencies are
required to be sufficient to reduce price. If such a reinterpretation is made, it may be
more convenient to talk about rebuttal than defence (see the check-list in chapter 5).
Moreover, if such a reinterpretation is made it may be desirable to publish a Notice
commenting on the interpretation of article 2(1)(b) as discussed below. A problem with
this approach is that it could limit the treatment of efficiencies to dynamic efficiencies
and not include static efficiencies as is done in Art 85(3), see our discussion in section
(5.3.4). A second approach is to rewrite the Merger Regulation. The advantage of this
approach is that the role of efficiencies can be considered in a more flexible way, for
example without necessarily focusing exclusively on consumer interests.140
Whatever approach is taken, the Merger Regulation should limit attention to a
recognition of the potential role of efficiencies in a flexible and unambiguous way.
Details on how to incorporate efficiencies do not belong in the Merger Regulation, since
they should be subject to periodic evaluation.
6.4.2.2
 
Notice
To outline the specific procedure by which efficiencies are (or are not) taken into
account, it would be desirable to publish a separate notice, comparable in goals to the
relevant sections of the “Merger guidelines” published in the U.S. or Canada. Such a
Notice could be based on various findings discussed in the present chapters, and outline
under which circumstances efficiencies are explicitly considered, and how minimum
required and actual efficiencies are compared.
The advantage of a separate Notice is that it can be changed in a more flexible way,
taking into account recent developments in the role of efficiencies and in our thinking
about them.
Writing a Notice may be particularly important if the firms themselves have to carry out
the burden of proving efficiencies. Writing a Notice where it is described in detail how
                                                       
140
 Our review of the E.U. practice revealed that the efficiency defence under Article 85(3) of the Treaty
of Rome may be more far reaching than the efficiency defence that could be constructed under
Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
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efficiencies are considered, may also have a commitment value. The increased
transparency makes it difficult to deviate from the described procedure, and worries
about industrial policy might be reduced.
6.4.2.3
 
Post-merger review
We have stressed that the procedure to be adopted for incorporating efficiencies depends
on the role of information costs and the reliability of structural indicators as predictors of
net effects. The actual mergers that have been proposed (and accepted) provide a unique
data base for the merger authorities to continuously evaluate their policy. For example,
the merging firms may be asked to provide evidence on the realisation (or lack thereof)
of promised efficiencies. This would allow the merger authorities to obtain a more
complete picture on the distribution of efficiency gains from mergers, in particular the
average and the variance of efficiencies. Similarly, the merging firms may be asked to
provide detailed historical data on competitive variables, in particular the evolution of
prices and market shares. This would enable to merger authorities to obtain a more
precise idea of the degree of pass-on. A post-merger review could thus significantly
contribute to experience and provide directions on how to update merger control and the
role of efficiencies.
124
7. REFERENCES
Adams, Walter and James W. Brock (1988): Reaganomics and the Transmogrification of
the Merger Policy, Antitrust Bulletin, 33, pages 339-359.
Akhavein, Jalal D.; Berger, Allen N.; Humphrey, David B.: The Effects of Megamergers
on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function; Review of Industrial
Organization; 12(1), February 1997, pages 95-139.
Arrow, Kenneth: Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventions, In:
R. Nelson, ed., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University
Press, 1962.
Asplund, Markus; Sandin, Richard: Competition in Interrelated Markets: An Empirical
Study, Stockholm School of Economics, 1996a.
Asplund, Markus; Sandin, Richard: Estimating the Number of Firms and Capacity in
Small Markets, Stockholm School of Economics, 1996b.
d'Aspremont, Claude; Jacquemin, Alexis: Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in
Duopoly with Spillovers, American Economic Review, 78(5), December 1988, pages
1133-37.
Bagnoli, Mark; Lipman, Barton L.: Succesful Takeovers without Exclusion, Review of
Financial Studies; 1(1), Spring 1988, pages 89-110.
Baker, J. and T. Bresnahan: Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single
Firm, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6(3), 1988, pages 283-300.
Banerjee, Ajeyo; Eckard, Woodrow E: Are Mega-Mergers Anti-Competitive? Evidence
from the First Great Merger Wave, Rand Journal of Economics; 29(4), Winter 1998,
pages 803-27.
Baldwin, John; Gorecki, Paul: Mergers Placed in the Context of Firm Turnover, in
Bureau of the Consensus, 1990 Annual Research Conference, Proceedings,
Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, pages 53-73.
Barros, Pedro P.; Cabral, Luis M. B.: Merger Policy in Open Economies, European
Economic Review, 38(5), May 1994, pages 1041-55.
Barton, David M., and Roger Sherma: The Price and Profit Effects of Horizontal
Merger: A Case Study, Journal of Industrial Economics, 33(2), 1984, pages 165-77.
Becker, Brian E.: Union Rents as a Source of Takeover Gains among Target
Shareholders, Industrial and Labor Relations Review; 49 (1) October 1995, pages
3-19.
Berger, Allen N.; Humphrey, David B.: Megamergers in Banking and the Use of Cost
Efficiency as an Antitrust Defense, Antitrust Bulletin; 37(3), Fall 1992, pages
541-600.
Berger, Allen N. and David B. Humphrey: The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency
and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function, Review of Industrial Organization,
1997, 12, pages 95-139.
125
Berkovitch, Elazar; Narayanan, M. P.: Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical
Investigation, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis; 28(3), September
1993, pages 347-62.
Besanko, David; Spulber, Daniel F.: Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust
Policy, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; 9(1), April 1993, pages 1-29.
Bettendorf Leon; Verboven, Frank: Competition on the Dutch Coffee Market,
forthcoming in European Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2000.
Borenstein, Severin: Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power, American
Economic Review, 80(2), May 1990, pages 400-404.
Bradley, Michael; Desai, Anand; Kim, E. Han: Synergistic Gains from Corporate
Acquisitions and Their Division between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring
Firms, Journal of Financial Economics; 21(1), May 1988, pages 3-40.
Brander, James A.; Spencer, Barbara J.: Moral Hazard and Limited Liability:
Implications for the Theory of the Firm, International Economic Review; 30(4),
November 1989, pages 833-49.
Bresnahan, Timothy F.: Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in:
Schmalensee, Richard; Willig, Robert D., eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization.
Volume 2. Handbooks in Economics, no. 10, Amsterdam; Oxford and Tokyo: North-
Holland; 1989, pages 1011-57.
Bresnahan, Timothy F.; Reiss, Peter C.: Entry in Monopoly Markets, Review of
Economic Studies; 57(4), October 1990, pages 531-53.
Bresnahan, Timothy F.; Reiss, Peter C.: Entry and Competition in Concentrated
Markets, Journal of Political Economy; 99(5), October 1991, pages 977-1009.
Bridgeman, John S.: Merger Efficiency – Fact or Fiction?, Speech given at Keele
University, 3 February 1999. (http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/rsearch/sp-arch/spe5-
99.htm)
Brueckner, Jan K.; Spiller, Pablo T.: Competition and Mergers in Airline Networks,
International Journal of Industrial Organization; 9(3), 1991, pages 323-42.
Cable, J.R.; Palfrey, J.P.R.; Runge, J.W.: Federal Republic of Germany, 1964-1974, in
D.C. Mueller, ed., The Detrminants and Effects of Mergers: an International
Comparison, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gun&Hanin, 1980, pages 99-132.
Canenbley, Cornelis; Schutte, Michael: Germany, in: International Mergers – The
Antitrust Process, Second Edition, edited by J. William Rowley and Donald I. Baker,
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996.
Camesasca, Peter D.: The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does it Make
the Difference?, European Competition Law Review; 1, 1999, pages 14-28.
Camesasca, Peter D.: Flying High: The de Havilland-Meger Revisited from a Law and
Economics Perspective, forthcoming in: The Scope for National Merger Control in
Europe, edited by John Kay and Alfred Haid.
Caves, Richard E.: Mergers, Takeovers, and Economic Efficiency: Foresight vs.
Hindsight, International Journal of Industrial Organization; 7(1), Special Issue,
March 1989, pages 151-74.
126
Caves, Richard E.; Barton, David R.: Efficiency in U.S. manufacturing industries,
Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1990.
Coate, Malcolm B.; McChesney, Fred S.: Enforcement of the US Merger Guidelines.
Empirical Evidence on FTC Enforcement of the Merger Guidelines, Economic
Enquiry; 30, 1992, pages 277-93.
Cohen, Weley M.; Levin, Richard C.: Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market
Structure, in: Schmalensee, Richard; Willig, Robert D., eds. Handbook of Industrial
Organization. Volume 2. Handbooks in Economics, no. 10, Amsterdam; Oxford and
Tokyo: North-Holland; 1989, pages 1060-1107.
Compte, Olivier, Jenny, Frederic, and Rey, Patrick: Capacity Constraints, Mergers, and
Collusion, mimeo, 1998.
Cosh, Andrew; Huges, Alan; Sing, Ajit: The Causes and Effects of Takeovers in the
United Kingdom: An Empirical Investigation for the Late 1960s at the
Microeconomic Level, in: D.C. Mueller, ed., The Determinants and Effects of
Mergers: an International Comparison, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gun&Hanin, 1980,
pages 227-270.
Cotterill, Ronald W.: Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from
Vermont, Review of Economics and Statistics; 68(3), August 1986, pages 379-86.
Crampton, P.: Alternative Approaches to Competition Law: Consumers' Surplus, Total
Surplus, Total Welfare and non-efficiency goals, World Competition 17, 1994, pages
55-86.
Davidson, Carl; Deneckere, Raymond: Horizontal Mergers and Collusive Behavior,
International Journal of Industrial Organization; 2(2), June 1984, pages 117-32.
Deneckere, Raymond; Davidson, Carl: Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand
Competition, Rand Journal of Economics; 16(4), Winter 1985, pages 473-86.
Deneckere, Raymond; Davidson, Carl: Coalition Formation in a Noncooperative
Oligopoly Models, mimeo. 1985b.
DePrano, Michael E., ad Nugent, Jeffrey, B.: Economies as an Antitrust Defense:
Comment, American Economic Review, 1969, pages 947-953.
Eckbo, B. Espen: Horizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder Wealth, Journal of
Financial Economics; 11(1-4), April 1983.
European Commission: Ninth Report on Competition Policy, Brussels-Luxembourg: EC
Commission, April 1980.
European Commission: The Economics of 1992, European Economy, 35, 1988.
European Commission: Contribution to Efficiency Claims in Mergers and Other
Horizontal Agreements, O.E.C.D./GD(96)65, 1996.
Farrell, Joseph; Shapiro, Carl: Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, American
Economic Review; 80(1), March 1990, pages 107-26.
Feenstra, Robert C.: Symmetric Pass-Through of Tariffs and Exchange Rates under
Imperfect Competition: An Empirical Test, Journal of International Economics;
27(1-2), August 1989, pages 25-45.
127
Feenstra, Robert C.; Gagnon, Joseph E.; Knetter, Michael M.: Market Share and
Exchange Rate Pass-Through in World Automobile Trade, Journal of International
Economics; 40(1-2), February 1996, pages 187-207.
Fisher, Alan A.; Lande, Robert H.: Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
California Law Review 71, December 1983, pages ??-??.
Fisher, Alan A.; Johnson, Frederick I.; Lande, Robert H.: Price Effects of Horizontal
Mergers, California Law Review 77, July 1989, pages 777-827.
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan: How Merger Control can Hasten
Anticompetitive Mergers, Research Institute for Industrial Economics, 1998a.
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan: Endogenous Merger Waves, Research Institute
for Industrial Economics, 1998b.
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan: Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Rise Share
Prices – A Theory of Preemptive Mergers, Research Institute for Industrial
Economics, 1999.
Friedman, James, 1971: A noncooperative Equilibrium for Supergames, Review of
Economic Studies, 28, pages 1-12.
Froeb, Luke M. and Werden, Gregory J.: Simulating the Effects of Mergers among
Noncooperative Oligopolists, in: Varian, Hal (ed.), Mathematica for Economists.
Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition
Policy in the new High-Tech, global market place, June 1997.
(http://www.antitrust.org/law/comp.Policy).
Galbraith, John Kennet: American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.
Gal-Or, Esther: The Informational Advantages or Disadvantages of Horizontal Mergers,
International Economic Review; 29(4), November 1988, pages 639-61.
Geithman, Frederick E.; Marvel, Howard P.; Weiss, Leonard W.: Concentration, Price
and Critical Concentration Ratios, Review of Economics and Statistics; 63(3), Aug.
1981, pages 346-53.
Gilbert, Richard J.; Newberry, David M. G.: Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of
Monopoly: Comment, American Economic Review; 74(1), March 1984,  ages
238-42.
Gilbert, Richard J.; Newberry, David M. G.: Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of
Monopoly: Reply, American Economic Review; 74(1), March 1984, pages 251-53.
Gokhale, Jagadeesh; Groshen, Erica L.; Neumark, David: Do Hostile Takeovers Reduce
Extramarginal Wage Payments?, Review of Economics and Statistics; 77 (3) August
1995, pages 470-85.
Goldberg, Lawrence: The Effect of Conglomorate Merges on Competition, Journal of
Law and Economics, 16, 1973, pages 137-158.
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou; Knetter, Michael M.: Goods Prices and Exchange Rates:
What Have We Learned?, Journal of Economic Literature; 35(3), September 1997,
pages 1243-72.
128
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou; Verboven, Frank: The Evolution of International Price
Dispersion in the European Car Market, C.E.P.R. Discussion Paper 2029, 1998.
Gowrisankaran, Gautam: A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers, Rand
Journal of Economics; 30(1), Spring 1999, pages 56-89.
Grossman, S. J.; Hart, O. D.: Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, Journal of Finance,
35(2), May 1980, pages 323-34.
Grossman, Sanford; Hart, Oliver: Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem, and the
Theory of the Corporation, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 1980, pages 42-64.
Grossman, Sanford J.; Hart, Oliver D.: Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial
Incentives, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, J. McCall (ed.), 1982,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.: The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a
Heterogeneous Cartel, International Economic Review; 32(4), November 1991,
pages 767-92.
Hart, Oliver D.: The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, Bell Journal of
Economics; 14(2), Autumn 1983, pages 366-82.
Hay, George A.; Werden, Gregory J.: Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy, and Economics,
American Economic Review; 83(2), May 1993, pages 173-77.
Healy, Paul M.; Palepu, Krishna G.; Ruback, Richard S.: Does Corporate Performance
Improve after Mergers? Journal of Financial Economics; 31(2), April 1992, pages
135-75.
Hekmat, Ali: The Effects of Different Types of Mergers on Union and Non-union Wages
in the United States, Journal of Economics (MVEA); 21(1) Spring 1995, pages 65-69.
Hermalin, Benjamin E.: The Effects of Competition on Executive Behavior, Rand
Journal of Economics; 23(3), Autumn 1992, pages 350-65.
Holmstrom, Bengt: Moral Hazard in Teams, Bell Journal of Economics; 13(2), Autumn
1982, pages 324-40.
Holmstrom, Bengt R.: Tirole, Jean: The Theory of the Firm, in: Schmalensee, Richard;
Willig, Robert D., eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization. Volume 1. Handbooks
in Economics, no. 10, Amsterdam; Oxford and Tokyo: North-Holland; 1989, pages
61-133.
Horn, Henrik; Lang, Harald; Lundgren, Stefan: Competition, Long Run Contracts and
Internal Inefficiencies in Firms, European Economic Review; 38(2), February 1994,
pages 213-33.
Horn, Henrik; Lang, Harald; Lundgren, Stefan: Managerial Effort Incentives, X-
Inefficiency and International Trade, European Economic Review; 39(1), January
1995, pages 117-38.
Horn, Henrik; Persson, Lars: Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets, CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 1544, 1997.
Horn, Henrik; Persson, Lars: Endogenous Mergers in an International Oligopoly, mimeo.
IIES, Stockholm University, March 1996.
129
Horspool; Korah, Valentine: Competition, Antitrust Bulletin; 37, 1992, pages 337-385.
Hovenkamp, Herbert: Federal Antitrust Policy, St. Paul, Minn.West Pub. Co 1994.
Houston, Joel F.; Ryngaert, Michael D.: The Overall Gains from Large Bank Mergers,
Journal of Banking and Finance; 18(6), December 1994, pages 1155-76.
Ingberg, John, Douglas Wholey, Feldman, Roger; Christianson, John B.: The Effect of
Mergers on Firms’ Costs – Evidence from the HMO Industry, working paper, 1998.
Ikeda, Katsuhiko; Doi, Noriyuki: The Performance of Merging Firms in Japanese
Manufacturing Industry, Journal of Industrial Economics, 31, 1983, pages 257-266.
Jacquemin, Alexis; van-Bergeijk, A. G., et-al., eds.: Economic science and practice: The
roles of academic economists and policy-makers, in: Cheltenham, U.K. and Lyme, N.
H.: Elgar; American International Distribution Corporation Williston, Vt., 1997,
pages 107-133.
Jarrell, Gregg A.; Brickley, James A. M.; Netter, Jeffry: The Market for Corporate
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, Journal of Economic Perspectives;
2(1), Winter 1988, pages 49-68.
Jenny, Frederic; Weber, André-Paul: France, 1962-1972, in: D.C. Mueller, ed., The
Detrminants and Effects of Mergers: an International Comparison, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gun&Hanin, 1980, pages 133-162.
Jenny, Frederic: Antitrust in a Global Economy, in: B. Hawk (ed.) Fordham Corporate
Law Institute, 1997.
Jensen, Michael C.; Ruback, Richard S.: The Market for Corporate Control: The
Scientific Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics;11(1-4), April 1983, pages
5-50.
Kamien, Morton I.; Zang, Israel: The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition,
Quarterly Journal of Economics; 105(2), May 1990, pages 465-99.
Kamien, Morton I.; Zang, Israel: Competitively Cost Advantageous Mergers and
Monopolization, Games and Economic Behavior; 3(3), August1991, pages 323-38.
Kamien, Morton I.; Zang, Israel: Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition, Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization; 9(2), October 1993, pages 205-29.
Kim, E. Han; Singal, Vijay: Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline
Industry, American Economic Review; 83(3), June 1993, pages 549-69.
Kinne, Konstanze: The “Efficiency Defence” in the U.S. American Merger Policy,
HWWA – Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung – Hamburg, Diskussionspapier 67, 1998.
Kitching, John: Why do mergers miscarry?, Harvard Business Review, 45, 1967, pages
87-90.
Kole, Stacy R.; Lehn, Kenneth: Workforce Integration and the Dissipation of Value in
Mergers: The Case of USAir’s Acquisition of Piedmont Aviation, Financial Research
and Policy Working Paper Series FR97-07, University of Rochester, 1997.
Korah, Valentine: An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, Fifth
Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994.
130
Kumps, Anne-Marie; Wtterwulghe, Robert: Belgium, 1962-1974, in: D.C. Mueller, ed.,
The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: an International Comparison, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gun&Hanin, 1980, pages 67-98.
Kwoka, J.; Warren-Boulton, F.: Efficiencies, Failing Firms, and Alternatives to merger:
A Policy Synthesis, Antitrust Bulletin, 1986, pages 431-450.
Lamm, R. McFall: Prices and Concentration in the Food Retailing Industry, Journal of
Industrial Economics; 30(1), Sept. 1981, pages 67-78.
Leibenstein, Harvey: Allocative Efficiency vs. “X-Efficiency”, American Economic
Review; 56, 1966, pages 392-415.
Lever, Jeremy: The Development of British Competition Law: A Complete Overhaul and
Harmonization, WZB, Discussion Paper FS IV 99-4, 1999.
Lichtenberg, Frank R.: Industrial De-Diversification and Its Consequences for
Productivity; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 18, 1992, pages
427-438.
Manne, Henry G.: Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political
Economy, 1965, pages 110-120.
Marris, R.: The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, Illinois: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1964.
Marvel, Howard P.: Competition and Price Levels in the Retail Gasoline Market, Review
of Economics and Statistics; 6(2), May 1978, pages 252-58.
Martin, Stephen: Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a Cournot Principal-Agent Model,
Journal of Economic Theory; 59(2), April 1993, pages 445-50.
McAfee, R. Preston; Williams, Michael A.: Can Event studies Detect Anticompetitive
Mergers?, Economics Letters; 28(2), 1988, pages 199-203.
McAfee, R Preston; Williams, Michael A.: Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy,
Journal of Industrial Economics; 40(2), June 1992, pages 181-87.
McCorriston, S., Morgan, C.W.; Rayner, A.J.: Processing Technology, Market Power,
and Price Transmission, Journal of Agricultural Economics 49, 1998, pages 185-201.
McFetridge, Donald G.: Merger Enforcement under the Competition Act after 10 Years,
Review of Industrial Organization, 13, 1998, pages 25-56.
Meeks, Geoffrey: Disappointing Marriage: A Study of the Gains from Merger,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.
Morgan, Eleanor J.: The Treatment of Oligopoly under the European Merger Control
Regulation, Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 1996, pages 203- 246.
Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.): The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: An International
Comparison. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers
Inc., 1980a.
Mueller, Dennis C.: The United States, 1962-1972, in: D.C. Mueller, ed., The
Detrminants and Effects of Mergers: an International Comparison, Mass.:
Oelgeschlager, Gun&Hanin, 1980, pages 299-314.
131
Mueller, Dennis C.: Mergers and Market Share, Review of Economics and Statistics;
67(2), May 1985, pages 259-67.
Mueller, Dennis C.: Merger Policy and the 1992 Merger Guidelines, Review of Industrial
Organization; 8(2) 1993, pages 151-62.
Mueller, Dennis C.: Merger Policy in the United States, Review of Industrial
Organization; 12 1997, pages 655-685.
Nalebuff, Barry J.; Stiglitz, Joseph E.: Information, Competition, and Markets, American
Economic Review; 73(2), May 1983, pages 278-83.
Neumark, David; Sharpe, Steven A.: Rents and Quasi Rents in the Wage Structure:
Evidence from Hostile Takeovers, Industrial Relations; 35(2) April 1996, pages
145-79.
Neven, Damien; Nuttall, Robin; Seabright, Paul: Merger in Daylight, The Economics and
Politics of European Merger Control, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London,
1993.
Neven, Damien; Papandropoulos, Pénélope; Seabright, Paul: Trawling for Minnows.
European Competition Policy and Agreements Between Firms, Centre for Economic
Policy Research, London, 1998.
O.E.C.D./GD(96)65: Efficiency Claims in Mergers and Other Horizontal Agreements,
1996.
O.E.C.D./GD(96)23: Failing Firm Defence, Competition Policy Roundtables No. 2,
1996b.
Panzar, John C.: Technological Determinants of Firm and Industry Structure, in:
Schmalensee, Richard; Willig, Robert D., eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization.
Volume 1. Handbooks in Economics, no. 10, Amsterdam; Oxford and Tokyo: North-
Holland, 1989, pages 3-59.
Peer, Henk: The Netherlands, 1962-1973, in: D.C. Mueller, ed., The Determinants and
Effects of Mergers: an International Comparison, Mass.: Oelgeschlager,
Gun&Hanin, 1980, pages 163-192.
Peoples, James; Hekmat, Ali; Moini, A. H.: Corporate Mergers and Union Wage
Premiums SOURCE: Journal of Economics and Finance; 17(2) Summer 1993, pages
65-75.
Perry, Martin K.: Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects, in: Schmalensee,
Richard; Willig, Robert D., eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 1,
Handbooks in Economics, no.10, Amsterdam; Oxford and Tokyo: North-Holland;
1989, pages 185-255.
Persson, Lars: The Auctioning of a Failing Firm, mimeo., Institute for international
Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 1997a.
Persson, Lars: Predation and Mergers: Is Merger Law Counter Productive?, mimeo,
Institute for international Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 1997b.
Pitovsky, Robert: Efficiencies in Defence of Mergers: 18 Months After. Remarks given
at George Mason Law Review Antritrust Symposium: The Changing Face of
Efficiency, October 16, 1998. (http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitovsky/pitofeff.htm)
132
Rau, P. Raghavendra; Vermaelen, Theo: Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition
Performance of Acquiring Firms, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 1998, pages
223-53.
Ravenscraft, David J.; Scherer, Frederic M.: Mergers, sell-offs, and economic efficiency,
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987.
Reinganum, Jennifer F.: Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly,
American Economic Review; 73(4), September 1983, pages 741-48.
Reitzes, James D.; Levy, David T.: Price Discrimination and Mergers, Canadian Journal
of Economics; 28(2), May 1995, pages 427-36.
Rowley, J. William; Baker, Donald I.: International Mergers – The Antitrust Process,
Second Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996.
Roll, Richard: The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, Journal of Business;
59(2), Part 1, April 1986, pages 197-216.
Rosen, Sherwin: Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure
Competition, Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1974, pages 34-55
Rydén, Bengt; Edberg, Jan-Olof: Large Mergers in Sweden, 1962-1976, in: D.C.
Mueller, ed., The Determinants and Effects of Mergers: an International
Comparison, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gun&Hanin, 1980, pages 193-226.
Salant, Stephen W.; Switzer, Sheldon; Reynolds, Robert J.: Losses from Horizontal
Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash
Equilibrium, Quarterly Journal of Economics; 98(2), May 1983, pages 185-99.
Saloner, Garth: Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information, Rand Journal of
Economics; 18(2), Summer 1987, pages 165-86.
Salop, Steven C.: Symposium on Mergers and Antitrust, Journal of Economic
Perspectives; 1(2), Fall 1987, pages 3-12.
Scharfstein, David: Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack, Rand Journal of
Economics; 19(1), Spring 1988, pages 147-55.
Scharfstein, David: The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, Review of Economic Studies;
55(2), April 1988, pages 185-99.
Scherer, F.M.: Comment, Brookings Papers: Microeconomics, 1991.
Scherer, F. M.; Backstein, Alan; Kaufer, Erich; Murphy, R. D.: The Economics of Multi-
Plant Operation: An International Comparison Study. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1975.
Scherer, Frederic M.: Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd edn.
Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company.
Scherer, F. M.; Ross, David: Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,
Third Edition, Houghton Nifflin Company, Boston, 1990.
Schmalensee, Richard: Inter-industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in:
Schmalensee, Richard; Willig, Robert D., eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization.
Volume 2. Handbooks in Economics, no.10, Amsterdam; Oxford and Tokyo: North-
Holland; 1989, pages 951-1009.
133
Schmalensee, Richard: Competitive Advantage and Collusive Optima, International
Journal of Industrial Organization; 5(4), December 1987, pages 351-67.
Schmidt, Klaus: Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition, Review of
Economic Studies; 64(2), April 1997, pages 191-213.
Schumann, Laurence: Patterns of Abnormal Returns and the Competitive Effects of
Horizontal Mergers, Review of Industrial Organization; 8(6), December 1993, pages
679-96.
Schumpeter, Joseph A.: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper, New York,
1942.
Schwert, G. William: Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions, Journal of Financial
Economics; 41(2), June 1996, pages 153-92.
Shleifer, Andrei; Vishny, Robert W.: Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process,
Journal of Economic Perspectives; 2(1), Winter 1988, pages 7-20.
Shughart II, W.; Tollison, R.: The Welfare Basis of the ''Failing Company'' Doctrine,
Antitrust Bulletin 30, 1985, pages 357-364.
Singal, Vijay: Airline Mergers and Competition: An Integration of Stock and Product
Price Effects, Journal of Business, 69(2), April 1996, pages 233-68.
Sleuwaegen, Leo: The relevant Trust Market, in: European Economy no. 57,
Competition and Integration, 1994, pages 109-130.
Snyder, Christopher: A Dynamic Theory of Countervailing Power, Rand Journal of
Economics 27, 1996, pages 747-769.
Stigler, George: A Theory of Oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 1964, pages
44-61.
Stigler, George J.: Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings 40, 1950, pages 23-34.
Stillman, Robert: Examining Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers, Journal of
Financial Economics;11(1-4), April 1983.
Stennek, Johan: Competition Increases X-efficiency - A Limited Liability Mechanism,
European Economic Review, forthcomming.
Stennek, Johan: Horizontal Mergers Without Synergies May Increase Consumer
Welfare, unpub. ms. Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm
University, October 1996.
Stulz, Rene M.; Walkling, Ralph A.; Song, Moon H.: The Distribution of Target
Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers, Journal of Finance;
45(3), July 1990, pages 817-33.
Tirole, Jean: The Theory of Industrial Organisation, MIT Press, Cambridge
Massachussets, 1989.
US Department of Justice; Federal Trade Commission: Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
Washington: US Department of Justice, April 1997.
von Ungern-Sternberg, T.: Countervailing Power Revisited, International Journal of
Industrial Organization 14, 1995, pages 507-520.
134
Verboven, Frank: Corporate Restructuring in a Collusive Oligopoly, International
Journal of Industrial Organization; 13(3), September 1995, pages 335-54.
Verboven, Frank: International Price Discrimination in the European Car Market, Rand
Journal of Economics; 27(2), Summer 1996, pages 240-68.
Verboven, Frank: The Markets for Gasoline and Diesel Cars in Europe, C.E.P.R.
Discussion Paper 2069, 1998.
Weiss, Avi: Using the Efficiencies Defense in Horizontal Mergers, The Antitrust
Bulletin, 1992, pages 123-132.
Werden, Gregory J.; Froeb, Luke M.: The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products
Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy, Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization; 10(2), October 1994, pages 407-26.
Werden, Gregory J.; Froeb, Luke M.: Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger
Policy in Differentiated Products Industries, in: Coate, Malcolm B.; Kleit, Andrew N.,
eds. The economics of the antitrust process. Topics in Regulatory Economics and
Policy Series. Boston; Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic, 1996, pages 65-88.
Werden, Gregory J.; Froeb, Luke M.: The Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal
Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis, Journal of Industrial Economics; 46(4),
December 1998, pages 525-43.
Werden, Gregory J.; Joskow, Andrew S.; Johnson, Richard L.: The Effects of Mergers
on Price and Output: Two Case Studies from the Airline Industry, Managerial and
Decision Economics; 12(5), October 1991, pages 341-52.
Williamson, Oliver: Economies as an Antitrust Defence: Reply, American Economic
Review, pages 954-959.
Williamson, Oliver E.: Economics as an Antitrust Defence: The Welfare Trade-offs,
American Economic Review; 58, 1968, pages 18-36.
Whish, Richard: Competition Law, Third Edition, Butterworths, London, 1993.

Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung
Books of the Research Area Market Processes and Corporate Development
(nur im Buchhandel erhältlich/available through bookstores)
Tobias Miarka
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation: A
Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships
2000, Physica-Verlag
Jianping Yang
Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen:
Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse
2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag
Horst Albach, Ulrike Görtzen, Rita Zobel (Hg.)
Information Processing as a Competitive
Advantage of Japanese Firms
1999, edition sigma
Dieter Köster
Wettbewerb in Netzproduktmärkten
1999, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag
Christian Wey
Marktorganisation durch Standardisierung:
Ein Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik
des Marktes
1999, edition sigma
Horst Albach, Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin
Antal, Kristina Vaillant (Hg.)
Organisationslernen – institutionelle und
kulturelle Dimensionen
WZB-Jahrbuch 1998
1998, edition sigma
Lars Bergman, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars
Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller,
Leonard Waverman
Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting
Priorities - Telecommunications
Monitoring European Deregulation 1
1998, Centre for Economic Policy Research
Manfred Fleischer
The Inefficiency Trap
Strategy Failure in the
German Machine Tool Industry
1997, edition sigma
Christian Göseke
Information Gathering and Dissemination
The Contribution of JETRO to
Japanese Competitiveness
1997, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag
Andreas Schmidt
Flugzeughersteller zwischen globalem
Wettbewerb und internationaler Kooperation
Der Einfluß von Organisationsstrukturen auf
die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit von
Hochtechnologie-Unternehmen
1997, edition sigma
Horst Albach, Jim Y. Jin, Christoph Schenk (eds.)
Collusion through Information Sharing?
New Trends in Competition Policy
1996, edition sigma
Stefan O. Georg
Die Leistungsfähigkeit japanischer Banken
Eine Strukturanalyse des Bankensystems in
Japan
1996, edition sigma
Stephanie Rosenkranz
Cooperation for Product Innovation
1996, edition sigma
Horst Albach, Stephanie Rosenkranz (eds.)
Intellectual Property Rights and Global
Competition - Towards a New Synthesis
1995, edition sigma.
David B. Audretsch
Innovation and Industry Evolution
1995, The MIT Press.
Julie Ann Elston
US Tax Reform and Investment: Reality and
Rhetoric in the 1980s
1995, Avebury
Horst Albach
The Transformation of Firms and Markets:
A Network Approach to Economic
Transformation Processes in East Germany
Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia
Oeconomiae Negotiorum, Vol. 34
1994, Almqvist & Wiksell International
(Stockholm).
Horst Albach
"Culture and Technical Innovation: A Cross-
Cultural Analysis and Policy
Recommendations"
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Hg.)
Forschungsbericht 9, S. 1-597
1994, Walter de Gruyter.
DISCUSSION PAPERS 1999
Suchan Chae Bargaining Power of a Coalition in Parallel Bargaining: FS IV 99 - 1
Paul Heidhues Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators
Christian Wey Compatibility Investments in Duopoly with Demand FS IV 99 - 2
Side Spillovers under Different Degrees of Cooperation
Horst Albach Des paysages florissants? Une contribution FS IV 99 - 3
à la recherche sur la transformation
Jeremy Lever The Development of British Competition Law: FS IV 99 - 4
A Complete Overhaul and Harmonization
Damien J. Neven Union Power and Product Market Competition: FS IV 99 - 5
Lars-Hendrik Röller Evidence from the Airline Industry
Zhentang Zhang
Justus Haucap The Incentives of Employers’ Associations to FS IV 99 - 6
Uwe Pauly Raise Rivals’ Costs in the Presence of
Christian Wey Collective Bargaining
Jianbo Zhang Asymptotic Efficiency in Stackelberg Markets FS IV 99 - 7
Zhentang Zhang with Incomplete Information
Justus Haucap Standortwahl als Franchisingproblem FS IV 99 - 8
Christian Wey
Yasar Barut A Comparison of Multiple-Unit All-Pay and FS IV 99 - 9
Dan Kovenock Winner-Pay Auctions Under Incomplete
Charles Noussair Information
Jim Y. Jin Collusion with Private and Aggregate Information FS IV 99 - 10
Jos Jansen Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing FS IV 99 - 11
in an R&D Race with Learning Labs
Johan Lagerlöf Incomplete Information in the Samaritan's Dilemma: FS IV 99 - 12
The Dilemma (Almost) Vanishes
Catherine Matraves Market Integration and Market Structure in the FS IV 99 - 13
European Soft Drinks Industry: Always Coca-Cola?
Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg The Evolution of Price Discrimination in the FS IV 99 - 14
Frank Verboven European Car Market
Olivier Cadot A Political Economy Model of Infrastructure FS IV 99 - 15
Lars-Hendrik Röller Allocation: An Empirical Assessment
Andreas Stephan
Holger Derlien Industriestandort mit Vorbildfunktion? FS IV 99 - 16
Tobias Faupel Das ostdeutsche Chemiedreieck
Christian Nieters
Christine Zulehner Testing Dynamic Oligopolistic Interaction: FS IV 99 - 17
Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry
Johan Lagerlöf Costly Information Acquisition and FS IV 99 - 18
Delegation to a “Liberal” Central Banker
Ralph Siebert New Product Introduction by Incumbent Firms FS IV 99 - 19
Ralph Siebert Credible Vertical Preemption FS IV 99 - 20
Ralph Siebert Multiproduct Competition, Learning by Doing FS IV 99 - 21
and Price-Cost Margins over the Product Life Cycle: 
Evidence from the DRAM Industry
Michael Tröge Asymmetric Information Acquisition in Credit Auction FS IV 99 - 22
Michael Tröge The Structure of the Banking Sector, Credit FS IV 99 - 23
Screening and Firm Risk
Michael Tröge Monitored Finance, Usury and Credit Rationing FS IV 99 - 24
Silke Neubauer Multimarket Contact, Collusion and the FS IV 99 - 25
International Structure of Firms
Horst Albach Dokumentation der „Bonner Stichprobe“ – Zur FS IV 99 - 26
Thomas Brandt Datenbank der Jahresabschlüsse deutscher
Holger Jakob Aktiengesellschaften, 1960-1997
M. A. Paradowska-Thimm
Jianping Yang
Tomaso Duso Endogenous Switching Costs and the Incentive FS IV 99 - 29
for High Quality Entry
Jos Jansen Regulating Complementary Input Supply: FS IV 99 - 30
Production Cost Correlation and Limited Liability
Robert Greb Internationalisierung der FuE-Tätigkeit von FS IV 99 - 34
Unternehmen der Chemischen Industrie in Deutschland
Suchan Chae The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on FS IV 99 - 35
Paul Heidhues Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective
Tobias Miarka The Recent Economic Role of Bank-Firm- FS IV 99 - 36
Relationships in Japan
William Novshek Demand for Customized Products, Production FS IV 99 - 37
Lynda Thoman Flexibility, and Price Competition
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2000
Justus Haucap Collective Wage Setting When Wages Are FS IV 00 - 01
Uwe Pauly Generally Binding: An Antitrust Perspective
Christian Wey
Stephanie Aubert Regionale Infrastrukturpolitik und ihre Auswirkung FS IV 00 - 02
Andreas Stephan auf die Produktivität:  Ein Vergleich von
Deutschland und Frankreich
Achim Kemmerling Political Economy of Infrastructure Investment FS IV 00 - 03
Andreas Stephan Allocation: Evidence from a Panel of
Large German Cities
Andreas Blume Security Needs and the Performance FS IV 00 - 04
Asher Tishler of the Defense Industry
Tomaso Duso Who Decides to Regulate? Lobbying FS IV 00 - 05
Activity in the U.S. Cellular Industry
Paul Heidhues Hiding Information in Electoral Competition FS IV 00 - 06
Johan Lagerlöf
Andreas Moerke Grundlegende methodische Überlegungen zur FS IV 00 - 07
Ulrike Görtzen mikroökonomischen Forschung mit japanischen
Rita Zobel Unternehmensdaten
Rabah Amir Market Structure, Scale Economies, and FS IV 00 - 08
Industry Performance
Absender/From:
Versandstelle - WZB
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785  Berlin
BESTELLSCHEIN / ORDERFORM Bitte schicken Sie bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers
unbedingt eine 1-DM-Briefmarke pro paper und einen
an Sie adressierten Aufkleber mit.   Danke.
Bitte schicken Sie mir aus der Liste der
Institutsveröffentlichungen folgende Papiere zu:
For each paper you order please send a "Coupon-
Réponse International" (international money order)
plus a self-addressed adhesive label.   Thank You.
Please send me the following papers from your Publication List:
Paper Nr./No. Autor/Author + Kurztitel/Short Title
